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In the early 1990s, the Medicaid budget expanded dramatically.  In response, 
federal and state policymakers implemented changes to curb patient demand. Taken 
together, these policies may have impeded low-income health care access 
in Maryland more effectively and less equitably than anticipated. 
Research question:  Did access-affecting policy changes in the mid-1990s 
alter Maryland’s low-income health care market differently for different racial and ethnic 
groups? 
Following extensive document and literature reviews, semi-structured interviews 
were conducted with stakeholders and experts in Maryland’s low-income health care 
market.  A content analysis of interview transcripts was performed.  HCUP SID hospital 
discharge data from Maryland and New Jersey was then used to test for treatment delay.  
A quasi-temporal measure was devised using patient-level racial/ethnic differences in 
incidences of appendicitis, appendiceal perforation, and prolongation of hospital stay 
following appendicitis with and without perforation. 
Qualitative analysis indicated that implementation of policy changes initially 
widened gaps in Maryland’s health care safety net.  This continued to hamper access to 
care disproportionately for homeless persons and immigrants.  HCUP data indicated that 
Maryland’s black appendicitis patients in 1996 were more likely (by 6 percentage points, 
p<0.05) than their white counterparts to suffer appendiceal perforation.  In 2003, black 
patients no longer showed higher incidence; similar trends emerged for Hispanics and 
other groups.  However, hospitalizations for black appendicitis patients increased from 
0.58 days longer than their white counterparts (p<0.01) in 1996 to 0.65 days longer 
(p<0.01) in 2003.  Most notably, insurance status disparities revealed that, in 1996, 
Maryland’s uninsured were more likely than the privately-insured to experience 
perforation (by 2.3 percentage points). By 2003, Maryland’s uninsured were 6.7 
percentage points (p<.01) more likely than the privately-insured to suffer perforation.  
Hospitalizations for uninsured appendicitis patients were accordingly longer than for 
privately-insured patients, although length of stay data failed to achieve statistical 
significance in both years. 
This research suggests demand was decreased largely by impeding access, 
disproportionately to the disadvantage of racial/ethnic minorities, the homeless, and 
immigrants.  Data confirm that access declined for the uninsured.  As this population 
continues to grow, insufficient access to care for the uninsured will remain an urgent 
problem. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction: Disparities and Medicaid 
A. Framing Health Care as a Civil Rights Issue 
For much of this country’s post-Civil War history, governmental concern 
regarding health care for racial and ethnic minorities and for the poor stemmed from the 
risk these populations posed to the health of wealthier white populations.1 Indeed, many 
programs aimed at improving public health have an unsavory history of using black 
patients, in particular, as laboratory test cases.2 Even such seemingly philanthropic 
endeavors as the establishment of Medicaid have, some suggest, been influenced by Jim 
Crow. Signed into law in 1965 during the heat of the civil rights movement, Medicaid 
was created with an unusual funding structure that required states to put up funds before 
the federal government offered any contributions. This allows states to decide for 
themselves what priority they would attribute to the health care of their poor. 
Many states, Maryland included, chose to participate with Medicaid from the 
outset. But some states resisted adopting Great Society programs that were perceived as 
improving the quality of life for racial and ethnic minorities at the expense of whites. To 
explain why some states had not yet opted to implement Medicaid three years after the 
program’s inception, a 1968 report by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights observed: 
“Alabama Negro leaders believe that Medicaid has been resisted by white powers 
because it would aid black poor on a nondiscriminatory basis, perhaps encouraging them 
to stay where they were born instead of emigrating to a Northern ghetto.”3 The report also 
cites state experts who proclaimed that: 
Alabama could have a Medicaid program for about $35 million with the 
federal government paying 83 percent of the cost… But like many other 
states, North and South, the Alabama government feels little commitment 
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to those poor and black. It spends hundreds of millions building 
superhighways with about the same percentage of federal aid that it 
refuses to accept for Medicaid.4
In his testimony before a 1968 hearing of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 
one state health officer expressed that “there seems to be more interest in highways than 
in health.” The commission concluded: “A sense of Congressional priority might suggest 
halting funds to lay down highways past shackfuls of sick children until Alabama shows 
twentieth century concern for all her children.”5 The impact of what can be identified at 
best as libertarian policy and the subsequent legacy of distrust from the poor and 
vulnerable remains palpable today. 
B. Disparities in Health Care Access 
Rising health care costs make the days of a $35 million Medicaid program seem 
quaint. Today’s health care inflation and rising costs in both the public and private 
sectors are, in fact, unmatched in U.S. history. These monies are funding previously 
unimaginable progress in medical and pharmaceutical research, high-tech health care 
tools, and revolutionary public health campaigns. In the last decade, the U.S. has 
achieved significant reductions in infant mortality and teenage parenthood. Vaccinations 
for children are at the greatest levels ever recorded. Use of tobacco, alcohol, and illicit 
drugs is leveling off. Mortality rates for coronary heart disease and stroke have waned.6
But such improvements are not reaching all Americans equally. 
Our society aspires to equality of opportunities for all our citizens and abhors the 
notion that the degree of access to high quality health care should be dependent upon 
one’s race, ethnicity, or socioeconomic status. In this way, persistent inequities in health 
care access and quality are directly inconsistent with basic American values. Health care 
3
disparities, therefore, can be viewed as the latest and ultimately most profound 
manifestation of a long national history of discrimination in health care provision for the 
disenfranchised. 
Consider the groundbreaking 1999 Georgetown University study, in which a team 
of researchers showed doctors videotaped interviews with “patients” (portrayed by 
actors) with identical medical and social histories about identical chest pain and asked to 
recommend treatment. Schulman et al found that physicians are significantly less likely 
to refer women and blacks than white men presenting with identical chest pain for 
invasive cardiac procedures, attributing the disparate care to “subconscious perceptions 
rather than deliberate actions or thoughts” on the part of physicians.7
Also consider the 2003 Institute of Medicine’s publication, Unequal Treatment: 
Confronting Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Healthcare, 8 and the federal Department of 
Health and Human Services’ (DHHS) annual National Healthcare Disparities Report.9
Both extensively document persistent and, in some cases, growing health care disparities. 
Such differences are the latest frontier of racial equality in health care and an important 
public policy problem. 
1. What are Health Care Disparities? 
First, note the wording of the phrase “health care disparities.”  This differs from 
health disparities, which are differences in health status.  Health disparities between racial 
or ethnic groups can be attributed to genetic factors; for example, blacks have higher 
rates of sickle cell anemia than whites and Ashkenazi Jews have higher rates of Tay 
Sachs Disease than people of other ethnicities.  It is therefore useful to think of racial and 
ethnic “health disparities” as the comparison of disease incidence by racial and ethnic 
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groups in the population as a whole.  Disparities in care, however, considers a population 
of individuals who are all sick, and measures differences by racial and ethnic group in 
treatments received. 
Beyond the distinction between “health disparities” and “health care disparities,” 
there is no universal consensus on the definition of the latter term.  For example, Unequal 
Treatment defined health care disparities as differences remaining after accounting for 
patient needs and preferences and the availability of health care (notably, after an 
exhaustive literature review, the author has concluded that no published study has met 
this rigorous definition), yet the DHHS considers all differences by race or ethnicity in its 
measures as evidence of disparities.10 Other researchers associate health care disparities 
with differences exclusively stemming from physician prejudice.11 This dissertation uses 
the DHHS’s definition. 
In Unequal Treatment, the IOM finds racial and ethnic disparities in health care, 
even after accounting for characteristics typically associated with disparities such as 
health insurance coverage and income. However, the IOM also emphasizes that health 
care disparities are not only a minority health issue. A large body of literature documents 
health care disparities based upon socioeconomic status, geography, gender, age, and 
disability status.12 Low-income groups, including Medicaid beneficiaries, have 
historically lacked access to the most basic care, in part because reimbursements to 
clinicians who provide care to Medicaid patients were so low. For example, as recently as 
1997, only two private dentists were enrolled as Medicaid-funded caregivers in the entire 
state of Delaware.13 
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2. What Causes Health Care Disparities? 
Although the causes of health care disparities are not well understood, a variety of 
individual, institutional, and health system factors likely contribute to their existence. As 
noted in a recent GAO report, “information on the non-financial causes of health care 
disparities is incomplete.”14 Some believe such differences are primarily clinician-driven, 
others attribute them to patient preferences, while still others blame the financing and 
delivery of health care. Indeed, the literature on disparity causation can be grouped into 
three categories: patient factors, clinician factors, and institutional factors.15, 16 There 
remains significant debate over the relative role of these factors. 
a. Patient Factors 
Patients themselves may be responsible for causing or exacerbating health care 
disparities. This may happen for any number of reasons, such as mistrust in the health 
care system, cultural beliefs about Western medicine or the American approach to health 
and medical care, or even patient preferences to refrain from seeking care. Other factors 
may be more directly driven by patient demographics, such as socioeconomic status—
which may impact one’s ability to take the time to see a clinician for diagnosis and 
treatment, transportation availability, or one’s ability to pay for care. Other related 
considerations may include comorbidities, stage of disease at presentation to clinician,17 
family or other social network support, and insufficient “health care literacy.”  (The U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services defines “health literacy,” through its Healthy 
People 2010 project, as “The degree to which individuals have the capacity to obtain, 
process, and understand basic health information and services needed to make 
appropriate health decisions.”18)
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b. Clinician Factors 
Physician perceptions, bias, racism, racial or ethnic stereotyping, or an inadequate 
understanding of the cultural health norms of a patient can also contribute to health care 
disparities. Other clinician factors may include the ability to judge a patient’s pain or 
availability to provide care during evenings or weekends for those who cannot leave 
work to seek care during regular working hours. Clinical uncertainty about the findings in 
the medical history or symptom presentation of minority patients can also play a role.19 
c. Institutional Factors 
Institutional contributors to health care disparity proliferation may include 
features of the health care system such as health insurance availability, de facto policies 
about differential treatment of uninsured patients, health care delivery site, an insufficient 
emphasis on primary care, screening, and prevention, or low Medicaid reimbursement 
rates—which makes clinicians less likely to see low-income patients.20 Other societal 
problems may include overrepresentation of minorities among low-income populations, 
which are more likely to lack private health insurance and to be concentrated in urban 
areas. 
Another institutional factor is that racial and ethnic minorities and low-income 
populations may be more likely to face access barriers, such as inadequate insurance or 
the inability to pay for care, which inhibit entrance to the health care system. These 
individuals therefore may be more likely to delay care or to receive it in overcrowded 
facilities with little integration or coordination of services.21 The fact that non-white 
populations are growing faster than white populations, combined with indicators that 
minorities are at greater risk for access barriers means that health care disparities based 
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upon race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status are likely to grow wider.  Hence the 
urgency to examine the problem. 
i. A Closer Look at Institutional Factors 
While public policy solutions may be able to play a part in ameliorating clinician- 
and patient-based causes, they are critical in helping to combat the institutional causes of 
disparities. Institutional factors that impact health care access and disparities in services, 
much like the factors that cause poverty, can differ significantly from one part of the 
country to another or one market to another. Health care costs and infrastructure in the 
rural Southeast, for example, may look radically different from the urban Northeast, yet 
health care disparities may be pervasive in both parts of the country. Given that safety net 
health care financing differs by state, it may be more useful to examine institutional 
factors that can contribute to health care disparities on a less national and more local 
level. It is with this regionalism in mind that we will examine a critical piece of the health 
care system infrastructure and consider the main safety net health care financing system 
in the United States: Medicaid. 
C. What are Useful Measures of Access to Care? 
1. Ambulatory-Care-Sensitive Conditions 
AHRQ defines “ambulatory-care-sensitive conditions” as “conditions for which 
good outpatient care can potentially prevent the need for hospitalization or for which 
early intervention can prevent complications or more severe disease.”22 While most 
ambulatory-care-sensitive conditions are associated with avoidable hospitalization, an 
important and relative newcomer to the universe of disparities measurement research is 
the timely surgical treatment of appendicitis to avoid appendiceal perforation. 
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2. Appendiceal Perforation Rates 
As explained by the National Digestive Disease Information Clearinghouse 
(NDDIC), a service of the National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney 
Diseases (NIDDK) at the National Institutes of Health, appendicitis is an inflammation of 
the appendix. No medical therapy has proven effective to control the condition once it is 
initiated, so appendicitis is considered a medical emergency. Most patients recover 
without difficulty if they receive care in a timely manner. Delays in treatment can result 
in appendiceal perforation, which may lead to peritonitis (an infection that occurs when 
bacteria from the appendix leaks into the abdomen), and can be life threatening.23 The 
main symptom of appendicitis is abdominal pain, which usually grows more severe over 
the course of six to twelve hours and eventually becomes excruciating.24 Blood and urine 
tests, as well as X-rays or other imaging tests are used to diagnose appendicitis in most 
cases, and the standard treatment is surgical removal.25 
Anyone can develop appendicitis, but it most often strikes people between the 
ages of ten and thirty. Appendicitis is one of the most common reasons for emergency 
abdominal surgery in children.26 That said, older appendicitis patients tend to experience 
more complications than children. The elderly in particular often have lower fever and 
less significant than their young counterparts. Many older adults are unaware of the 
severity of the situation until the appendix is nearly perforated.27 
The literature indicates that appendiceal perforation is more prevalent among 
racial and ethnic minorities as well as low-income populations, and even suggests its use 
as a possible new measure of access to care for the U.S. National Healthcare Disparities 
Report.28 Bratton et al.29 and O’Toole et al. found that children covered by Medicaid and 
uninsured children had significantly higher rates of appendiceal perforation. In O’Toole’s 
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study, compared with privately insured children, those covered by Medicaid presented 
later (47.3 +/- 4.1 hours vs. 23.1 +/- 2.5 hours; P<.01), had a higher risk of appendiceal 
perforation (44 percent vs. 23 percent; P<.05), and required a longer hospital stay (7.9 
+/- 0.9 days vs. 4.6 +/- 0.44 days; P<.01).30 Similar findings were made in the adult 
population.31 
Moreover, later research indicates a relationship between race and appendiceal 
perforation among children. Smink et al. found that appendiceal perforation 
disproportionately affected children of minority race (29.7 percent of whites compared 
with 38.6 percent of blacks, 34.6 percent of Asians, 39.5 percent of Hispanics, and 35.4 
percent of patients of other races). They also found that appendiceal perforation was more 
common among patients covered by Medicaid (39.9 percent) and uninsured patients (34.6 
percent) compared with privately insured patients (29.7 percent).32 Another study found 
that minority children had between 24 percent and 38 percent higher odds of appendicitis 
rupture than white children, adjusting for age and gender, and remaining significant after 
adjusting for other factors.33 Kokoska et al., too, concluded that black children have 
higher rates of perforation, a greater delay to surgical management, and lower 
laparoscopic rates, while Hispanic children more frequently experienced complex 
appendicitis—and both Hispanics and blacks had longer hospital stays and higher 
charges.34 
These issues will be explored in the quantitative analysis described in Chapter 8. 
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D. Medicaid: The Federal Role in State Low Income Health Care 
Markets (LIHCMs) 
1. What is a Low-Income Health Care Market? 
A market can be defined as “a social arrangement that allows buyers and sellers to 
discover information and carry out a voluntary exchange of goods or services… The 
function of a market requires… that both parties expect to become better off as a result of 
the transaction.”35 It is “the world of commercial activity where goods and services are 
bought and sold.”36 Markets are comprised then of buyers (who exhibit demand) and 
sellers (who exhibit supply). In the health care market considered in this dissertation, we 
can think of patients as “buyers,” or consumers, of health care, making the “sellers” 
components of the health care delivery system. As demand for low-cost health care 
increases (in response to growth of uninsured patients, a worsening economy, health care 
inflation, and other contributors), supply will decline and prices will rise. 
Indeed, this is how the system works. As the number of poor people seeking care 
increased in the early 1990s, the Medicaid budget was stretched. State and federal 
policymakers sought to implement changes to curb demand. These changes affected 
access to care for buyers in the Maryland low-income health care market. What the 
literature does not indicate is whether the changes impacted buyers of different racial and 
ethnic groups equally. 
2. What is Medicaid? 
Medicaid, an entitlement program established under the 1965 Social Security Act 
(SSA), is the largest public source of payment for health care services to the poor. As an 
“entitlement program,” it is not subject to a budget cap; anyone eligible may enroll in the 
program, regardless of cost to the government. Prior to its passage, low-income 
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populations were frequently outside of mainstream medical care and dependent upon the 
charity of physicians, hospitals, or clinics. The poor, as a result, were often discriminated 
against in their attempts to access services.37 
3. Medicaid Funding: Federal Contributions Vary by State 
Unlike Medicare, a federal entitlement program that was also established by the 
1965 SSA, Medicaid is jointly funded by federal and state governments. The structure set 
forth by the SSA enabled states to participate in Medicaid by pledging their own money, 
which the federal government then matched with additional funding. By creating 
different funding structures for Medicare and Medicaid, Congress effectively mandated 
that while the entire population of the nation’s elderly would be eligible for government-
sponsored health insurance, only the poor who reside in states that chose to use a portion 
of its own funds were to be given access to public health coverage. Not all elected to 
participate at first; the last state to do so, Arizona, did not offer Medicaid coverage until 
October 1982.38 
The federal government annually calculates its matching rate, the federal medical 
assistance percentage (FMAP), by comparing the state’s average per capita income level 
with the national income average. States that exceed the national average are reimbursed 
for a smaller share of their costs than are poorer states. Law prohibits the FMAP to fall 
below 50 percent or to exceed 83 percent. In fiscal year 2004, FMAPs varied from 50 
percent (in 12 states) to 76 percent (in Mississippi).39 
4. Medicaid Eligibility Varies by State 
As of December 2005, Medicaid enrollment stood at just about 45 million 
people,40 funding one-third of all births and one-half of all nursing home costs 
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(contributing to the cost of care for two-thirds of all nursing home residents).41 It is the 
largest federal grant program, representing over 41 percent of total federal-to-state 
grants.42 
Federal law identifies 27 different Medicaid eligibility categories, which can be 
grouped into five broad coverage categories: children, pregnant women, adults in families 
with dependent children, individuals with disabilities, and the elderly in long-term care. 
(The elderly are also covered by Medicare, and the low-income elderly can be “dually 
eligible” for both programs.)  To be eligible for Medicaid, applicants must also earn 
below a certain income (which varies by state) and, for the most part, cannot not be an 
immigrant who arrived in the U.S. after August 1997, as discussed in later chapters. The 
federal government requires that certain groups must be covered, while others may be 
covered at state discretion. 
5. Medicaid-Funded Services Vary by State 
The federal government requires that all participating states cover specific 
services under Medicaid, such as physician and hospital services, nursing home and home 
health services for persons who qualify for nursing home care, pregnancy-related 
services, “early and periodic screening, diagnosis, and treatment” (EPSDT) for those 
under age 21, care provided by federally qualified health centers and rural health clinics, 
and emergency services for non-citizens.43 However, non-mandated services vary greatly 
by state. For example: 
• 44 cover podiatrist services; 
• 44 cover dental care; 
• 34 cover psychologist services; 
• 43 cover eyeglasses; 
• 33 cover screening services; 
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• 16 cover respiratory care for the ventilator-dependent; and 
• 12 cover religious, non-medical health care institutions.44 
States have flexibility in determining eligibility levels and whether and how to 
expand Medicaid coverage. For example, Medicaid covers 35 percent of the non-elderly 
low-income population in Massachusetts, but only 15 percent of its counterpart 
population in Colorado.45 Additionally, annual Medicaid per capita spending varies 
nearly threefold from the most generous to the least generous states. (To wit: Colorado 
and Wisconsin spend the least on a per-person annual basis, $197 and $219, respectively. 
Massachusetts and New York spend the most, $435 and $692, respectively.)46 
Medicaid costs also vary by beneficiary type. In 2001, for example, payments for 
the 23.3 million Medicaid-enrolled children (i.e., 50 percent of all beneficiaries) averaged 
approximately $1,305 per capita, while payments for the 11.6 million adults (i.e., 25 
percent of all beneficiaries) averaged $425 less at $1,725 per person. The average jumps, 
however, for the 7.7 million disabled (16 percent of beneficiaries) to $10,455 per person, 
and for the 4.4 million elderly (9 percent of all beneficiaries) to $10,965 per person.47 
6. Health Care Costs 
Health care costs are on a sharp and steady incline in both the private and public 
sectors. The United States has seen a 47 percent increase in health care expenditures from 
1990 to 2000. In 2003 alone, the nation spent 15.3 percent of its gross domestic product 
(GDP) on health care. Experts anticipate that the U.S. will spend 18.7 percent of the GDP 
on health care annually within 10 years, which amounts to a projected 75 percent increase 
from 1990 to 2010.48 
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a. Rising Costs of Medicaid 
Researchers estimate that Medicaid accounted for 17 percent of all U.S. health 
expenditures in the early 2000s,49 up from 6 percent in 1988.50 Rising Medicaid costs are 
due to several factors. The federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services [CMS, 
formerly the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA)] cites the following: an the 
increasing population of Medicaid-eligible individuals as a result of federal mandates, 
population growth, economic recessions, expanded coverage and use of services, 
inappropriate use of disproportionate share hospital (DSH) payments (which may result 
in greater federal payments to states), an increase in the number of elderly and disabled 
individuals who require extensive acute and/or long-term health care and related services, 
technological advances that keep critically ill individuals alive and in need of costly care, 
the growth of new and expensive drugs, and clinician reimbursement rates, which have 
grown faster than inflation.51 The changing Medicaid case mix is another possible cause; 
when Medicaid rolls decreased after welfare reform, those who remained in the program, 
on average, were higher-cost beneficiaries.52 
The Congressional Budget Office identifies health care cost inflation as another 
culprit. It asserts that health care costs in both the private and public sectors are 
increasing due to advances in and greater use of technology, reductions in managed care 
savings, and rising prescription costs. Indeed, about two-thirds (65 percent) of the growth 
in Medicaid cost reflects general increases in health care costs for those currently 
enrolled.53 Aetna, a prominent health insurance company, also attributes cost increases to 
the rise of “blockbuster drugs” and aggressive direct-to-consumer ads.54 
Another important component to rising Medicaid costs: demographic changes. 
Today, there are more aged and disabled Americans than ever before, and they account 
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for roughly 60 percent of current Medicaid expenditures. The Congressional Budget 
Office actually projects virtually no increase in Medicaid costs due to cost of children and 
non-elderly, and thus attributes nearly all projected cost increases to the elderly and 
disabled.55 The combination of weak state revenue growth, increasing health costs, and 
growing eligible populations has prompted some to refer to the current Medicaid 
financial crunch as “the perfect storm.”56 
b. Cost Containment Mechanisms 
Officials at both the state and federal levels of government are eager to contain 
health care costs. The cost containment mechanisms that have received the greatest 
attention include block grants, waivers, and managed care. 
i. Block Grants 
Medicaid is currently an entitlement program, which means that the government 
is obliged to finance it for a prescribed population with no preset budget limit. Anyone 
eligible for the program must be accepted, regardless of cost to the government. Social 
security is another example of an entitlement program. Block grants, on the other hand, 
transfer a set amount of funds from the federal to the state governments. The guaranteed, 
fixed-dollar block grant, which would grow to keep up with inflation, eliminates any 
guesswork about how much funding a state will receive. Block grants also give states 
increased autonomy to determine funding, benefits, and eligibility. However, if state 
predictions of increased case loads come to pass, block-granted Medicaid would result in 
capped funding to cover services for more people.  This could lead to potentially sharp 
reductions in the breadth of services available to each enrollee. 
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There have been three noteworthy attempts to turn Medicaid from an entitlement 
to a block grant. The first came from President Reagan in 1981; the second from Newt 
Gingrich and other drafters of the Contract with America in 1995; the third from 
President Bush in 2003.57 All three efforts failed.  Notably, since that time, there have 
been no serious congressional initiatives aimed at establishing a Medicaid block grant. 
ii. Waivers and Capitated Managed Care Systems 
Waiver authority under sections 1915(b) and 1115 of the SSA plays a critical role 
in state flexibility to contain Medicaid costs. Section 1915(b) waivers, or “Freedom of 
Choice” waivers, enable states to develop innovative health care delivery or 
reimbursement systems for the same federal contribution. Section 1115 waivers permit 
statewide health care reform experimental demonstrations that expand coverage to 
uninsured populations and test changes to delivery systems while maintaining cost 
neutrality.58 Nineteen states have expanded their Medicaid eligibility via use of managed 
care under 1115 waivers.59 
Table 1.1 














1996 13,330,119 40.1 19,911,028 59.9 33,241,147
1997 15,345,502 47.8 16,746,878 52.2 32,092,380
1998 16,573,996 53.6 14,322,639 46.4 30,896,635
1999 17,756,603 55.6 14,183,585 44.4 31,940,188
2000 18,786,137 55.8 14,904,227 44.2 33,690,364
2001 20,773,813 56.8 15,788,754 43.2 36,562,567
2002 23,117,668 57.6 17,029,871 42.4 40,147,539
2003 25,262,873 59.1 17,477,846 40.9 42,740,719
Source: CMS, 2004. See http://www.cms.hhs.gov/medicaid/managedcare/trends04.pdf. 
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As Table 1.1 indicates, Medicaid managed care expanded enormously during the 
1990s.60 Between 1991 and 2004, the number of beneficiaries enrolled in some kind of 
managed care grew from 2.7 million to 27 million, an increase of 900 percent.61 Of the 
total Medicaid enrollment in the United States in 2004, approximately 60 percent 
received Medicaid benefits through managed care.62 All states except Alaska, New 
Hampshire, and Wyoming have all, or a portion of their Medicaid population enrolled in 
an MCO.63 
iii. Other cost containment strategies: 
In addition to continued MMC experimentation, states are cutting costs by: 
• Restricting eligibility (18 states); 
• Reducing benefits (15); 
• Increasing copayments (15); 
• Freezing or reducing payments to doctors (29); and 
• Changing pharmaceutical coverage (40).64 
E. What, if any, Relationship Exists Between Disparities and Policy 
Changes to LICHMs? 
The research question considered in this dissertation is as follows: Did access-
affecting policy changes in the mid-1990s alter Maryland’s low-income health care 
market differently for different racial and ethnic groups? This phrasing contains two 
important implications: 
1. Changes occurred in the market, and 
2. Those changes affected access to care. 
Before we can consider if different demographic groups had different experiences, we 
first must corroborate these statements. 
Part One of this dissertation explores in detail the changes posed by watershed 
federal legislation enacted in the mid-1990s. These include a comprehensive welfare 
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reform package that eliminated automatic enrollment of welfare recipients into Medicaid, 
and the Balanced Budget Act, which created a new health insurance program for poor 
children. Congress also passed several measures during that time period that curbed 
health benefits for poor immigrants. 
Part Two builds upon this foundation by identifying how these and other policy 
changes affected both supply and demand for health care services among poor 
Marylanders. It provides background into Maryland’s demographics and racial and ethnic 
health care disparities before the time period of interest, describes the state’s Medicaid 
program from the early 1990s, outlines the de jure and de facto changes that occurred in 
the mid-1990s, describes the impact of those changes, and presents a qualitative content 
analysis of transcripts from interviews conducted with key stakeholders in Maryland’s 
low-income health care market. In doing so, Part Two provides insights by those 
implementing both the federal and state policy changes about how access to health care 
changed for Maryland’s poor. 
Part Three asks the two key questions: did changes in the mid-1990s affect access 
to care among Maryland’s low-income populations as the stakeholders predicted? And if 
so, were certain racial or ethnic groups affected differently than others? This section 
reports on a quantitative analysis of perforated appendicitis and length of hospitalization 
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Chapter 2: Methodology 
A. Description of Qualitative Analysis 
1. Literature Review 
The author conducted several comprehensive literature searches dating from 1990 
through 2004. Sources included the Federal Register, Library of Congress, PubMed, 
Lexis-Nexis (both the News Articles database and the U.S. Law Reviews and Journals, 
Combined database), and the Internet (using Google and Yahoo). Search terms included 
(independently and in combination): 
• Balanced Budget Act of 1997 
• Balanced Budget Refinement Act of 1999 
• Maryland Medicaid 
• Children’s Health Insurance Program 
• Contract with America 
• Health care disparities 
• HealthChoice (Maryland’s Medicaid managed care program) 
• Health disparities 
• Immigrant health 
• Medicaid managed care 
• Personal Responsibility and Work Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) 
• Welfare reform 
These searches revealed thousands of documents (836 from Lexis-Nexis alone) 
including news articles, reports, proposed legislation, proposed regulations, final 
regulations, testimony, and academic and professional conference presentations. Culling 
the articles based upon their relevancy to changes in Maryland’s low-income health care 
market in the mid-1990s, the author selected over 950 documents (original documents 
and secondary research) for inclusion into a bibliographic database that the author set up 
in Microsoft Access. By December 2004, the 85 key articles were coded and included in 
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the database. Such materials formed the basis of Part One and informed much of Part 
Two. 
2. Interviews 
In accordance with the University of Maryland Internal Review Board’s (IRB) 
approval received on May 19, 1994, personal interviews were conducted with 14 
stakeholders during the period of February 2005 through September 2005. Each interview 











1 Researcher at Washington, D.C. think tank 8/5/2005 9
2 Executive Maryland Medicaid agency official 3/17/2005 40
3 Former Maryland Medicaid agency staff member 
and attorney 
2/23/2005 18
4 Executive with Maryland Medicaid data contractor 4/29/2005 29
5 CEO of Federally Qualified Health Center in 
Maryland 
3/11/2005 13
6 Senior Lobbyist at Non-Profit Advocacy 
Organization 
9/1/2005 9
7 Senior staff with Health Care for the Homeless 7/27/2005 30
8 Executive with Maryland Department of Social 
Services 
9/1/2005 18
9 Staff with Maryland Department of Social Services 3/10/2005 14
10 CEO of Federally Qualified Health Center in 
Maryland 
3/24/2005 25
11 Academic Researcher of Maryland economic trends 8/5/2005 7
12 CEO of association of managed care organizations 7/28/2005 20
13 Staff with Maryland Medicaid data contractor (with 
expertise in disparities) 
4/29/2005 14
14 CEO of managed care-related organization  8/30/2005 2
Total:      248 
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These themes and relevant interview sections were then entered into an Access 
database and integrated into the qualitative analysis. Interviewee selection was conducted 
using a snowball sampling methodology, beginning with a professional contact at the 
Maryland Medicaid office that provided names of additional contacts. Each interviewee 
was asked for additional names of people to interview and stopped when the names 
overlapped.  See Table 2.1. 
B. Description of Quantitative Analysis: HCUP Dataset 
To triangulate findings of the document review and the interviews, the author 
sought a quantitative approach to evaluate the research question.  After investigating 
other data sources (particularly the Behavior Risk Factor Surveillance Survey sponsored 
by the Centers for Disease Control), the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP, 
pronounced “H-Cup”) was determined to provide the most appropriate source of 
comprehensive Maryland data before and after the critical policy changes explored in this 
study. More robust than the BRFSS survey’s small sample size of low-income racial and 
ethnic minorities, HCUP captures all hospitalizations in Maryland, and provides 
consistent preventive care variables over the relevant years. 
HCUP is a set of related databases and software tools sponsored by the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services’ Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 
(AHRQ). These databases include patient-level health care data collected from state data 
organizations, among other sources, and represent the largest collection of longitudinal 
hospital care data from 1998 onward in the U.S. HCUP enables research on, among other 
topics, access to health care at the national and state market levels.65 
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1. Data Process 
As per AHRQ’s regulations for HCUP use, a data use agreement was filed with 
the HCUP Central Distributor in 2005 explaining the nature of this project. At that time, 
the SID HCUP data for New Jersey and Maryland for 1996 and 2003 were purchased. In 
the spring of 2006, the author attended two HCUP workshops at the AcademyHealth 
Annual Research Meeting conference in Seattle, Washington and received approximately 
10 hours of training in HCUP data manipulation. 
2. Justification of Years and Databases Selected 
The year 1996 was selected as the baseline year for several reasons. First, the new 
Maryland Medicaid managed care program, HealthChoice, and the Balanced Budget Act 
of 1997 were not yet implemented. Secondly, it was important that the datasets across the 
years include common variables, and several variables changed from the 1995 to the 
1996 iteration. Although Maryland’s welfare reform package was implemented in mid-
1996, using 1996 data provides the latest (albeit partial year) data before the policy 
changes took effect. 
3. Avoidable Hospitalizations and Prevention Quality Indicators (PQIs) 
One approach to evaluating the research question is to identify a quantitative 
measure of access to care.   With that measure, one can conduct several analyses:  a) 
determine to what extent there racial and ethnic disparities before the study period for 
that measure, b) determine to what extent there racial and ethnic disparities after the 
study period for that measure, and c) consider what factors can explain the differences in 
access by race and ethnicity from the pre- to the post-study period. 
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The category of measures that presented itself as the most logical assessment tool 
are hospitalizations for ambulatory-care-sensitive-conditions, i.e., “conditions for which 
good outpatient care can potentially prevent the need for hospitalization or for which 
early intervention can prevent complications or more severe disease.”66 Such so-called 
“avoidable hospitalizations” are an inefficient use of health care resources because they 
provide costly and more invasive care than would have been necessary had the health 
problem been identified earlier, and are therefore a widely accepted proxy for access to 
care. 
To help track care provided for such conditions, investigators at Stanford 
University and the University of California developed a set of “prevention quality 
indicators” (PQIs), a set of measures that are used with inpatient discharge data to 
identify the level of health care quality for ambulatory-care-sensitive conditions. PQI 
software, distributed by AHRQ, can be applied to hospital inpatient administrative data 
(e.g., billing data available through HCUP SIDs). While PQIs rely upon hospital inpatient 
data, they provide insight into the health care delivery system outside of the hospital 
setting. Indeed, according to AHRQ’s PQI Overview, they “provide a window into the 
community—to identify unmet community heath care needs, to monitor how well 
complications from a number of common conditions are being avoided in the outpatient 
setting, and to compare performance of local health care systems across communities.”67 
Examples of hospitalizations for ambulatory-care-sensitive conditions include 
lower limb amputations for diabetes patients or inpatient care for vaccine-preventable 
illnesses like pneumonia. Relatedly, patients suffering with appendicitis who lack access 
28 
to surgical evaluation can experience delays in obtaining necessary care, which can result 
in perforated appendicitis, a life-threatening condition. 
The complete list of PQIs includes: 
• Diabetes, short-term complications (PQI 1) 
• Perforated appendicitis (PQI 2) 
• Diabetes, long-term complications (PQI 3) 
• Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (PQI 5) 
• Hypertension (PQI 7) 
• Congestive heart failure (PQI 8) 
• Low birth weight (PQI 9) 
• Dehydration (PQI 10) 
• Bacterial pneumonia (PQI 11) 
• Urinary infections (PQI 12) 
• Angina without procedure (PQI 13) 
• Uncontrolled diabetes (PQI 14) 
• Adult asthma (PQI 15) 
• Lower extremity amputations among patients with diabetes (PQI 16).68 
This study looks at perforated appendicitis, PQI 2.  Perforated appendicitis is an 
ideal measure for several reasons.  First, virtually every case of appendicitis will rupture 
if left untreated, making those who fail to receive treatment in a timely fashion readily 
apparent.  Secondly, there is no evidence that appendicitis strikes certain races or 
ethnicities more frequently.  Assuming that this condition affects racial and ethnic groups 
equally, increased appendiceal perforation among a particular racial or ethnic population 
would indicate insufficient access to appendicitis care.   Finally, the primary symptom of 
appendicitis is abdominal pain that grows increasingly more severe as time passes.  Given 
that virtually all successfully-treated cases involve hospital visits and surgery, if we 
hypothesize that those with less ability to pay delay coming to the hospital in the hopes 
that the pain will dissipate on its own, we should see increased likelihood of appendiceal 
perforation among low-income and uninsured populations. 
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4. Differences-in-Differences Approach 
The HCUP database used in this study is the state inpatient database (SID), which 
contains inpatient discharge abstracts from 22 participating states, including Maryland. 
The possibility of conducting the same research on both Maryland level and national 
level data was explored. This strategy would indicate if results in Maryland were 
consistent with the nation as a whole, or if there were variations in Maryland that were 
attributable to state-specific policies or approaches to implementing new national 
policies. Such a “differences-in-differences” approach, however, proved problematic due 
to limited state data availability and data cost. The SID only included 15 states in 1996 
(at a total cost of $6,795) and 20 states in 2003 (at a total cost of $12,175).69 Efforts to 
use other HCUP data failed. Although HCUP’s “National Inpatient Survey” database 
includes a sampling of hospitals from most states for both 1996 and 2003 and offers 
nationally representative data, it lacks critical variables, including race and ethnicity data, 
which preclude the relevant analyses. 
To overcome these problems, and in consultation with both Dr. Mark Lopez and 
Dr. R. H. Sprinkle, another state was selected with similar demographics and a similar 
Medicaid structure: New Jersey. The quantitative findings compare Maryland with New 
Jersey for both 1996 and 2003. While not a perfect differences-in-differences 
methodology, assessing trends in a similar state allows for identification of disparate 
trends that would require additional study before concluding that the policy changes 
described herein were a primary driver in observed outcomes. 
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5. Analyses Conducted 
The HCUP data distributor, Social and Scientific Systems, Inc. (SSS), created a 
dataset using PQI software derived from the New Jersey and Maryland SID for both 1996 
and 2003, converted from a SAS to a STATA software format. In consultation with Dr. 
Sprinkle, Dr. Lopez, and an SSS consultant, the author selected one PQI, ruptured 
appendicitis, as the primary quantitative indicator for access to care. With Dr. Lopez’s 
assistance, the data was further cleaned. 
Using the combined Maryland and New Jersey 1996 and 2003 dataset, this study 
includes probit regression models and ordinary least squares regression models using, 
respectively, perforated appendix and length of hospital stay as dependent variables. 




65 See the HCUP Overview website at http://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/overview.jsp. Last accessed: 
12/24/2006. 
66 Prevention Quality Indicators Overview. AHRQ Quality Indicators. July 2004. Agency for Healthcare 




69 Amounts calculated using the cost schedule in the HCUP Application, available at http://www.hcup-
us.ahrq.gov/db/state/SIDSASDSEDD_28Jul2006.pdf. Last accessed 12/24/06. 
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Part One: Federal Legislation Affecting Access to Care for 
Vulnerable Populations 
Chapter 3: Federal Legislation and its Effects on States’ Low 
Income Health Care Markets 
A. Background on Welfare Reform 
One of the ideological drivers behind the conservative congressional agenda of 
the mid-1990s was the desire to devolve power from the federal government to the states, 
where it could be, in Ronald Reagan’s language, “closer to the people.”70 Stronger state 
governments, the rhetoric suggests, imply a smaller and leaner federal government. 
Indeed, as the Contract with America itself reads, “This year’s [1995] election offers the 
chance [to] transform the way Congress works. That historic change would be the end of 
government that is too big, too intrusive, and too easy with the public’s money.”71 The 
Personal Responsibility Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA, or HR 3734), 
which transitioned welfare from an entitlement to a block grant program, is an example 
of such an effort. 
In his remarks introducing PRWORA, Representative John Kasich (R-OH) 
summarized the new Congress’ outlook when he noted: 
Judeo-Christianity says it is a sin not to help people who need help, but it 
also says it is equally a sin to continue to help people who need to learn 
how to help themselves…. If we have a program that traps people in 
dependence, it is wrong…. I think we have created some systems, 
including the current welfare system, that have provided too many of the 
wrong incentives for people to avoid work or to be lulled into a sense of 
dependency.72 
This sentiment was embraced by both parties. Indeed, it was President Clinton who 
declared four years earlier his intent to “change welfare as we know it.”73 PRWORA set 
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out to accomplish this lofty goal not only by transforming welfare into a block grant, but 
also by imposing a five-year lifetime limit for cash assistance, and ending the historic 
connection between Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Medicaid. 
B. PRWORA and How it Affects Access to Care Nationally 
1. Decoupling Medicaid and Welfare Eligibility 
Prior to 1997, eligible families received cash awards via AFDC, and AFDC 
recipients were automatically eligible to enroll in another social program—Medicaid. In 
its effort to amend one but not the other, the new law severed the automatic link between 
AFDC and Medicaid eligibility, enabling individuals to qualify for the latter but not the 
former. PRWORA froze Medicaid eligibility criteria such that individuals who could 
enter the program prior to its passage would be able to enter the program in the future. 
Therefore, the most direct route to post-PRWORA Medicaid eligibility would be to meet 
the criteria in place on the day PRWORA passed, July 16, 1996.   
A secondary route to Medicaid enrollment is for the individual to qualify for 
Transitional Medical Assistance (TMA). On the books since Congress passed the Family 
Support Act of 1988, TMA allows families leaving welfare to continue Medicaid 
coverage for 6 months, regardless of income, and for six more months if their income 
falls below 185 percent of the federal poverty level.74 PRWORA reauthorized the 1988 
law, extending states’ obligation to provide TMA through 2001.75 For reasons discussed 
below, however, TMA is frequently underutilized.76 
In support of HR 3734, Rep. Zach Wamp (R-TN) asserted that: 
We [the Republicans] said, “let us disconnect Medicaid, health care for the 
poor, from welfare, and do what the President asked us to do and send a 
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clean welfare reform bill….” We did make that decision on this side of the 
aisle to disconnect the two [i.e., welfare reform and Medicaid].77 
By decoupling the two programs, Wamp and his colleagues’ goal was to put greater 
limits on eligibility and benefits for the welfare program without affecting Medicaid. 
The Republicans’ decision to separate welfare reform from any kind of Medicaid 
reform was a political necessity;78 President Clinton had already vetoed two previous 
welfare reform efforts that he believed had ominous implications for Medicaid enrollees. 
In one such veto, exercised against the FY 1996 budget bill — which would have 
transformed both Medicaid and AFDC into a block grant — the president commented: 
The Republican budget … would … end the guarantee of quality medical 
care that now exists for 26 million Americans…. I will not permit the 
repeal of guaranteed medical coverage for senior citizens, for disabled 
people, for poor children and pregnant women. … We cannot, we must 
not do this. … if it continues to be a part of the budget… I would veto it 
again.…We cannot destroy Medicaid.79 
Yet for all the effort on both sides of the aisle to preserve Medicaid, the measure would 
prove to have significant, albeit unintended consequences to this safety net health care 
program for the poor. 
a. Loss of AFDC Frequently Meant Loss of Medicaid 
Congress expected that separating Medicaid and welfare eligibility would shrink 
welfare rolls while Medicaid participation would remain steady. In fact, because 
PRWORA de-linked eligibility for the two programs, the Congressional Budget Office 
anticipated no decrease in Medicaid enrollment or spending.80 
The Congressional Budget Office, however, was wrong: post-1995 declines in 
welfare caseloads are correlated with declines in Medicaid enrollment, particularly 
among parents.81 Perhaps those who moved from welfare to work were dropped from 
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Medicaid because Transitional Medical Assistance had expired before they were able to 
secure a job that offers health insurance. Or perhaps they were never offered Transitional 
Medical Assistance when they made the transition from welfare.82 A 1995 study of two 
states found that at least half of children and half-to-two-thirds of parents leaving welfare 
also left Medicaid (despite many remaining eligible).83 Indeed, the trend was strong 
enough that, despite state efforts to expand Medicaid eligibility, Medicaid enrollment for 
both children and parents were declining.84 A 1997 GAO study of three states found that 
the Medicaid participation rates among welfare recipients (i.e., ranging from 84-to-100 
percent) fell to 26-to-61 percent after their welfare benefits were revoked.85 Similarly, in 
a meta-analysis of “welfare leavers” studies, researchers noted a consistent pattern among 
former AFDC and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) recipients: 
When families cease receiving AFDC/TANF, Medicaid enrollment goes 
down. The magnitude of the decline varies between studies, but often, 
one-third or more of children and most adults in families that have exited 
are no longer reported to be receiving Medicaid when exiters are surveyed 
some months after leaving.86 
Keeping with this national trend, Maryland’s Medicaid rolls fell as the state’s 
welfare reform was implemented. Maryland’s welfare reform program, entitled 
Temporary Cash Assistance or TCA, was begun in January 1995 and used less restrictive 
eligibility determinations than the PRWORA would allow. The state’s welfare rolls 
declined 51 percent from TCA’s initial implementation through the end of the decade, 
and Medicaid enrollment by those who had been eligible for AFDC over that same period 
fell by approximately 23,000.87 
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b. As Medicaid Enrollment Falls, Uninsurance Rates Increase 
Misperceptions about the program have long been a barrier to Medicaid 
enrollment. Some eligible individuals refrain from applying because they are currently 
healthy and are confident that they can get Medicaid at some future date should they need 
it.88, 89 Others are resistant because they feel that the stigma associated with welfare 
carries over into Medicaid90, 91 This section will set those factors aside and focus instead 
on the administrative concerns arising from PRWORA (either through the confluence of 
multiple issues or, in some cases, the resulting domino effect) that hamper Medicaid 
enrollment and contribute to increased rates of uninsurance. 
The notion that those losing Medicaid coverage generally become uninsured is 
not unique to post-PRWORA America; it was occurring on a smaller scale as early as 
1988.92 So perhaps not surprisingly, as former welfare beneficiaries fell off the Medicaid 
rolls, uninsurance rates correspondingly increased. Uninsurance among the poor rose 
throughout the PRWORA implementation period; while approximately 33 percent of 
poor women were uninsured in 1994, more than 40 percent were uninsured in 2001.93 
It appears that the longer former welfare recipients are off Medicaid, the greater 
the likelihood that they will become uninsured. In one study, 23 percent of women were 
uninsured one year after leaving AFDC. Three years later, however, 45 percent were 
uninsured.94 In another study, 41 percent of women (and 25 percent of children) who had 
left welfare between 1995 and 1997 were uninsured in 1997. One year or more after 
leaving welfare, 49 percent of women (and 29 percent of children) were uninsured.95 In 
the words of a third study: “If state Medicaid programs could increase the number of 
children and parents leaving welfare who continue on Medicaid, uninsurance rates might 
decline.”96 
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The prognosis: more of the same. In the words of two prominent researchers: 
Short of major state reforms or changes in federal legislation, it seems 
likely that more adults (primarily mothers) will lose Medicaid coverage in 
the future. Welfare reform, in conjunction with a strong economy, may 
lead more welfare recipients to jobs, and some of them will obtain health 
benefits. However, many low-wage workers are not offered coverage or 
cannot afford it. Thus it seems likely that more adults will become 
uninsured.97 
c. Transitional Problems Arising from Medicaid/TANF De-Linking 
i. Complexity and Variation in TANF and Medicaid Eligibility Rules 
Confusion about Medicaid eligibility, which varies from state to state, is a 
problem that has plagued the program for years. In 1981, a District Court opinion labeled 
Medicaid eligibility rules “an aggravated assault on the English language, resistant to 
attempts to understand it.”98 PROWRA’s additional complications did little to alleviate 
the Court’s concern. State workers charged with implementing the law are frequently 
confused about the latest changes in eligibility requirements.99, 100 This confusion is 
shared by applicants, who are often deterred from applying because they perceive that the 
eligibility determination is burdensome, demeaning, or too complex to understand.101, 102 
In many cases, families leaving welfare assumed that they were no longer eligible for 
Medicaid.103 
A related problem for AFDC/TANF and Medicaid administrators are the differing 
rules for TANF and Medicaid eligibility. After PRWORA, entry into the two programs 
may have different standards for income, disregarded earnings, asset levels, two-parent 
families, time limits, and work requirements. This can be particularly problematic when 
eligibility determinations are done manually using paper applications (rather than an 
automated, computerized eligibility determination process).104 Although PRWORA set 
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aside $500 million in enhanced matching federal funds to help states change their 
systems and perform outreach activities, there have been few takers. The federal 
government lifted the expiration date for states to spend these funds, and in January 2000, 
HCFA urged state Medicaid directors to take advantage of the extension and of the 
availability of the funds.105 
ii. Confusion Between TANF and Medicaid 
Case workers across the country were frequently confused about the application 
of new TANF eligibility rules to Medicaid. Some thought Medicaid is exclusively for 
families on welfare, is subject to the TANF lifetime limits, is time-limited, or is subject to 
TANF work requirements.106 As one report noted, 
Because of the historical link between eligibility for cash assistance and 
Medicaid, unless instructed to process applications for TANF and 
Medicaid separately and carefully monitored, eligibility workers may deny 
an application for Medicaid based on failure to comply with a TANF work 
requirement or fail to inform applicants about alternative options for 
Medicaid coverage, especially for children (i.e., applicants will “fall 
through the cracks”).107 
Interviews with state officials confirmed that such confusion exists among some 
of Maryland’s eligibility workers.108 
While PRWORA requires Medicaid and TANF eligibility to be determined 
independently, agency administrative systems may view Medicaid as “an extra welfare 
benefit,” such that when people lose welfare benefits, their Medicaid case frequently is 
simultaneously closed. 
Because the two programs remain connected in the minds of caseworkers 
and recipients as well as in state computer eligibility systems, the new 
emphasis on closing welfare cases as quickly as possible is causing many 
families to be cut off Medicaid, even when they are still eligible.109 
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Housing the TANF and Medicaid programs under one agency and requiring the 
same staff to determine eligibility for both may further exacerbate this confusion. For 
example, Wisconsin’s Medicaid enrollment is handled by the Department of Workforce 
Development, which also oversees TANF and food stamp applications. Department of 
Workforce Development staff members handle an average of 400 cases each. Some fear 
that the combination of this heavy caseload and the variations in program eligibility 
creates a situation ripe for incorrect eligibility determinations.110 
Furthermore, the new requirement that state agency staff verify an applicant’s 
immigration status before declaring an applicant eligible for Medicaid further 
complicates the case worker’s tasks.111 
d. Incidents of Misdiagnosed Eligibility 
In Pennsylvania, 32,000 ex-welfare beneficiaries (including 24,000 children) were 
dropped from the Medicaid rolls erroneously. In March 1997, when Pennsylvania’s 
welfare reform went into effect, roughly one-sixth of the 186,000 people who no longer 
received welfare benefits mistakenly also lost health benefits. Approximately 20 percent 
of the 32,000 in question received restored Medicaid coverage for six months. The 
remaining 80 percent were slated to receive benefits for just two months.112 
Pennsylvania’s story is not unique. As many as 3 million people were dropped 
from Medicaid nationwide between 1995 and 1998. The culprit: “…the reduction of 
welfare rolls, computer glitches in welfare offices, confusing information about eligibility 
and recipients’ decisions to curtail dependence on state programs.” 113 
A 1999 Families USA report concluded that welfare reform is responsible for the 
loss of health care insurance for hundreds of thousands of Americans. This report 
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highlighted three main reasons: (a) upon transitioning from welfare to work, many 
beneficiaries lose Medicaid eligibility; (b) Medicaid services are illegally eliminated 
despite continued eligibility; and (c) state efforts to dissuade people from applying for 
welfare results in limited opportunity to apply for Medicaid.114 
States are allowed to ‘divert’ people from completing their welfare 
applications by requiring them to undertake job search activities or to seek 
other forms of private help before applying for assistance…. Although 
such ‘diversion’ processes are becoming routine in the context of cash 
welfare assistance, they can improperly divert people from applying for 
Medicaid as well… [and] these diversionary practices may constitute a 
barrier to coverage for both new applicants and those who have left the 
Medicaid rolls but need coverage again.115 
In response to these stories, HCFA sent a letter in April 2000 asking all state 
Medicaid directors “to review their records to be sure no one who is entitled to Medicaid 
lost their benefits after leaving welfare and to reinstate anyone who was improperly 
terminated from the Medicaid program.”116 
e. State use of Separate Application Forms for all Means-Tested Programs 
Research indicates that separate applications for Supplemental Security Income 
(SSI) and Medicaid can reduce Medicaid participation.117 HCFA guidance indicates that 
states may continue to enroll automatically all TANF beneficiaries into Medicaid without 
a separate determination for Medicaid eligibility, and that they may use a single 
application for both programs.118 
2. Unintended Consequences of PRWORA 
a. Redeterminations of Medicaid Eligibility Can Cause “Churning” 
PRWORA requires that states redetermine Medicaid eligibility at least every 12 
months, or whenever the beneficiary experiences a change that might affect eligibility. 
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This can result in “churning,” or short-term interruptions in eligibility. Frequently this 
occurs when beneficiaries do not respond quickly enough to notices about continued 
eligibility. 
Churning puts tremendous strain on health care providers and insurers… 
because substantial resources are required upfront for enrollment and 
intake each time a beneficiary enters or re-enters the system… In 
addition… no health care provider can “manage” care without ongoing 
access to the patient. When patients enter and quickly exit the system, 
perhaps to re-appear yet again if Medicaid eligibility is reestablished, care 
is most likely fragmented instead of well coordinated.119 
Some states choose to conduct redetermination assessments even more frequently 
than PRWORA requires. For example, in Wisconsin, Medicaid eligibility is tied to food 
stamp recertification, and the state redetermines eligibility for food stamps every three 
months.120 This exacerbates the churning phenomenon. Furthermore, many families 
disappear from the welfare system upon losing welfare or Medicaid eligibility without 
undergoing a formal redetermination process, thus foregoing 12 more months of 
transitional Medicaid.121 In short, states are not sufficiently effective at keeping families 
enrolled in Medicaid until a redetermination occurs. 
Yet another concern is that states may fail to reassess a child’s Medicaid 
eligibility when the parents are no longer eligible. This can lead to significant declines in 
children’s enrollment, despite continued eligibility.122 
b. Jobs Held by Former Welfare Beneficiaries Often do not Offer Health 
Insurance 
Those leaving welfare tend to work at jobs that pay less than $8 per hour and do 
not offer such benefits as health insurance or paid sick leave.123 Indeed, although 56 
percent of female former welfare recipients reported employment, only 33 percent had 
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private or employer coverage.124 In those cases where health insurance is offered for the 
employee, benefits may not include coverage for dependents. In fact, the majority of 
welfare beneficiaries who find employment earn below the poverty level, but in most 
states, even a low-wage and part-time job renders parents ineligible for Medicaid. 125 
c. Harder for Recipients to Apply 
As welfare recipients move from welfare to work, the steps that applicants must 
follow before the state determines Medicaid eligibility are often prohibitively onerous. 
For example, mandated in-person interviews at a welfare office between 9:00 am and 
5:00 pm may be impossible for newly working people to manage.126 Similarly, despite 
the requirement that redetermination (see above) be conducted ex parte, that is, without 
the involvement of the recipient in the initial review, most states require that families 
report in person to the state benefits office to file redetermination paperwork, and thus 
create another barrier to continued Medicaid access.127 
d. Problems with Transitional Medical Assistance (TMA) Administration 
As noted above, TMA provides a blanket extension to all Medicaid enrollees, but 
is not without its own administrative problems. For example, because an outdated federal 
mandate prohibits individuals from receiving TMA unless they have received welfare 
payments for a period of months, Maryland and other states that provide lump-sum 
welfare payments to beneficiaries are banned from offering TMA to those who would 
otherwise be eligible. As a result of this and other administrative difficulties, two studies 
indicate that “very few families who leave welfare actually receive Transitional 
Medicaid,”128 despite their automatic eligibility. The exact scope of the problem, 
however, remains unknown because states do not systematically track TMA enrollment. 
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e. More Strain on the Safety Net and Federally Qualified Health Centers 
Because Less Reimbursement for More Patients 
As more people lose Medicaid coverage, more low-income patients will rely upon 
safety-net institutions, such as federally qualified health centers (FQHCs) and public 
hospitals, who offer care either for free or at reduced cost. This means that such sites are 
receiving smaller Medicaid reimbursement even as the numbers of uninsured clients 
increase. Without supplemental state or local funding, safety net institutions 
simultaneously are facing a decreased supply of funding and resources and an increased 
demand for services—a dangerous equation to the financial health of the safety net.129, 130 
f. Changing Case Mix Among Remaining Medicaid Enrollees 
States are experiencing significant turnover in Medicaid caseloads, but those who 
leave the program are not identical to those who stay. Research indicates that former 
welfare recipients leaving Medicaid are disproportionately low-cost users, while those 
who remain on Medicaid are more likely to accrue higher costs. Indeed, a person’s health 
status is an important determinant of whether a person’s Medicaid coverage persisted 
after leaving welfare.131, 132 This suggests that the Medicaid case mix may be evolving 
into a higher-need and higher-cost group for whom current capitated payments may not 
be adequate.133 Medicaid managed care programs, then, may be at a significant 
disadvantage unless capitation rates are updated to keep pace with the changing case mix. 
This changing case mix may affect states’ efforts to implement large-scale Medicaid 
managed care.134 
PRWORA also had significant implications for immigrant health care, which is 
discussed in detail in later chapters. 
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C. BBA and How it Affects Access to Care Nationally 
Congress passed the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, which included several 
provisions with significant implications for low income health care markets. Specifically, 
the BBA: 
• Established the children’s health insurance program; 
• Made significant reductions in federal Medicaid spending; 
• Altered federal reimbursement formulas for safety net providers; 
• Allowed states to experiment with managed care in their Medicaid programs 
without seeking federal approval; 
• Changed residency program and graduate medical education funding; 
• Restored certain benefits to legal immigrants that were taken away by 
PRWORA (discussed in detail in later chapters); and 
• Made changes to states’ authority over their Medicaid programs. 
1. Established the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) 
Perhaps the most significant change posed by the BBA was the establishment of a 
new program aimed at covering health care costs for low-income children. Subtitle J of 
the BBA created the SCHIP Program (Title XXI of the Social Security Act), a child 
health care block grant which would give states $20.3 billion in new federal funds over 
five years to extend health insurance coverage to children.135 States were given the option 
either to expand Medicaid eligibility or to create a separate program to provide this 
coverage. 
2. Made Significant Reductions in Federal Medicaid Spending 
The BBA included the steepest decline in the federal Medicaid budget since 
1981.136 These cuts came from several BBA provisions, including newly-imposed limits 
on the federal match to states to reimburse disproportionate share hospitals (DSH) for 
care to Medicaid beneficiaries.137 Established by congress in the early 1980s, the DSH 
funding initiative mandated that state Medicaid agencies make allowances when 
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establishing reimbursement rates for hospitals serving a disproportionate number of 
Medicaid or low-income patients.  Indeed, most of the BBA’s federal Medicaid spending 
cuts stemmed from reductions in payments to safety net institutions, particularly DSH 
hospitals.138 
Additionally, the BBA allows states to mandate that clinicians and other providers 
pay Medicare deductibles and copayments for low-income Medicare beneficiaries. 
(Before BBA, Medicaid frequently paid these costs). States may, under the BBA, count 
Medicaid reimbursement as payment-in-full for services rendered to qualified Medicare 
beneficiaries and people who are dually eligible for Medicaid and Medicare.139 
Further Medicaid savings come from reduced payments for physicians’ services, 
inpatient and outpatient hospital services, hospitals’ cost of capital, clinical laboratory 
services, and durable medical equipment.140 The BBA also establishes that Veterans’ 
pensions be considered as income, thus reducing Medicaid’s contribution to the cost of 
veterans’ institutional care.141 
3. Altered Federal Reimbursement Formulas for Safety-Net 
Institutions and Clinicians 
The expansion of managed care into the Medicaid market complicated the health 
care delivery and reimbursement process for clinicians and hospitals accustomed to 
traditional fee-for-service Medicaid, such as FQHCs and rural health clinics. FQHCs are 
federally mandated to provide care to all patients, including the uninsured and those on 
Medicaid. To provide incentives to care for Medicaid (and Medicare) patients, FQHCs 
and rural health clinics received higher reimbursement rates under the “Boren 
Amendment” (i.e., 100 percent of all “reasonable and customary” costs for providing care 
to Medicaid beneficiaries). This led to widespread cost-shifting whereby FQHCs covered 
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their expenses for treating the uninsured with the augmented reimbursement they 
received for Medicaid patients. 
The BBA contained provisions for phasing out the Boren Amendment. This 
meant that, over a five-year period, FQHCs and rural health centers would no longer 
receive reimbursement for 100 percent of costs for services provided to Medicaid 
patients. The reduction in Medicaid caused financial difficulty for many of these 
centers.142 
Savings are also derived from the repeal of federal minimum payment protections 
for other safety net institutions, such as hospitals and nursing homes. (The previous law 
imposed minimum payment standards that states had to meet when setting reimbursement 
rates for these care delivery sites).143 
Other cost-related changes under the BBA included new payment methods for 
rehabilitation hospitals, nursing facilities, outpatient hospital and therapy services, and 
home health service;144 an increase in the federal share of Medicaid payments to 
Washington, D.C.; and a new state entitlement grant program of $100 million over four 
years (FY 1998 through FY 2001) for emergency services to each of the twelve states 
with the highest number of undocumented aliens,* as determined by the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service [(INS), subsequently reorganized under the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS)].145 
* The term “alien” is synonymous with “immigrant,” and is more frequently used in legislative language. 
47 
4. Allowed States to Experiment with Managed Care in their Medicaid 
Programs without Seeking Federal Approval 
Before the BBA, states seeking to move a portion of its Medicaid population into 
managed care had to obtain federal approval under a Section 1115 or 1915(b) waiver 
from HCFA (subsequently renamed the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, or 
CMS) within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The BBA changed this 
requirement by allowing states to move most Medicaid enrollees from fee-for-service to 
managed care arrangements without obtaining federal approval. Rather than waivers, 
states need only to amend their Medicaid State Plan with HCFA/CMS to reflect the role 
of managed care in their Medicaid programs.146 
While the Congressional Budget Office did not project this aspect of the BBA to 
be responsible for any federal cost savings, it was likely, in the words of one researcher, 
“to have a major impact on access to covered hospital and physician services by low-
income families. These provisions also had important implications for the hospitals, 
physicians, and health centers from which low-income families have traditionally 
obtained needed care.”147 
The BBA also lifted the so-called “75/25 Rule,” which held that no managed care 
organization (MCO) could have more than 75 percent of its membership comprised of 
Medicaid beneficiaries, and no less than 25 percent of its membership comprised of 
privately paying patients, thereby barring Medicaid-only MCOs. In other words, the BBA 
permits states to establish Medicaid-only MCOs, and to require most of its Medicaid 
beneficiaries to enroll in managed care organizations that do business only with 
Medicaid.148 
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5. Changed Graduate Medical Education Funding For Residency 
Programs 
The BBA cut funding for residency programs, limiting available funds and 
consequently exerting downward pressure on residency programs and cultural-
competency training. FQHCs and hospitals operating under traditional fee-for-service 
Medicaid typically rely upon residency programs for low-cost professional services. 
Residency programs, indeed, have long been a mainstay of the health care safety net. 
These cuts, therefore, have implications for the health care safety net and for 
access to care for poor minorities. Aside from smaller residency classes, which diminish 
supply, reductions in GME funding could have other unintended results. For example, 
research suggests that racial and ethnic disparities in health care may stem in part from 
poor understanding among clinicians of the populations they serve.149 “Cultural-
competency training” in medical and nursing schools and in residency programs is cited 
as an important component of any campaign to eliminate disparities.150, 151, 152 Such 
initiatives are in their infancy, but preliminary findings indicate that they have been 
effective at promoting better health outcomes, particularly in Medicaid managed care 
settings.153 Budget cuts for such programs, therefore, affect both the supply of safety net 
clinicians and the degree to which all clinicians are trained to care for culturally diverse 
populations. 
Overview of Graduate Medical Education Changes in the BBA:
First, the BBA made several important changes to graduate medical education 
funding mechanisms that affect the number and mix of residents trained. Pre-BBA, 
Medicare offered two funding mechanisms to support training programs in teaching 
hospitals: Direct Medical Education defrays direct costs of training physicians (e.g., 
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salaries, fringe benefits of residents and faculty), and Indirect Medical Education funds 
additional operating costs that teaching hospitals incur in patient care (e.g., costs 
associated with offering a broader range of services using more intensive treatments, 
treating sicker patients, and using a costlier staff mix). These payments effectively served 
as an incentive for hospitals to increase their number of residents, since residents are 
cheaper labor than nurses or physicians, particularly when associated costs are defrayed 
by Medicare. However, the BBA put a ceiling on the number of Direct Medical 
Education reimbursements. Experts suggest that assessing the role that the BBA has had 
in containing graduate medical education cost growth is difficult to ascertain because of 
insufficient data, confounding factors, and difficulty in ascribing cause and effect.154 
6. Restored Certain Benefits that were Eliminated in PRWORA 
The BBA restored Medicaid to certain children who were receiving SSI and 
Medicaid when Congress enacted PRWORA on August 22, 1996, but subsequently lost 
their SSI coverage as a result of changes brought about by the welfare reform law. Those 
children who continue to meet the previously applicable SSI disability criteria, family 
income ceilings, and other conditions of eligibility may be reinstated into Medicaid under 
the BBA.155 
For more on restoration of benefits for immigrants, please see chapter 4. 
7. Made Changes to States’ Authority over their Medicaid Programs 
The BBA expanded state authority in several areas, and limited it in others. 
Examples of state authority expansions are as follows. The BBA: 
• Provided states with more options to allow additional children and disabled 
persons to be eligible for Medicaid; 
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• Gave states the option of providing twelve months of continuous eligibility to 
children under 19 years of age; 
• Offered states new authority to grant presumptive (i.e., temporary) Medicaid 
eligibility to children up to age 19 while the state processes their applications 
for Medicaid or SCHIP; 
• Allowed states to guarantee six months of Medicaid coverage to managed care 
enrollees; 
• Created a “Medicaid Part B” block grant, which offers states funding to cover 
Medicare Part B premiums for low-income individuals; 
• Established a new state option to allow disabled SSI beneficiaries with 
incomes up to 250 percent of the federal poverty level and who otherwise are 
ineligible for benefits to buy into the Medicaid program on a sliding scale 
premium basis; and 
• Enabled states to pay the Medicaid reimbursement rate to Medicare providers 
for services provided to qualified Medicare beneficiaries and dual eligibles.156, 
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Congress also used the BBA to limit state authority by increasing consumer 
protections.158 Specifically, it: 
• Required that states provide auto-enrolled Medicaid managed care 
beneficiaries a 90-day grace period within which they may switch plans; 
• Established a new right for an MCO contracting with the state Medicaid 
agency to be given notice and a hearing before the state may terminate its 
contract; and 
• Created a “prudent layperson” definition of an “emergency medical 
condition.”159 
The BBA also made other changes to state low-income health care markets 
around the country. It expanded premium assistance for low-income Medicare 
beneficiaries, included a new primary care case management (PCCM) benefit option, and 
liberalized eligibility requirements for Medicaid assistance under home- and community-
based care waivers.160 
D. Subsequent Federal Legislation 
Implementation of the BBA began in 1998, but the full impact of the BBA’s 
reimbursement phase-out ultimately was never realized. The Medicare, Medicaid, and 
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SCHIP Benefits Improvement and Protection Act of 2000 (BIPA) established that, as of 
January 1, 2001, state Medicaid plans (i.e., plans submitted by states to the Center for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services describing their Medicaid programs) be amended to 
provide payment to health centers equal to 100 percent of FQHC average costs for fiscal 
years 1999 and 2000. Such amounts would serve as the baseline for subsequent fiscal 
years, and in FY 2001 and beyond, BIPA requires that FQHCs also receive an increase in 
percentage costs as measured by the Medicare Economic Index.161 
E. Conclusion 
This chapter discusses the impact of two major federal legislative initiatives on 
low-income health care markets across the country. The next chapter discusses the impact 
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Chapter 4: National Impact of Congressional Changes on 
Immigrants’ Access to Care 
A. Background: Political Context of PRWORA’s Immigrant 
Restrictions 
1. Immigrants and Health Care 
For many reasons, immigrants are among the nation’s most vulnerable 
demographic groups. Compared with the U.S. born, they are poorer, less likely to be 
covered by employer-based insurance, less likely to have a usual source of care, and their 
use of health care services tends to be lower. They also have cultural and linguistic 
barriers to care,162 and are also less likely than non-immigrants to see a physician or a 
nurse, seek care in emergency departments, or visit a dentist.163 
Like other minority demographic groups, immigrants are not spread equally 
across the U.S., but are instead concentrated in a handful of states. Several states with the 
largest and fastest-growing immigrant communities, including Arizona,164 California,165 
Florida,166 New Jersey,167 New York,168 and Texas,169 have filed suits against the federal 
government for reimbursement for health care and other social services for 
undocumented aliens.170 This became an important factor in the welfare reform debate of 
the mid- to late 1990s, and in the BBA, Congress tried to ameliorate the excess fiscal 
burden by awarding states supplemental funding to offset health care costs for their 
foreign-born populations. 
2. Immigrant Access to Health Care 
As recently as the 1980s, most safety-net clinicians around the country either 
were not subject to or chose to disregard prohibitions against providing care to 
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immigrants. Indeed, evidence shows that clinicians generally ignored whatever statutory 
barriers were in place that limited access to care for non-citizens, and provided care to 
immigrants regardless of their citizenship status.171 This de facto policy continued 
through the late 1980s, when the relaxation of federal immigration policy (including 
amnesty to undocumented immigrants and liberalization of rules regarding family 
reunification)172 and simultaneous state Medicaid expansions led to a dramatic influx of 
poor immigrants into a handful of states and onto their Medicaid rolls.173 
Before PRWORA, immigrant health care fell under the “Permanently Residing 
Under Color of Law” (PRUCOL) doctrine, which held that an immigrant whose status 
was “ambiguous, under consideration, or even clearly irregular, could be eligible for 
government-sponsored benefits,” provided that the immigrant was not under active INS 
pursuit for deportation.174 In 1992, this sentiment was reinforced when the U.S. Supreme 
Court determined in Plyer v. Doe175 that state and local governments must extend basic 
public benefits (including, until 1996, health care) to residents regardless of immigration 
status.176 
Most legal immigrants, therefore, were eligible for Medicaid on the same basis as 
U.S. citizens prior to PRWORA,177 and various state efforts to provide care to these 
newcomers resulted in large immigrant enrollment in benefit programs. For example, by 
1994, immigrant women comprised 60 percent of all deliveries funded by Medi-Cal (i.e., 
California’s Medicaid program).178 
A powerful populist backlash emerged in response. California’s Proposition 187, 
which was approved by voters in 1994 and had been a central campaign theme for 
successful gubernatorial candidate Pete Wilson, sought to prevent illegal immigrants 
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from benefiting from a range of tax-funded social welfare benefits. Anti-immigrant 
activists in other states, including Arizona, Florida, and Oregon, attempted similar 
initiatives.179 These efforts set the stage for the drama that was to play out two years later 
when the Republicans won a majority in the U.S. House of Representatives and initiated 
its “Contract with America” agenda. 
When Representative John Kasich introduced HR 3734 (PRWORA) on June 22, 
1996,180 Congress had just passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
(signed into law April 26, 1996),181 and was debating the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act (signed into law September 30, 1996).182 These new laws 
exemplified the growing national anti-immigrant sentiment by limiting non-citizens’ 
rights of residence and judicial appeal, as well as the ability of undocumented immigrants 
to adjust to legal status.183 
a. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) 
of 1996 
The two major changes posed by IIRIRRA were the establishment of procedures 
for requiring proof of citizenship prior to receipt of federal public benefits, and the 
tightened requirement for the “Affidavit of Support” required for sponsored 
immigrants.184 
INS’s guidelines for implementing the IIRIRA made the Affidavit of Support, a 
long-time requirement for immigrant sponsors, an enforceable contract. Previously, the 
courts had determined that the affidavit represented a “moral” rather than legal, 
commitment.185 The guidance explains that: 
To ensure that the immigrants are not likely to rely on public benefits, 
sponsors must demonstrate on the new form that they meet minimum 
income requirements and can be financially responsible for the sponsored 
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immigrants. Sponsors must complete the new Affidavit of Support form 
for relatives who will file applications for immigrant visas or for 
adjustment of status on or after December 19, 1997.186 
Under IIRIRA, a sponsor must be at least 18 years of age and a U.S. citizen or a 
lawful permanent resident domiciled in the United States (including territories and 
possessions). Additionally, the sponsor must offer proof of employment, provide federal 
income tax returns for the three most recent tax years indicating an income level at or 
above 125 percent of the federal poverty level,187, 188 and maintain the income of his 
charge at a level at least 125 percent of the federal poverty level.189 The sponsor will 
remain liable for his charge until the immigrant either: a) becomes a U.S. citizen, b) can 
be credited with 40 quarters (i.e., approximately 10 years) of work, c) leaves the United 
States permanently, or d) dies.190 In this way, post-IIRIRA sponsors take on a more active 
role than ever before in supporting the immigrants they bring to the United States. Failure 
to provide this support is, for the first time, actionable: delinquent sponsors may be sued 
not only by the sponsored immigrant, but also by federal or state agencies to reimburse 
the cost of any means-tested public benefits that the sponsored immigrant received.191 
B. PRWORA’s Changes Affecting Immigrants’ Access to Health 
Care 
Major goals of both PRWORA and the IIRIRA were to discourage immigrants 
likely to seek public benefits from entering the United States, and then shift responsibility 
for immigrant support away from the government and onto the newcomers’ sponsors. An 
intended byproduct would be overall cost savings. According to a Congressional Budget 
Office analysis, the immigrant provisions would generate approximately 40 percent of 
PRWORA’s overall savings of $54 billion (despite the fact that immigrants represented 
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only 15 percent of all welfare recipients in the US).192 The Congressional Budget Office 
also estimated that, if PRWORA had been fully implemented, the government would 
have denied Medicaid to approximately 260,000 elderly legal immigrants, 65,000 
disabled immigrants, 175,000 other adult immigrants, and 140,000 children who would 
otherwise qualify for Medicaid by 2002.193 
Upon signing PRWORA into law, President Clinton expressed: 
strong objections to certain provisions…. I am deeply disappointed that 
this legislation would deny Federal assistance to legal immigrants and 
their children, and give States the option of doing the same. My 
Administration supports holding sponsors who bring immigrants into this 
country more responsible for their well-being. Legal immigrants and their 
children, however, should not be penalized if they become disabled and 
require medical assistance through no fault of their own.194 
Nonetheless, approximately 935,000 non-citizens lost benefits under PRWORA,195 and 
use of welfare by legal immigrants and refugees declined significantly by the end of the 
decade. Indeed, immigrants represented 15 percent of all welfare recipients when 
PRWORA was signed into law in 1996, but despite the growth of the total immigrant 
population, that proportion fell to 12 percent by 1999.196 
1. Changes in State Authority over Medicaid 
A primary theme of the Contract with America agenda was the decentralization of 
program implementation from the federal to the state level. PRWORA accomplished this 
in several ways, perhaps most obviously in its transition of the AFDC cash assistance 
entitlement program to a TANF block grant to the states. Similarly, the law transitioned 
to states the authority to provide Medicaid to immigrants. But in important ways, 
PRWORA also expanded federal authority into immigration policy in areas that have 
traditionally been within a state’s jurisdiction. 
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a. Expansions in State Autonomy 
Post-PRWORA expansions allow states to determine individually whether they 
will provide federal benefits (including Medicaid) to current legal immigrants, or future 
immigrants after the mandatory five-year ban, and whether to provide state or local funds 
allowing future immigrants to participate in Medicaid during the five-year moratorium. It 
also gives states the power to determine what mix of state and local funded services they 
will extend to current and future legal immigrants. 
States can choose to either provide Medicaid to immigrants based upon his or her 
own eligibility, or to limit access by employing outright bans, state residency 
requirements, or “deeming.”197 Deeming refers to the state’s use of the combined income 
and assets of the sponsor, sponsor’s spouse, and the immigrant when determining the 
immigrant’s eligibility for Medicaid or state-sponsored means-tested programs.198 By 
artificially raising the immigrants’ income above the eligible range, deeming renders 
most applicants’ income as too high to qualify for Medicaid.199 (Before PRWORA, 
deeming was not applicable to Medicaid, but was used in determining eligibility in other 
social programs, including Food Stamps, Supplemental Security Income, and cash 
assistance.200)
b. Expansions of Federal Authority 
However, PRWORA also places some new restrictions on state authority. For 
example, PRWORA requires states, subsequent to August 1996, to enact a law explicitly 
proclaiming the state’s intent to provide services to undocumented and other “non-
qualified” immigrants, even though such services would be funded with state or local 
dollars only. States are also forbidden from retaining “sanctuary laws” that prohibit state 
or local officials from reporting illegal immigrants to the INS. (This PRWORA provision 
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remains in force after an unsuccessful challenge by NYC Mayor Rudolph Giuliani who 
claimed it violated the Tenth Amendment and jeopardized public health.) Finally, 
PRWORA requires states to verify not only legal status, but citizenship status of 
applicants for all “federal public benefits programs which provide direct federal 
expenditures.”201 PRWORA, in this way, hastens the trend of immigration-related federal 
expansion into historically state domains, which began with the passage of the 1986 
Immigration Reform and Control Act.202 (That measure required the federal government 
to confirm the legal status of non-citizens before providing federal benefits.) 
2. Classes of Immigrants under PRWORA 
Before PRWORA was passed, legal immigrants and permanent U.S. residents 
were entitled to full Medicaid coverage. Today, a state’s ability to provide immigrants 
with Medicaid coverage breaks down differently based on date of arrival (i.e., before or 
after August 23, 1996) and whether they are “qualified” or “unqualified,” as described 
below. This simplification of immigration status places classes of legal immigrants (e.g., 
applicants for asylum or adjustment of status) in the same “unqualified” status as 
undocumented aliens. In doing so, PRWORA blurs the distinction between those 
immigrants who are in the United States with the government’s consent and those who 
are here without it.203 
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Table 3.1 
Medicaid Eligibility for Immigrants Under PRWORA 




















Eligible for 1st 7 years Emergency only* Emergency 
only* 
Note: * Emergency medical conditions are defined as: “a medical condition (including emergency labor and 
delivery) manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that the absence 
of immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected to result in: (A) placing the patient’s health in 
serious jeopardy, (B) serious impairment to bodily functions, or (C) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or 
part.”204 
a Legal permanent residents (LPRs), also called “permanent residents,” are green card holders and may live in the 
United States indefinitely unless they commit a “deplorable act.”  
b “Refugees & Asylees” status is based on individualized persecution abroad and may eventually adjust to 
permanent residency. Includes Cuban/Haitians and Amerasians. 
c “Nonimmigrants” refers to those admitted temporarily for a limited purpose (e.g., students, visitors, and 
temporary workers). 
d “Undocumented immigrants” are also called illegal immigrants, and include those who are in the United States in 
violation of immigration law for whom no legal relief or recognition has been extended. 
e PRUCOL stands for Persons Residing Under Color of Law. 
Sources: PRWORA language and Congressional Record Service (CRS) Report for Congress, “Alien 
Eligibility for Public Assistance,” 1998. 
a. Qualified Immigrants 
PRWORA defines two categories of immigrants as “qualified”: 1) Legal 
Permanent Residents (LPRs), also called “permanent residents,” and 2) Refugees and 
Asylees. The first group are green card holders and, under PRWORA, may live in the 
United States indefinitely, unless they commit a “deplorable act.” The “Refugee and 
Asylee” status is based on individualized persecution abroad and may eventually adjust to 
permanent residency. In addition to LPRs, PRWORA specifically enumerates the 
following as qualified immigrants: refugees, asylees, Cuban or Haitian entrants, persons 
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granted withholding of deportation, persons granted conditional entry, certain parolees 
and certain victims of domestic violence.205 
i. Qualified Immigrants Arriving before August 23, 1996 
Even those qualified immigrants who entered the country before PRWORA was 
enacted may be denied Medicaid permanently, at state option. Wyoming is the only state 
that has chosen to do so;206 forty-nine states and the District of Columbia opted instead to 
cover all qualified immigrants who resided in the United States before August 22, 1996, 
the date the welfare law was enacted. Refugees and asylees are exempt from these 
limitations for seven years after receiving their status. Beyond that, Medicaid is provided 
at state discretion.207 
ii. Qualified Immigrants Arriving after August 23, 1996 
Qualified immigrants arriving after August 23, 1996 are ineligible for Medicaid 
and Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) for their first five years in the United 
States, after which time states can decide whether to include them in the Medicaid 
program. States may choose to include qualified post-PRWORA-arrivals in the Medicaid 
eligibility pool outright or sparingly by, for instance, limiting eligibility with sponsor 
deeming requirements. In other words, the state may allow into the Medicaid eligibility 
pool only those post-August 23, 1996 qualified immigrants if the combined income of the 
immigrant and his sponsor and his sponsor’s spouse qualifies for Medicaid. (The 
deeming period ends only after the immigrant becomes a citizen or has worked in a 
qualified job for 40 quarters—approximately 10 years.) Alternatively, states may choose 
to withhold Medicaid or CHIP to qualified immigrants entirely after the five-year ban has 
expired.208, 209 
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Under PRWORA, even pregnant immigrant wives of U.S. citizens who came to 
the United States legally, but after August 23, 1996, are ineligible for publicly-funded 
prenatal care during the two-year “conditional resident status” period.210 
PRWORA also excluded qualified immigrants arriving after August 23, 1996 
from SSI and food stamps, but subsequent legislative language struck this provision when 
the BBA was enacted a year later. 
b. Unqualified Immigrants (Regardless of Arrival Date) 
Unqualified immigrants fall into three categories: illegal immigrants, “non-
immigrants,” and PRUCOL. “Illegal immigrants,” also called “undocumented 
immigrants” or “undocumented aliens,” include those who are in the United States in 
violation of immigration law for whom no legal relief or recognition has been extended. 
“Non-immigrants” are those who are admitted temporarily for a limited purpose (e.g., 
students, visitors, and temporary workers). PRUCOL status means that the government is 
aware of the immigrant’s presence, the immigrant is permanently residing in the U.S., 
and the government has provided written assurance that deportation is not planned.211 
The three groups are unaffected by PRWORA, which is to say that they remain 
eligible for the same health care benefit as before PRWORA’s enactment: emergency 
coverage only.212 
C. BBA’s Changes Affecting Immigrants’ Access to Health Care 
The BBA reversed some of the impact of PRWORA on immigrant access to care. 
Specifically, it: 
• Restored Medicaid and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) to elderly and 
disabled poor legal immigrants who, on August 22, 1996, both lived in the 
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United States and were receiving assistance. Those populations lost coverage 
under PRWORA. 
• Allows non-disabled legal residents who were in the United States as of 
August 22, 1996 to receive SSI and Medicaid if they become disabled in the 
future. Those who were legally within U.S. borders in August 1996 remain 
ineligible to receive SSI based upon income and old age, but under BBA are 
now eligible for both programs if they become disabled. According to the 
Center for Budget and Policy Priorities, at least two-thirds of those over age 
65 can meet the disability standard, and only “very few” of the over-75 
population will fail to meet the disability criteria.213 Note also that those who 
arrived after August 22, 1996 or who were not lawfully present on that date 
are banned from SSI eligibility unless they gain 40 quarters of work history or 
become citizens.214 
• Established that Cuban-Haitian entrants will be treated like refugees with 
respect to eligibility for federal benefits; 
• Required that Americasians (children fathered by U.S. citizens during 
Southeast Asian conflicts in the 1960s and 1970s) will be treated as refugees 
and granted the ability to immigrate to the United States; 
• Set forth that certain North American Indians born in Canada (i.e., tribes with 
long-established rights to enter and re-enter the U.S.) will have access to 
Medicaid and will have SSI restored; 
• Included Filipino war veterans who fought under U.S. command in WWII, 
and Hmong and Highland Lao veterans who fought on behalf of U.S. forces 
during the Vietnam war as U.S. military veterans (that is, they will be exempt 
from bans on federal benefits); 
• Established that a parent of a battered child who is not a perpetrating parent 
may also receive assistance along with the child. Those agencies that offer 
services to battered spouses and children are permitted, under the BBA, to 
make certain determinations that the individuals are eligible to be treated as 
qualified aliens [also called qualified immigrants] for the purposes of federal 
benefit eligibility;215 and 
• All provisions of the BBA amending PRWORA were effective as though 
included at enactment. In other words, individuals in the categories described 
above who have been terminated from or denied benefits may obtain 
assistance retroactive to August 22, 1996.216 
D. How Did These Medicaid Eligibility Changes Contribute to 
Declining Access to Care? 
Consider the mathematical reality that the proportion of immigrants who arrived 
after 1996 is perpetually growing, while the percentage that arrived before 1996 and 
therefore are eligible for Medicaid is shrinking. As the post-1996 population increases, 
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more individuals will be affected by PRWORA’s restrictions and a greater proportion of 
immigrants will lack access to care. But that is not the entire story; there are those 
immigrants who were in the U.S. in 1996 and are eligible for Medicaid, but for reasons 
described below, choose not enroll. The following section will explore this phenomenon. 
1. “Public Charge” Determination 
a. Background on Public Charge 
Although the words “public charge” do not appear anywhere in PRWORA, the 
concept casts a shadow over all of Title IV: “Restricting Welfare and Public Benefits for 
Aliens.217 The opening section sets the tone for the rest of the Title: 
The Congress makes the following statements concerning national policy with 
respect to welfare and immigration: 
(1) Self-sufficiency has been a basic principle of United States immigration law 
since this country’s earliest immigration statutes. 
(2) It continues to be the immigration policy of the United States that (A) aliens 
within the Nation’s borders not depend on public resources to meet their needs, 
but rather rely on their own capabilities and the resources of their families, their 
sponsors, and private organizations and (B) the availability of public benefits not 
constitute an incentive for immigration to the United States… (Emphasis added). 
[Part 3 Omitted Intentionally]… 
(4) Current eligibility rules for public assistance and unenforceable financial 
support agreements have proved wholly incapable of assuring that individual 
aliens not burden the public benefits system. 
(5) It is a compelling government interest to enact new rules for eligibility and 
sponsorship agreements in order to assure that aliens be self-reliant in accordance 
with national immigration policy. 
(6) It is a compelling government interest to remove the incentive for illegal 
immigration provided by the availability of public benefits…218 (Emphasis 
added). 
The idea that aliens ought not to depend upon the government has been on the 
immigration law books for more than one hundred years, but had rarely been enforced for 
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most of the 20th Century.219 In the wake of the anti-immigrant sentiment that arose in the 
1990s, however, potential dependence became sufficient cause to justify denying 
citizenship applications and, in rare instances, deportation. Despite the severity of its 
impact, until the INS issued its guidance in May 1999,220 nowhere in PRWORA or in 
related agency guidance did the government indicate how public benefit consumption 
could comprise a determination of public charge. This left public charge determinations 
to the discretion of individual governmental agents. 
b. Fear and the Public Charge Label 
While low immigrant enrollment in Medicaid and CHIP is undoubtedly due to 
multiple factors, fear of being labeled a public charge (and subsequent citizenship or 
deportation implications) may be the paramount issue that dissuades immigrants from 
seeking publicly funded health benefits. INS and State Department officials frequently 
refused immigrant applications if they determined the applicant was “likely to become a 
public charge.”221 PRWORA effectively gave the responsibility to enforcing the law’s 
immigrant provisions to the INS. These federal agents were empowered to label an 
immigrant as a public charge, and such a finding could lead to the denial of applications 
for green cards or re-entry to the United States after a trip out of the country.222 
i. Collaboration of INS and State Public Benefits Offices 
Prior to the guidance publication, some INS and federal State Department 
officials made public charge determinations purely on the basis of past or current use of 
non-cash public assistance programs. These officials were explicit that Medicaid receipt 
would harm an immigrant’s chances to adjust their status or become citizens.223 
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Frequently, immigrants refrain from seeking even those health care services to 
which they or their children are entitled, and some speculate the cause to be federal 
regulations that require Medicaid agencies to share all information they receive from 
applicants with the INS and, subsequently, the federal Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS). The DHS now can legally access all data submitted on Medicaid applications, 
including income, assets, and state residency status.224 State welfare agency staff, in fact, 
were mandated to report anyone they suspect may be an illegal alien to the DHS.225 As a 
result, undocumented immigrants reportedly are frequently too fearful of possible 
immigration consequences to apply for aid to cover either themselves or even their 
American-citizen children.226, 227 Fear of being defined as a public charge and thus 
potentially excluded from citizenship or, in extreme cases, even deported keeps 
immigrants wary of using any public health service.228 
It was not uncommon for county health departments to submit to the INS all data 
regarding documentation status for any immigrant who applies for TANF, Food Stamps, 
or General Relief. Medicaid applications were completed and submitted in offices 
bearing signs that caution: “Please be aware that we can send any information you give 
us to INS.” Although the last sentence of such signs explains that: “We will not send 
information from people who are applying for [Medicaid] only,” many immigrants walk 
out before reading that far.229 
ii. Port of Entry Detection Programs 
Some of the most proactive and well documented INS programs occurred in one 
state: California, where officials made public charge determinations exclusively on the 
immigrant’s use of Medicaid and other means-tested health care benefits from1994 
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onward.230 Such campaigns may inform immigrants’ decisions about seeking out health 
care services beyond the Golden State’s borders. 
For example, INS and state officials did not simply exchange information, but 
worked together to exclude entry of potential public charges into the U.S. One effort, to 
identify immigrants and force them to reimburse California for Medi-Cal benefits before 
allowing them to return to the state, was the INS’s “Port of Entry Detection” programs. 
The first such program began in 1994 and sought to identify and, subsequently, inform 
welfare agency staff about primarily Hispanic immigrants who may have illegally 
obtained Medi-Cal coverage. Collaboratively, state officials worked with INS to identify 
possible residency fraud cases.231 
The California Airport Residency (CAR) program was yet another initiative. 
Through CAR, which began in 1994 at the international airport in Los Angeles and two 
years later was expanded to the international airport in San Francisco, state health 
department officials questioned immigrants returning through these airports about their 
use of Medi-Cal-funded services. Those who had received benefits in the last five years 
were frequently barred from re-entry until Medi-Cal benefits were fully reimbursed. After 
a court injunction eventually stopped the state from making these illegal demands, CAR 
continued an amended version of its practice: state officials suggested that immigrants 
may “wish” to refund the state for its health service coverage.232 One state health 
department official reported that, of those detained through CAR, most were racial and 
ethnic minorities: 50 percent were Asian, 25 percent were Latino, and 25 percent were of 
other nationalities.233 
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The California Bureau of State Audits subsequently published a report finding 
these programs “unjustified,” and noted that 86 percent of the individuals investigated by 
the Port of Entry programs were women between the ages of 21 and 40. “The profiles of 
people investigated by the[Port of Entry Detection] and CAR programs contrasted 
sharply with the general profile of people eligible for MediCal benefits,” the report notes, 
adding that “women accounted for 50 percent of the people eligible for Medi-Cal benefits 
but comprised over 97 percent of the Port of Entry Detection and CAR program 
investigations.”234 This suggests that the INS and Department of Health Services officials 
may have targeted immigrant women of childbearing age, those perhaps most visibly in 
need of health care services.235 
iii. Public Charge Lookout System 
Confusion over PRWORA implementation caused immigration officials in 
California to illegally prevent immigrants who had received Medicaid and other benefits 
from re-entering the United States.236 In the mid-to-late 1990s, the State Department and 
the INS jointly implemented the now-defunct “Public Charge Lookout System” which, in 
violation of Medicaid law and policy, obtained information on individual immigrants’ 
past use of state and/or federally-funded public benefits. This information was channeled 
to consular offices, which then barred immigrants seeking to enter the country (or in the 
case of permanent residents, re-enter after a visit abroad) from doing so until they repaid 
the total amount of the benefits received by the immigrant or members of the immigrant’s 
family. 
For example, between July 1997 and April 1998, legal immigrants who had 
received Medi-Cal services in the past and were seeking visas to re-enter the United 
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States were directed to refund the state for costs of health care services paid for by Medi-
Cal. The U.S. State Department had also collected Medicaid use data on legal immigrants 
from nine other states for the same purpose.237 The Public Charge Lookout System 
effectively separated parents from children for months as sponsoring families pooled 
their resources to reimburse public coffers for legally-obtained social services. 238 
When the Public Charge Lookout System was disbanded, and in response to a 
class action lawsuit,239 California’s health department reported that as many as 2,000 
legal immigrants were due refunds totaling $3.5 million.240 In the words of one study, 
“The [Public Charge Lookout System] system was recently terminated, but news of these 
practices spread widely through immigrant communities and continues to have a 
devastating impact on immigrants’ access to public health services.”241 
iv. Deportation Fears Heightened After September 11, 2001 
Advocates for immigrant communities have long argued that both individual and 
the public health are jeopardized when concerns about immigration status deters 
immigrant families from seeking care. Since September 11, 2001, worries about 
deportation have become more pronounced. Groups such as the Asian/Pacific American 
Legal Center, the Broward Immigration Coalition, the California Primary Care 
Association, the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund, and the National 
Immigration Law Project and others wrote a letter to the CMS Administrator raising 
these issues. “Our organizations often hear reports of immigrant families who avoided 
needed health care because of fears that family members will be reported to the 
Department of Homeland Security.”242 
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Indeed, this phenomenon has been recognized by the Department of Justice: 
“‘Federal and State benefit granting agencies’ had reported that immigrants’ concerns 
about using health services were creating ‘significant negative public health 
consequences across the country…This situation is becoming particularly acute with 
respect to the provision of emergency and other medical assistance, children’s 
immunization, and basic nutrition programs, as well as the treatment of communicable 
diseases.” Immigrants’ fears of obtaining these necessary medical and other benefits are 
not only causing them considerable harm, but are also jeopardizing the general 
public.’”243 
c. INS Guidance on Public Charge 
In May 1999, INS for the first time defined “public charge” as an alien who has 
become (for deportation purposes) or is likely to become (for admission or adjustment of 
status purposes) “primarily dependent on the government for subsistence, as 
demonstrated by either the receipt of public cash assistance for income maintenance, or 
institutionalization for long-term care at government expense.”244 
The guidance sought to reassure immigrants that Medicaid receipt (except for 
long-term care institutionalization) would not define them as a public charge. “The focus 
of public charge is on cash benefits for income maintenance and institutionalization for 
long-term care at government expense,” it noted, specifying that “[the] INS and [the] 
State [Department] will not consider participation in Medicaid or CHIP, or similar state-
funded programs, for public charge purposes.”245, 246 The inclusion of long-term 
institutional care receipt in the definition of “public charge” as the sole Medicaid-funded 
service included in the INS guidance was supported by the U.S. Department of Health 
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and Human Services.247 In a May 1999 memo clarifying the public charge guidance, INS 
regional directors were told that, “… if there is no reimbursement requirement under law, 
the alien cannot be said to be a public charge.”248 
That it took the federal government almost three years from PRWORA’s passage 
to clarify the impact of public benefits receipt on INS public charge determinations was 
significant both to immigrants and to state Medicaid agencies. Prior to May 1999, needy 
immigrants—even pregnant women whose children would be American citizens—had to 
guess what health care services INS and state Medicaid agency staff would consider 
worthy of the feared public charge determination that could thwart a citizenship 
application or cause deportation. Frequently, they refrained from accepting benefits 
altogether.249, 250 This seemed especially true of undocumented aliens: one study 
concluded that fear of immigration-related consequences resulted in deferred treatment, 
and another found that “…undocumented individuals consistently indicated that they 
would refrain from seeking care or delay care due to fear of the immigration 
consequences.”251 Mixed-status families faced similar barriers, such that even eligible 
family members delayed seeking care for fear of the possible impact on undocumented 
relatives.252 
d. Impact of the Guidance 
When INS issued its guidance, HHS Deputy Secretary Kevin Thurm noted that: 
‘We have been concerned for quite some time about the confusion and 
fear in immigrant communities that accepting certain government benefits 
would jeopardize their ability to become legal U.S. residents…. I am 
particularly pleased that virtually all health services and benefits—
including Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program 
(CHIP)—are exempt from the public charge test for admission, 
adjustment, or deportation.’253 
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In a memo from INS’s Executive Associate Commissioner for Field Operations 
dated May 20, 1999—the day that INS issued its guidance—all INS regional directors 
were informed that “IIRIRA did not create any requirements that aliens repay benefits 
received in the past in order to avoid being found inadmissible on public charge grounds, 
nor has such a requirement existed in the past. Accordingly, officers should not instruct or 
suggest that aliens must repay benefits previously received as a condition of admission or 
adjustment, and they should not request proof of repayment as a condition of finding the 
alien admissible to the United States.”254 (Emphasis mine.) 
The memo goes on to state that, “If an INS officer finds evidence of possible 
benefit fraud in the course of performing his or her immigration duties, that information 
should be forwarded through official channels to the appropriate benefit-granting agency 
for possible investigation and enforcement action. In such cases, absent a determination 
of fraud by the benefit-granting agency, immigration benefits to which the alien is 
otherwise entitled should not be withheld or denied.” 255 (Emphasis mine) 
Dissemination of the guidance to immigrant communities was the next step.256 
But in light of the highly-publicized stories of INS and Medicaid agency collaborations, 
many immigrants continue to fear that enrolling in Medicaid or allowing their children to 
enroll in SCHIP is dangerous. Until they see that their neighbors are obtaining green 
cards despite receiving publicly-funded health benefits that they are not forced to repay, 
many immigrants are likely to continue avoiding any government-funded health care.257, 
258 This chilling effect on Medicaid enrollment and access to care for immigrants would 
have disturbing consequences on public health. 
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2. Confusing Eligibility Requirements 
Another way in which Medicaid eligibility changes contributed to declining 
access to care is the slow penetration of policy changes at the agency level. County clinic 
administrators complained that, because of the multi-year lag between the passage of 
federal legislation and its ultimate implementation on the state and local levels, there are 
no consistent, reliable information sources regarding eligibility. INS and Medicaid 
agency staff frequently offered conflicting guidance.259 
Evolving policy changes that accompanied PRWORA and BBA implementation 
also made it difficult for Medicaid agency staff to determine eligibility.260 These staff 
were not well-informed of the ever-emerging distinctions in immigrant Medicaid 
eligibility. As a result, Medicaid applications of pregnant immigrants seeking prenatal 
care in California were not approved for almost nine months.261 Confusion over new 
policies may be responsible for the sharp mid-1990s decline in new Medicaid cases.262 
3. Language Barriers 
Talk has been called the “main ingredient in health care” and “the fundamental 
instrument … by which therapeutic goals are achieved.”263 Lack of linguistic 
concordance, therefore, is a well-documented barrier to both effective communication 
and effective care. Studies have found that interpreter services and culturally-sensitive 
care are essential components of high-quality care for non-English speaking 
immigrants,264 but the insufficient supply of bilingual clinicians and the lack of third-
party reimbursement for interpreter services can make language barriers 
insurmountable.265 Compounding these problems further is the heterogeneity of 
immigrant minority communities. For example, “Asian and Pacific Islanders” are defined 
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as a single group for census calculations, but this category includes fifty different 
population groups and 150 language and dialects.266 
A related problem is the complexity of the Medicaid application process which, as 
difficult as it is for English-speakers, can be overwhelming for immigrants. In many 
cases, Medicaid is the only way that low-income qualified immigrants who legally 
resided in this country when PRWORA passed are able to access health care. Indeed, in 
1997, non-English speakers comprised 25 percent of those eligible for Medicaid in 
California.267 
Consciousness of patient population’s cultural norms is another critical factor in 
both outreach and care. One hospital sought actively to bring in Medicaid patients in a 
largely Chinese-speaking community, but was largely unsuccessful, in part because the 
hospital’s main telephone number was comprised mainly of the number four—which in 
Mandarin is the numerological equivalent of the word “death.”268 Factors such as these 
may seem obscure to policy-makers, but are critical to increasing access to care among 
immigrant communities. 
4. Administrative Barriers 
a. Old Medicaid Application Forms Still in Use 
Another barrier to Medicaid for immigrants is the use of pre-PRWORA Medicaid 
application forms, which in some states remained in use for years after the law passed. 
These outdated forms often required parental immigration status and incorrectly stated 
that an applicant’s residency status could be impacted by enrollment in Medicaid.269 
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b. Residency is Often Fluid or Impossible to Prove 
Particularly in urban areas where rent may be above the means of a single family, 
it is common for multiple families of immigrants to reside at one address. Not every 
surname may appear on the utility bills or the rental agreement, which are often required 
to prove state residency for Medicaid eligibility. Similarly, seasonal workers frequently 
live in makeshift housing alongside fields in which they work during the harvest. There is 
no way to identify a formal address for such immigrants.270 
c. Seasonal Workers’ Incomes Exceed Eligibility Limits During Harvest 
Periods 
An applicant’s household income must be assessed in order to determine 
Medicaid eligibility, but this can be a challenging task when seasonal workers earn wages 
within the “informal economy,” where there are no written records of their salaries or of 
the hours they worked.271 Further compounding this problem is the introduction of 
assessing Medicaid eligibility quarterly (post-PRWORA) rather than annually (as was 
done pre-PRWORA). While seasonal workers’ gross annual incomes usually fall 
substantially below the federal poverty level, their income accrues unevenly during the 
year. Medicaid eligibility may be easy to prove during the winter, when many are out of 
work. However, during the harvest season when seasonal workers’ incomes are at their 
peak, incomes may exceed the Medicaid income threshold for a short while. This 
phenomenon, according to those providing prenatal care, leads pregnant immigrant 
women to postpone seeking prenatal care until the harvest season ends.272 
d. Determination of Eligibility for Emergency Services 
There are barriers to emergency services for post-1996 immigrants because most 
states will not declare that immigrants are eligible until after the emergency has occurred. 
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While some states (such as California) allow all immigrants, even undocumented, to 
apply for an “emergency-only” Medicaid card, most states (such as New York, Texas, 
and Florida) offer Medicaid coverage for emergencies only after the emergency occurred. 
The latter model serves as a deterrent for seeking care because immigrants do not know 
whether there will be any assistance in paying for it.273 
E. Consequences, Intended and Unintended, of PRWORA on 
Immigrants 
As Congress came to recognize some of the unintended consequences of 
PRWORA, it made efforts to reverse policies that were particularly onerous for 
immigrants. The Agricultural Research, Extension, and Education Act of 1998 for 
example, which was approved by Congress on June 4, 1998, restored food stamp 
eligibility to immigrants who are children, elderly, or disabled and who resided in the 
U.S. before August 1996. Subsequently, the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 
2002 reinstated food stamp eligibility to several groups, regardless of when they arrived 
in the U.S., including legal immigrants residing in the country for five years, children, 
and legal immigrants who receive disability benefits.274, 275 The Immigrant Children’s 
Health Improvement Act of 2003 now allows immigrants to become eligible for 
assistance after demonstrating five years of work history. This last measure revises the 
PRWORA requirement that immigrants demonstrate ten years of work history.276 In the 
meantime, however, PRWORA affected many aspects of the safety net for America’s 
newest residents. 
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1. Declines in Immigrant use of Social Services 
Immigrants are more likely than non-immigrants to need Medicaid coverage for 
several reasons: immigrants are poorer (see Table 3.2), less likely to be covered by 
employer-based health insurance, less likely to have a usual source of care, and have 
lower health care service utilization rates than their U.S.-born counterparts.277 
Table 3.2 
Percentage of women 15–44 who are covered by Medicaid 278 
Poor* Total
1994 2001 1994 2001 
United States (Total) 46.5 35.0 12.6 10.1 
Native born 48.8 38.9 12.4 10.3 
Immigrants (Total) 36.0 20.6 14.8 9.0 
Naturalized citizens 35.4 27.6 6.7 7.3 
Non-citizens (Total) 36.0 19.4 17.1 9.6 
Long-standing residents** 41.1 23.2 17.3 10.5 
Recent immigrants*** 25.6 15.3 16.4 8.3 
*Women in families with incomes under federal poverty level ($15,260 for family of three in 2003). 
**Long-standing residents in 1994 were those who had been in the United States prior to 1990; long-
standing residents in 2001 were those who had been in the United States prior to 1996. 
***Recent immigrants in 1994 were those who had arrived in 1992 or later; recent immigrants in 2001 
were those who arrived in 1997 or later. 
Note: CPS data include some information on undocumented immigrants, although that information is 
generally acknowledged to be a considerable undercount of that population group. 
Source: The Alan Guttmacher Institute, tabulations of data from U.S. Census Bureau Current Population 
Survey, 1995–2002. 
However, immigrants are disproportionately less likely than U.S.-born residents 
to use social service benefits. In fact, a University of Maryland study concluded that 
immigrants pay between $12,000 and $20,000 more in taxes than they use in social 
services over their lifetimes.279 Using 1993 Census Bureau data, only 6 percent of 
immigrants collected any type of cash welfare benefit (i.e., AFDC, SSI, or General 
Assistance). This uptake, while slightly higher than U.S.-born residents, was concentrated 
among refugees and elderly immigrants. Among the poor, immigrants were less likely 
(16 percent) than their US-born counterparts (25 percent) to receive welfare benefits.280 
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2. Immigrant Usage of Medicaid Declines 
PRWORA limited the eligibility of certain immigrant subgroups from the 
Medicaid program, but it appears to also have affected Medicaid enrollment by the still-
eligible immigrant population. After its enactment, the gap between enrollment of 
qualified immigrants and U.S.-born citizens grew, even after controlling for 
socioeconomic status, state policies, and unemployment rates.281 Indeed, use of Medicaid 
by immigrants has been steadily declining since the mid-1990s.282 Throughout the 
country, clinics are providing preventive care to fewer children and pregnant women.283 
The same phenomenon began occurring in public hospitals. In order for public 
hospitals to receive Medicaid reimbursement for emergency care delivered to 
nonqualified aliens, they must verify immigration status; failure to do so prohibits them 
from reimbursement for services rendered.284 
Many immigrants responded to inquiries by hospital staff by simply avoiding care 
and withdrawing from the Medicaid program. The proportion of poor non-citizen women 
enrolled in Medicaid decreased by almost half, from 36 percent in 1994 to 19 percent in 
2001. In fact, the decline of legal immigrants’ participation in all welfare programs 
between 1994 and 1999 were substantial: TANF (-60 percent), food stamps (-48 percent), 
SSI (-32 percent) and Medicaid (-15 percent).285 
Despite a Center for Immigration Studies (CIS) report that suggests the opposite, 
Medicaid enrollment among non-citizens did decrease after welfare reform. (Several 
studies noted that the CIS report relied upon improper methodology.)286, 287 Not only 
were non-citizens less likely to receive Medicaid, but the percentage of non-citizens 
enrolled in the program declined from 1996 to 2001. Furthermore, non-citizen enrollment 
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remained constant between 2001 and 2002, during which time enrollment rate among 
non-immigrants increased.288 
Similar analysis of the CPS for March 1995 through 2000 indicates that there 
were reductions in non-citizen use of Medicaid from 1994 through 1999. Among LPR 
alien families, there was a 15 percent decline in Medicaid use. Among low-income (i.e., 
incomes below 200 percent of the federal poverty level) refugee families, Medicaid usage 
decreased 36 percent from 1994 to 1999. 289 When the unit of analysis is the individual, 
rather than the family, Medicaid use fell by 23 percent among individual LPR aliens, and 
58 percent among refugee aliens during the same time period.290 
3. Loss of Medicaid for Immigrants Means More are Uninsured 
With respect to health insurance status, immigrants have been a particularly 
vulnerable group, even before welfare reform. Prior to PRWORA, nearly 43 percent of 
non-citizen immigrants were uninsured—which is three times the national average,291 and 
uninsurance among immigrants continued to grow,292 even among children. By 1999, 
American-born offspring of LPRs (27.4 percent) and undocumented immigrants (39.3 
percent) experienced higher uninsurance rates than children of U.S. citizens (20 
percent),293 even though all three groups of youngsters shared U.S. citizenship status. 
The loss of Medicaid exacerbated the problem. Immigrant participation in 
Medicaid declined more sharply than the overall Medicaid population.294 To wit, in 1995, 
54 percent of low-income non-citizens immigrants were uninsured, but with the 
PRWORA-imposed loss of Medicaid coverage, uninsurance rates for this group rose to 
59 percent by 1998.295 
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Rising numbers of uninsured immigrants is a logical consequence of PRWORA, 
which relied upon non-citizens to shoulder a disproportionately high amount of the 
measure’s total savings. Restrictions on welfare benefits for immigrants were expected to 
total $23 billion, or nearly half of the total federal savings anticipated from PRWORA.296 
This monetary goal, however, was thwarted by the BBA, which restored Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI) and Medicaid benefits to all disabled and elderly immigrants 
receiving SSI when PRWORA was enacted. The BBA also restored SSI and Medicaid to 
all immigrants who resided on U.S. soil when PRWORA was enacted who become 
disabled in the future. Additionally, the BBA restored additional benefits to refugees 
while simultaneously widening the pool of immigrants treated as refugees.297 
4. Increased Uninsurance Means Lower Utilization among Immigrants 
For immigrant populations, not only did Medicaid enrollment fall, but usage of 
health care services declined, as well. Research conducted in states with large immigrant 
populations provides important information about the use of health care services by 
uninsured and poor immigrants during the mid-to-late 1990s and beyond. For example, 
evidence indicates that California immigrants, concerned about legal repercussions of 
Proposition 187, refrained from hospital or clinic use until their conditions became 
severe. Rates of child immunizations went down while rates of catastrophic illness went 
up.298 Indeed, in the weeks after Prop 187 became law, many hospital outpatient clinics 
experienced significant drops in patient visits. Four Los Angeles public clinics reported 
declines of 50 to 75 percent during the week after the new law was passed.299 
Uninsured immigrants in Texas faced similar issues. A July 2001 decision 
rendered by then-Texas Attorney General John Cornyn stated that PRWORA prohibited 
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the Harris County Hospital District in metropolitan Houston from providing free or 
reduced-fee nonemergency health care to undocumented immigrants. He noted that 
violation of this provision may result in sanctions to the district, as well as possible “legal 
consequences pursuant to state law for spending public funds for an unauthorized 
purpose.”300 
Cornyn supported his position with language from PRWORA, which requires 
post-August 22, 1996 enactment of a state law explicitly making illegal immigrants 
eligible for any state or local public benefit.301 The seventy-seventh session of the Texas 
Legislature ended on May 28, 2001, nearly two months before Cornyn’s statement, and 
would not meet again to consider legislation clarifying its position on health care for 
undocumented immigrants until January 2003.302 In the interim, at least two of Texas’s 
county hospitals stopped serving undocumented persons pursuant to Cornyn’s opinion.303 
Just north of Houston, the Montgomery County Hospital District trustees voted 
unanimously to remove over 400 illegal aliens from its indigent care program because 
they “feared prosecution if the district continued to provide such care.”304 
In 2003, the Texas legislature in its seventy-eighth session enacted legislation that 
met Cornyn’s requirements.305 The Legislature’s House Research Organization’s bill 
analysis for that measure notes that: 
Texas has a public health interest in treating immigrants to prevent the 
spread of infectious disease. …Federal exemptions to PRWORA allow 
undocumented immigrants to obtain vaccinations and treatment for 
communicable disease. However, these services alone are not sufficient to 
protect the public health, and communities should be able to offer access 
to preventive health care for legal immigrants….306 
Further interpretation by Attorney General Greg Abbott indicates that Texas law, with 
this new provision, “permits, but does not require, a hospital district to provide 
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nonemergency public health services to undocumented persons who are otherwise 
ineligible for those benefits under federal law.”307 (Emphasis mine.) 
5. Clinicians Unnecessarily Burdened 
a. Hurts Patient/Clinician Relationship 
Requiring that clinicians effectively act as an agent for the state by reporting 
patients they believe are undocumented aliens, some fear, can weaken the doctor–patient 
relationship, create an incentive for patients to lie to their caregivers,308 and erode the 
trust that is critical between clinicians and those in their care.309 It also puts physicians in 
the sometimes contradictory role of policeman and advocate for his or her patients. “If 
physicians report illegal immigrants to help enforce the law and balance the state budget, 
why not also identify tax evaders, traffic-ticket scofflaws, or parents who fail to pay child 
support?”310 
b. Determining What is “Communicable” 
There is not always a clear and immediate delineation between patients with 
communicable diseases and those with other conditions. For example, a chronic cough 
could be a consequence of a lung tumor, asthma, or tuberculosis. The presence of a 
communicable disease can only be established after a clinical evaluation, which often 
requires tests and therapy.311 PRWORA does not address how such interventions are to 
be funded. 
c. Medical Ethics Violations 
PRWORA mandates that clinicians only provide care for communicable diseases, 
such that if two patients present with identical symptoms (e.g., a chronic cough), but one 
is due to documented asthma and the other documented tuberculosis, the physician may 
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only provide care to the latter one. In the words of one hospital’s chief of pediatrics, 
“‘This is morally reprehensible, and it is contrary to every canon of modern medical 
ethics of which I am aware.’” The Hippocratic Oath, he notes, makes no reference to 
citizenship status.312 
d. Hurts Safety Net 
In the words of two researchers, removing people from Medicaid eligibility does 
not alter their need for health care, but instead: 
shifts the burden from the Medicaid system to the network of safety-net 
providers… who will have to try to stretch their already scarce revenues 
even farther. Complicating the situation even more, immigrants may be a 
particularly expensive group to serve, as reflected in the dramatic 
increases in expenditures for language assistance….313 
Hospitals report that they are unable to receive reimbursement for even 
emergency Medicaid services because patients fear possible INS-related consequences if 
they file Medicaid application forms.314 FQHCs and hospitals serving immigrant 
communities are thus faced with even greater uncompensated care than other delivery 
sites within the safety net. 315 In this way, rather than reducing illegal immigration, in the 
words of one commentator, PRWORA’s restrictions on Medicaid-funded health care for 
immigrants threatens the survival of the safety net and therefore the health of the greater 
community.316 
To address this concern, the American Medical Association (AMA) will “actively 
lobby the federal and state governments to restore and maintain funding for public health 
care benefits for all legal immigrants,” and will “lobby Congress to adequately 
appropriate and dispense funds for the current programs that provide reimbursement for 
the health care of undocumented aliens.” Moreover, the AMA is calling for the federal 
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government to provide reasonable payment for federally mandated medical screening 
examinations and further examination and treatment needed to stabilize a condition in 
patients presenting to hospital emergency departments when payment from other public 
or private sources is not available.317 
6. Potential Impact on Health Care Disparities 
In general, as poor immigrants face greater barriers to care and as these 
populations simultaneously continue to be disproportionately members of racial and 
ethnic minority groups, a greater proportion of racial and ethnic minorities will be facing 
access barriers. There are, however, also some very specific ways in which PRWORA 
impacts access to health care services disproportionately for minority groups, and thereby 
furthering health care disparities. PRWORA establishes that, for example, treatment for 
breast and cervical cancer are only covered by Medicaid in emergency situations, and 
screening services are not covered at all. Research from the Centers for Disease Control 
indicates that low use of screenings may be why Hispanic women, who have a higher 
incidence of cervical cancer, have a greater likelihood of presenting in a more advanced 
phase than non-Hispanic women. Unequal access to screenings across racial and ethnic 
groups can result in different health outcomes.318 
7. Emergency Department Overcrowding 
Under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA) of 1986, 
emergency departments (also called “emergency rooms”) must provide care for all, 
regardless of citizenship status. But hospitals must decide in most states whether to 
provide emergency care for post-PRWORA immigrants without first knowing if they will 
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be reimbursed by Medicaid. It is an unfair burden on ERs in areas with high 
concentrations of post-PRWORA immigrants. 
8. Care May be More Expensive in the Long Term 
Proscriptions against preventive and primary care for immigrants may not 
encourage the most evidence-based or the most cost-effective practices. It may be less 
expensive, for instance, to offer a patient with diabetes ongoing primary care and avoid 
the expensive emergency treatment needed for the kidney failure caused by untreated 
diabetes. Similarly, costs of prenatal care for even undocumented immigrants may be 
lower than the costs of providing ongoing care for their U.S.-born children, whose health 
conditions may have been preventable with prenatal care.319 
Disallowing immigrant prenatal care, in most cases, is not cost-effective, since 
children born in the United States, regardless of parental citizenship status, are American 
citizens and therefore eligible for publicly-funded health benefits. In other words, health 
conditions that were preventable and less expensively treated with prenatal care will 
become the burden of U.S. taxpayers, unless the child dies as a result of those preventable 
conditions.  
F. Conclusion 
This chapter outlined in depth the impact of major federal legislation (including 
the IIRIRA, PRWORA, and the BBA) on immigrant health care. Specifically, it explored 
the background of PRWORA’s immigrant restrictions, how some restrictions were 
reversed by the BBA, and how the measures appear to have resulted in diminished 
access. Different classifications of immigrants under PRWORA are described. 
Additionally, this section explored immigrants’ barriers to care, including fear of a 
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“public charge” determination and of repaying the state the cost of any Medicaid benefits 
before being considered for citizenship. It highlighted several major administrative 
barriers to accessing care, and then discussed consequences of PRWORA, including 
diminished use of health care. Finally, it looked at the burdens PRWORA placed on 
clinicians, and suggests that PRWORA’s intent to control Medicaid costs have actually 
backfired. chapter 5 will build on the foundation of federal changes established in 
chapters 3 and 4 by looking at how these changes in federal policy translated into 
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Part Two: Maryland’s Low-Income Health Care Market 
Chapter 5: Maryland Social Policy Landscape Before the 
Study Period 
A. Overview of Maryland Demographics 
1. Racial and Ethnic Profile in Maryland, Pre-1996 
For the 30 years preceding the study period, Maryland was significantly less 
white, more black, roughly as Asian, and less Hispanic than the nation as a whole. 
Table 4.1 
Total and Minority Populations in U.S., 1970–1990 
UNITED 
STATES 





Whites 177,748,975 87.5 188,371,622 83.1 199,686,070 80.3 12.3 
Asians 1,538,721 0.8 3,500,439 1.5 7,273,662 2.9 372.7 
Blacks 22,580,289 11.1 26,495,025 11.7 29,986,060 12.1 32.8 
Hispanic Origin 
(of any race) N/A N/A 14,608,673 6.4 22,354,059 9.0 53.0* 
White, Non-




827,255 0.4 1,420,400 0.6 1,959,234 0.8 136.8 
Total 203,211,926 100 226,545,805 100 248,709,873 100 22.4 
* Denotes Percent Change 1980–1990; Source: U.S. Census320, 321 
Table 4.2 indicates that Maryland had a smaller proportion of whites in 1970 
(81.5 percent) compared with the U.S. (87.5 percent), a 6.0 percentage point difference. 
That difference grew to 8.2 percentage points by 1980 and 9.3 percentage points by 1990. 
Black Marylanders accounted for 17.8 percent of the state’s total population in 1970 
(compared to 11.1 percent in the U.S.—a 6.7 percentage point difference), 22.7 percent in 
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1980 (compared with 11.7 percent in the U.S.—an 11.0 percentage point difference), and 
24.9 percent in 1990 (compared with 12.1 percent in the U.S.—a 12.8 percentage point 
difference). 
Table 4.2 
Total and Minority Populations in Maryland, 1970–1990 





Whites 3,194,888 81.5 3,158,838 74.9 3,393,964 71.0 6.2 
Asians 17,944 0.5 64,278 1.5 139,719 2.9 678.6 
Blacks 699,479 17.8 958,150 22.7 1,189,899 24.9 70.1 
Hispanic Origin (of any 
race) 
N/A N/A 64,746 1.5 125,102 2.6 93.2* 
White, non-Hispanic N/A N/A 3,116,160 73.9 3,326,109 69.6 67.3* 
American 
Indian/Eskimo/Aleut 
4,239 0.1 8,021 0.2 12,972 0.3 206.0 
Total 3,922,399 100 4,216,975 100 4,781,468 100 21.9 
* Denotes percent change 1980–1990; Source: Maryland Department of Planning322and U.S. Census323 
The percentage growth of Asian Marylanders has almost identically mirrored the 
percentage of Asian Americans since 1970. Although Asians represented 0.5 percent of 
the state population (and 0.8 percent nationally) in 1970, Asians comprised 1.5 percent of 
the population of both the state and the U.S. in 1980 and nearly doubled a decade later to 
make up 2.9 percent of both the state and national population in 1990. 
Although data on Hispanics are not available for 1970, in 1980 Maryland’s 
Hispanic population of any race (1.5 percent) lagged significantly behind that of the U.S. 
(6.4 percent). The gap grew from 4.9 percentage points in 1980 to 6.4 percentage points 
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in 1990, when Hispanics comprised 2.6 percent of the state and 9.0 percent of the 
national populations. 
a. Baltimore 
Baltimore is Maryland’s only large urban center, although when the low-income 
populations of the small urban towns near the Washington, DC border are combined, the 
numbers rival those of Baltimore. Like many inner city urban areas, Baltimore has 
concentrated pockets of poor minorities. In the 20 year period from 1970 to 1990, the 
total population of the city declined nearly 19 percent while the white population fell by 
about 40 percent. Unemployment remained high throughout that period, with the 
percentage of Baltimorians in the labor force hovering at about 60 percent. 
Table 4.3 
Baltimore Demographics 
BALTIMORE 1970 1980 1990 Percent change  
1970–1990 
White 479,837 345,133 289,041 -39.8 
Non-White 425,922 441,662 446,973 4.9 
Total Population 905,759 786,795 736,014 -18.7 
Percent in labor force 58.6 57.0 60.7 3.6 
Per capita income (2000$) $15,013 $18,152 $22,277 48.4 
Source: U.S. Census324 and Maryland Department of Planning.325 
2. Immigrant Profile in Maryland, Pre-1996 
The state’s immigrant communities were and continue to be concentrated in the 
DC suburbs, particularly in Montgomery County. In some DC suburbs, immigrants 
comprise the majority of the local population.326 Indeed, the greater Washington, DC area 
is considered one of the three emerging immigrant gateways according to immigration 
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researchers, along with Atlanta and Dallas, because of the sharp increase of immigrants 
in these regions over the last twenty years.327 
Table 4.4 
Foreign Born in Metro-Baltimore and Metro-Washington, 1970–2000 
1970 1980 1990 
Total % Total % Total % 
Baltimore 57,374 2.8 73,759 3.4 87,660 3.7
Washington (DC, MD, VA, WV) 130,328 4.5 253,329 7.8 489,668 11.6
Source: The Brookings Institute. 328 
Metropolitan Baltimore, as indicated by Table 4.4, also has a growing immigrant 
community, though it is not growing as quickly as the metropolitan DC population. 
Baltimore also has a sizable refugee population, and a refugee health clinic sits across the 
street from the main Maryland Department of Social Services office.329 
B. Maryland’s Low-Income Health Care Market 
1. Key Players 
There are several key players in Maryland’s low-income health care market. Each 
plays a separate and critical role in ensuring access to care for low-income populations. 
In no particular order, critical stakeholders include: 
• Poor Marylanders, located throughout the state and found in concentrated 
pockets within Baltimore, 
• The Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DHMH), which 
administers the Medicaid program, 
• The Maryland Department of Social Services, which administers the state’s 
welfare program (including the delinking of cash assistance from Medicaid), 
• The Maryland Insurance Administration (MIA), which regulates the managed 
care companies in the state, 
• Each of the managed care companies that contract with the state to provide 
care to Medicaid beneficiaries, which will be described in greater detail in 
later chapters, 
• Care delivery sites that historically have provided care to the state’s Medicaid 
population, particularly the state’s community health centers and federally 
qualified health centers (including Health Care for the Homeless clinics), 
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which for decades have been providing care to low-income Marylanders 
regardless of insurance status or ability to pay, 
• Others providing care to Maryland’s Medicaid and non-Medicaid poor 
populations, 
• Τhe University of Maryland, Baltimore County’s (UMBC) Center for Health 
Program Development and Management, which conceptualized the state’s 
mandatory Medicaid managed care program and currently contracts with the 
state to maintain and analyze program data on utilization, and 
• Τhe groups of consumer advocacy organizations, such as the Maryland 
Alliance for the Poor and Catholic Charities, who work with low-income 
populations to ensure access to health care services. 
2. Financing the Low-Income Health Care Market: Rising Costs of 
Medicaid 
Maryland is, in many ways, a microcosm of the nation, and its reaction to national 
economic and political trends frequently reflects other states’ experiences. For example, 
personal health care expenditures in Maryland rose steadily from 1991 to 1998, with an 
average annual increase of 4.7 percent, which almost exactly reflects the national 
average.330 This has been driving both Maryland’s and the nation’s desire to pursue 
managed care, in both the private and public sectors, as a key cost containment measure. 
a. Maryland’s Struggling Economy 
The beginning of the 1990s was not kind to Maryland’s economy. According to 
the Maryland Department of Fiscal Services (now the Maryland Department of 
Legislative Services), construction and service industries suffered setbacks as federal 
defense spending declined. From 1990 to 1992, the state lost 109,600 jobs, roughly 5 
percent of its workforce.331 The result: simultaneous increases in state spending and 
sluggish growth of state revenues.332 
By the mid-1990s, Maryland was facing a serious fiscal crisis. The state’s 
Medicaid program covered only half of the state’s residents with income below the 
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federal poverty level, yet Medicaid costs were spiraling out of control. Indeed, although 
eligibility levels for Maryland Medicaid throughout this time period were below the 
national averages,333 combined rising Medicaid enrollment and health care inflation 
doubled the Medicaid budget in six years (1989 to 1994), and by fiscal year 1994, 
Medicaid was the greatest single expenditure of state government.334 Officials throughout 
the state feared the fallout of a federal reduction in Medicaid coverage. This anxiety was 
heightened during the congressional welfare reform debate, when federal lawmakers 
considered establishing a Medicaid block grant to states—which would have wreaked 
havoc on Maryland’s efforts to cover costs for its poor populations.335 It was in this 
context that Medicaid managed care’s promise of cost reductions became so attractive. 
b. Historic Medicaid Care Delivery Sites 
During the 1980s, both expansions in Medicaid coverage for pregnant women and 
children and then the establishment of the federally qualified health center (FQHC) 
program led to a symbiotic relationship between Medicaid and community health centers 
(CHCs). The FQHC program enabled CHCs to expand coverage to larger Medicaid and 
Medicare populations, for whom they were getting a “reasonable cost-based” 
governmental reimbursement. 
This expansion and assured reimbursement also allowed CHCs to care for more of 
the increasing uninsured populations. In fact, CHCs nationally identified grants and 
Medicaid (35 and 34 percent, respectively) as their two greatest revenue sources in the 
early 1990s.336 Maryland’s CHCs, however, were even more dependent upon Medicaid, 
which comprised nearly 46 percent of CHC revenues during the same time period.337 A 
GAO study cautioned that CHCs are financially vulnerable if they grow dependent on 
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Medicaid prepaid managed care for a substantial percentage of their revenues, if they 
negotiate inadequate capitation rates, or if they assume risk outside of primary health 
care. 338 
3. Overview of the State’s Medicaid Managed Care Programs as a Cost 
Containment Strategy 
Maryland has one of the longest histories of Medicaid managed care of any 
state.339 In the City of Baltimore, the state began contracting with Medicaid health 
maintenance organizations (HMOs) in 1974.340 Medicaid costs stabilized as enrollment 
stayed steady at approximately 340,000 per month during the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
but by fiscal year 1994, average enrollment was roughly 444,000 per month.341 As noted 
above, this doubled the Medicaid budget in the six years between 1989 and 1994, making 
it the largest single expenditure of state government.342 As Maryland’s Medicaid budgets 
continued to rise annually, managed care companies were attracted to the state with the 
hopes of capitalizing on Medicaid’s growing market share. 
The state responded to rising enrollment and costs by pursuing more aggressive 
managed care strategies to contain Medicaid costs. By the late 1980s, Maryland was a 
national leader in developing a primary care case management (PCCM) model for its 
Medicaid program as a way to contain cost, but the PCCM program proved inadequate 
during the budget crisis of the early 1990s. The financial crunch became the primary 
factor driving the Maryland Medicaid program toward exploration into various new 
forms of managed care.  The state initiated three separate managed care systems for its 
Medicaid population in the 1990s alone:  the PCCM system, which was a combination of 
case management and support services, then an integrated delivery systems for patients 
with severe and costly conditions (which was only partially implemented and then 
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abandoned), and finally, mandatory enrollment of beneficiaries in competing, capitated 
MCOs.  Despite the existence of these programs in Maryland, prior to the 1996 
introduction of mandated Medicaid managed care programs, only about 21 percent of 
Maryland’s Medicaid enrollees opted for full-risk managed care.343 Nonetheless, the push 
to contain Medicaid costs would substantially alter Medicaid’s health care delivery 
structure in Maryland and throughout the country. 
a. Maryland Access to Care (MAC) Program 
In 1991, the state began MAC, a PCCM system operating under a federal waiver 
to Section 1915 of the Medicaid law. Its goals were to improve access to primary and 
preventive services, promote appropriate use of medical services, improve continuity of 
care, increase clinician participation, and reduce costs. At the time of its inception, MAC 
was the largest mandatory Medicaid PCCM program in the country.344 
Each enrollee was assigned to (i.e., was not permitted to select) a primary care 
provider (PCP), that is, a physician or clinical group to serve as a “gatekeeper.”345 (A 
gatekeeper is a clinician who coordinates all aspects of patient care and provides referrals 
to laboratories, hospitals, and specialists.)  MAC required preauthorization for emergency 
room or other specialty services, and PCPs were paid on a fee-for-service basis with 
augmented reimbursement to encourage participation. All Medicaid enrollees were 
assigned to MAC except the following exempt groups: those eligible for Medicare; 
voluntary HMO enrollees; those in institutional, foster, or hospice care; and participants 
in special programs for diabetes, sickle cell, and corrective case management. By 
December 1992 (twelve months after MAC began operations), 70 percent of the 
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Medicaid eligible were enrolled (i.e., 300,000). In its first year, the state estimated that it 
had saved $35 million on patient services. 346 
b. Voluntary MCO Program 
In addition to the MAC program, between 1988 and 1995 a statewide HMO 
option became available to Medicaid beneficiaries who volunteered to participate. 
Voluntary MMC enrollment in HMOs increased fourfold to 126,000 by late 1995,347 
possibly because beneficiaries wanted to take advantage of attractive incentives (e.g., 
adult eyeglasses and adult dental benefits, which are not otherwise available to this 
population). One state source noted that Medicaid beneficiaries could opt in and out of 
managed care, such that they could receive the incentive benefits when they need it, but 
then opt out when they wanted choice of clinicians. This led to participants cycling in and 
out on managed care participation.348 Voluntary managed care also meant that enrollees 
tended to be healthier than the Medicaid population as a whole. 
c. High-Cost User Initiative 
Medicaid costs continued to rise, despite MAC and the voluntary MCO program. 
A 1992 analysis of the state’s Medicaid program found that more than half of 
expenditures were attributable to five percent of total beneficiaries.349 In response, the 
Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DHMH) began investigating 
approaches to address this high cost group. In 1994, the state received funding from the 
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation to explore methods to cut costs and improve outcomes 
of this five percent. The resulting program, the High Cost User Initiative (HCUI), 
received federal approval as an 1115 waiver program. 
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MAC did not allow for support services for those patients needing better housing, 
nutrition, counseling, supervision, or suffering from multiple conditions. The HCUI, 
however, focused on broader social services for this high cost population. Specifically, 
the HCUI relied upon enhanced case management teams both to review Medicaid 
patients identified as high cost cases within 24 hours of hospital admission and to prepare 
discharge plans with supplemental services (including physical therapy, dental care, 
outpatient addition therapy, nutritional supplements, assisted living services, 
transportation, and family training). The HCUI’s administrative component was the 
creation of the Center for Health Program Development and Management (CHPDM) at 
UMBC. The CHPDM, established in 1995 under a cooperative arrangement between the 
University of Maryland and the Maryland DHMH, developed the federal waiver 
application and was charged with operating the HCUI and providing technical assistance 
to the state health department.350 
d. Integrated Care Management System 
Another component of HCUI, which was never implemented due to changes in 
the state’s political leadership subsequent to the 1994 election,351 was the Integrated Care 
Management System (ICMS). In effect, this would have been a specialty HMO that 
received capitation payments for comprehensive care of patients with a history of high-
cost Medicaid episodes. The ICMS would have been organized around clinical needs, 
such as uncontrolled hypertension, diabetes, congestive heart failure, pediatric asthma, 
and late-stage cancer. 
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4. A New Twist on an Old Idea: Mandatory Medicaid Managed Care 
In January 1995, the new incoming secretary of the DHMH suspended ICMS 
development and began plans for a new Section 1115 waiver, entitled HealthChoice. This 
new program would establish mandatory enrollment of Medicaid enrollees in competing, 
capitated MCOs. The Maryland legislature enacted a bill in May 1995 directing the 
DHMH to formulate plans for comprehensive Medicaid reforms to be submitted to the 
legislature in its 1996 session. During the summer of 1995, Congress passed a budget 
resolution that would cut an estimated $2.8 billion from Maryland’s Medicaid program 
over 7 years, forcing additional pressure on the DHMH Secretary to come up with a cost-
cutting plan for Medicaid.352 
DHMH responded by establishing a broad-based, 131-member advisory 
committee353 to ensure buy-in from all the major stakeholders.354 This was a uniquely 
inclusive process, and a majority of those involved in the HCFA waiver development 
process hoped to participate in the resulting program, particularly current Medicaid 
providers like the University of Maryland and Johns Hopkins University health care 
systems.355 
C. Conclusion 
Medicaid is a complicated program, operated both by the federal and state 
governments, which funds health care services for very low-income populations. As an 
entitlement program, Medicaid is extremely expensive, and states have been seeking 
innovating approaches to reduce its budget. Maryland has a long history of Medicaid 
reforms aimed at containing costs. The MAC initiative was a PCCM program that 
provided all participating Medicaid beneficiaries with a primary care clinician who 
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served as the gatekeeper. By the mid- to late 1990s, Maryland state officials had 
conceived of HealthChoice, a mandatory Medicaid managed care initiative that would 
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Chapter 6: Changes in Maryland’s Low-Income Health Care 
Market 
The mid-1990s represented a tumultuous period for Maryland’s low-income 
health care market. Many factors that affected the market sought to alter the health care 
delivery system, such as the new mandatory Medicaid managed care program, 
HealthChoice. Other intentional or “de jure” changes include the loss of cost-based 
financing for safety net institutions, the implementation of federal immigration policy, 
and the state’s new welfare reform program. At the same time, there were “de facto” 
changes to the market—that is, changes that were not developed by policymakers seeking 
to create a certain result, such as evolving demographics and unforeseen problems with 
HealthChoice implementation. 
A. De Jure Changes 
1. A New Medicaid Program: HealthChoice 
a. Goals of HealthChoice 
In 1996, Maryland’s General Assembly began consideration of (January 11) and 
ultimately approved (April 6) HealthChoice, which would require nearly all of the 
Medicaid population to enroll in managed care plans. Within six months of submission to 
the federal Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA, now Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services, or CMS), HealthChoice received federal approval on October 30, 
1996. The program was established with five goals: 
• “Develop a patient-focused system featuring a medical home; 
• Create comprehensive, prevention-oriented systems of care; 
• Build on the strengths of Maryland’s existing health care delivery system; 
• Hold MCOs accountable for delivering high-quality care; and 
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• Achieve better value and predictability for state dollars.”356 
The state anticipated that making a single clinician responsible for a patient’s 
health would eliminate fragmented and episodic care. Initially, another goal was program 
growth.357 The savings generated from HealthChoice were originally slated to fund 
benefit or eligibility expansions, but federal threats of Medicaid block grants and the 
state’s tightening budget rendered that aim unachievable.358 So while other states used 
managed care as a cost containment method where savings were converted into broader 
coverage, HealthChoice instead focused upon lowering costs and improving the quality 
of care for those currently eligible to participate,359 and eligibility expansions were tabled 
at the program’s outset. 
b. Unique Attributes of the HealthChoice Program 
Highlights of the program include its unique risk adjustment mechanism, the 
“Adjusted Clinical Groups,” or ACGs, which sought to enhance reimbursement to those 
providing care to sicker patients. HealthChoice is also different from most state Medicaid 
managed care programs in that it allows health care clinicians to establish their own 
MCOs.360 A related key provision allows historical safety net institutions to establish 
MCOs to compete with the private MCO market for Medicaid business. 
Another progressive aspect of HealthChoice is the particular attention it devotes 
to seven “special populations,” including children with special health care needs, the 
physically disabled, the developmentally disabled, pregnant and postpartum women, the 
homeless, HIV and AIDS patients, and those with substance abuse problems.361 Under 
HealthChoice, these groups enjoy enhanced benefits, and MCOs may receive higher 
capitation rates for these population groups. 
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i. Medicaid Enrollees Not Eligible for HealthChoice 
Maryland required that individuals who are eligible and who qualify for 
HealthChoice (i.e., most Medicaid recipients) participate in the program. As of June 30, 
2005, approximately 67 percent (or 482,749) of the Maryland’s 716,158 Medicaid 
beneficiaries were enrolled HealthChoice.362 Medicaid eligibles that are not in 
HealthChoice consist of those ineligible to participate, and include: 
• Individuals who receive Medicare; 
• Individuals who are 65 years or older; 
• Individuals who are eligible for Medicaid under spend down; 
• Medicaid recipients who have been or expected to be continuously 
institutionalized for more than 30 successive days in a long-term care facility 
or in an institution for mental diseases; 
• Individuals institutionalized in an intermediate care facility for mentally 
retarded persons; 
• Recipients enrolled in the Model Waiver; and 
• Recipients enrolled in limited coverage categories, such as women who 
receive family planning services through the Family Planning Waiver.363 
ii. The Rare and Expensive Case Management (REM) Program 
Medicaid enrollees with specific conditions are included in the Rare and 
Expensive Case Management (REM) Program. Maryland offers fee-for-service 
reimbursement to clinicians caring for these beneficiaries.  REM program participants are 
also eligible for a larger package of benefits. Once enrolled in the program, beneficiaries 
are assigned a case manager who assesses their needs, directs them to appropriate 
clinicians, works with multidisciplinary teams to ensure that the patients’ needs are met, 
develops plans of care, monitors clinical care and services, assists in service coordination 
and family supports, addresses changing clinical and other needs, and recommends 
transfers out of the program, when appropriate.364 
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d. HealthChoice Payment Structure 
i. Reimbursement for MCOs 
MCOs receive a capitated (i.e., per-member) fee, risk-adjusted according to the 
beneficiary’s age, sex, location, parental status, and disability status. Another risk-
adjustment factor is medical history. 
The capitation amount an MCO is offered for a particular patient is calculated 
using an innovative algorithm based upon “adjusted clinical group” (ACG) category. 
Specifically, the state assigns each Medicaid enrollee into an ACG category, which 
provides graduated fixed capitation rates such that MCOs receive higher reimbursements 
for the sickest and costliest patients.365 ACG determination is based on the patient’s 
Medicaid claims history.  When insufficient data prevents an ACG determination, the 
state assigns the beneficiary to a demographic category, which reflects each beneficiary’s 
age, residence, eligibility group (i.e., families with children and the disabled), and gender.  
MCOs also receive a lump sum for delivery costs for pregnant women, children under 
one year of age, and people with HIV or AIDS.366 
Under HealthChoice, therefore, Medicaid MCOs are not only required to provide 
care, but also must collect a substantial amount of data on medical history and patient 
visits. At HealthChoice’s outset, one state official noted that the dependency of 
reimbursement upon encounter data offers MCOs a strong incentive to collect detailed 
information on each patient visit. Indeed, insufficient encounter data means that a 
beneficiary with costly health problems may be rated as healthy and therefore may fetch a 
lower capitated rate.367, 368 
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ii. Reimbursements for FQHCs 
Under HealthChoice, MCOs pay FQHCs a predetermined “market rate” for each 
visit the FQHC reports to the MCO. The MCO, in turn, reports that encounter to the 
Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DHMH), which issues an 
additional payment to the FQHC to cover the difference between the FQHC’s 
“reasonable cost” and the market rate.369 Further description of how the FQHC 
reimbursement process actually worked is described below. 
e. MCOs Additional Obligations and Regulations Under HealthChoice 
The state is responsible for multiple oversight activities over HealthChoice 
MCOs. Prospectively, the state’s DHMH must review any organization seeking to 
become a participating MCO for system adequacy, and the Maryland Insurance 
Administration is responsible for the applicant’s financial solvency. Retrospectively, the 
state must hire an external quality review organization, or EQRO, to ensure that each 
MCO is providing high quality care to HealthChoice enrollees.370 
In addition to primary health care coverage, the state requires MCOs that contract 
with the HealthChoice program to offer other related services. These include language 
interpretation, educating enrollees on prevention and good health habits, case 
management, outreach and home visits for certain special needs and hard-to-reach 
populations, and coordinating needed services such as transportation and the 
Supplemental Nutritional Program for Women, Infants, and Children. MCOs are 
permitted to offer additional services not already in the benefit package as an incentive to 
attract enrollees, but the State does not provide reimbursement for them. For example, all 
of the MCOs cover adult preventive dental services, which are not included in the 
Maryland Medicaid benefits package.371 
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2. Changes in Funding for FQHCs: Loss of Cost-Based Reimbursement 
a. Cost-Based Reimbursement Ends 
In 1998, FQHCs lost the cost-based reimbursement that they had been receiving 
since 1990. The state did not begin to compensate for this loss until 2001, 3.5 years later, 
when it began phasing in a multi-year reinstated cost-based reimbursement. This gap put 
a financial strain in FQHCs and, in turn, the entire safety net throughout the state.372 
b. Loss of Medicare Pilot Funding 
Another change in the low-income health care market affected the state’s largest 
FQHC, Baltimore Medical Systems (BMS). BMS grew out of a Medicare demonstration 
project that began in the late 1970s, and a substantial amount of its patient base had 
always been the elderly. Through 1998, Medicare volume accounted for roughly $25 
million of BMS’s revenue, but this changed with the implementation of the federal 
Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA). The federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services interpreted the language in the BBA in a way that fundamentally changed the 
demonstration project. What had been an open-enrollment, cost-based reimbursement 
program with no patient cost participation and no managed care became a closed-
enrollment managed care program with significant cost sharing. 
3. De Jure Changes Affecting Health Care for Immigrants 
The impact of changes arising from new federal immigration laws on Maryland’s 
immigrants was greatly tempered by a state-only program for those immigrants who 
arrived after August 1997. One must be eligible for TANF in every way other than length 
of time in the country in order to qualify for the state program.373 As a result, health care 
and other social services were still available for certain legal immigrants. 
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Table 5.1 
Comparison of Maryland Immigrant Benefits Based Upon Arrival Date 
Legal Immigrants Here Before 8/22/1996 Legal Immigrants Here ON/After 8/22/1996 
- Family eligible for TCA - Family eligible for TCA 
- Family Eligible for Medical Assistance - Children/pregnant women eligible for 
Medical Assistance 
- Children eligible for Food Stamps - Children eligible for Food Stamps. 
Source: “Guide to Welfare in Maryland,” Welfare Advocates, 2005.374 
However, as more time passes, the percentage of immigrants in the state before August 
1996 will continually shrink and a greater proportion of the adult, non-pregnant 
immigrant community will lack access to health care coverage. 
4. Changes in Welfare Policy and Implications for Health Care 
Maryland’s Medicaid rolls fell as the state’s welfare reform plan was 
implemented. The state’s primary welfare reform program, entitled Temporary Cash 
Assistance (TCA), began in January 1995 and used less restrictive eligibility 
determinations than the PRWORA would allow.375 Although it was enacted a few months 
before PRWORA, the TCA program was implemented as the state’s version of 
PRWORA. Like its federal counterpart, TCA also divorces welfare from Medicaid 
eligibility. 
One of the goals of PRWORA was to decrease by at least 50 percent the number 
of welfare recipients on the rolls in 1996 by the year 2002. Using this as a measure, 
Maryland, like most states, was very successful. It achieved that goal by 1997, five years 
ahead of schedule. 376 
Maryland’s welfare reform efforts include the Family Investment Program (FIP) 
and the Temporary Cash Assistance (TCA) program. One of the key features of these 
programs is local flexibility, whereby the Local Departments of Social Services (LDSS) 
offices are empowered to allocate funds for welfare avoidance grants (i.e., one-time 
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payments that help poor families cover unexpected needs, like car repairs, without which 
the family would lose its ability to thrive and would become eligible for TCA). 377 
In 1999, there was a surplus of $156 million in unspent federal TANF block grant 
dollars.378 While within about a year after PRWORA was enacted, 42 states changed their 
welfare rules affecting how recipients could combine work with cash assistance, but the 
changes in Maryland are among the most severe. For example, Maryland was one of only 
four states that eliminated eligibility for cash assistance when earnings were less than half 
of the FPL for a family of three (17 states permitted recipients who entered the workforce 
to attain a poverty-level income level before cutting eligibility). According to one 
analysis, Maryland reduces benefits by $0.74 for every dollar earned, ranking the state 
among the five with the fastest benefit reduction rate.379 Moreover, of those five states, 
only Maryland begins reductions at the first dollar of earnings.380 
B. De Facto Changes 
1. Changes in Demographics 
Evolving demographic factors, such as an increase in immigrant and minority 




Total and Minority Populations Growth in Maryland, 1990 to 2004 
MD 1990 Percent of 
MD 1990 









Total population 4,781,468 5,311,531 530,063 11.1 
White 3,393,964 71.0 3,500,045 65.9 106,081 3.1 
Black 1,189,899 24.9 1,505,045 28.3 315,146 26.5 
Hispanic 125,102 2.6 230,332 4.3 105,230 84.1 
Source: Maryland Department of Planning381, 382 
a. Growth of Racial and Ethnic Minorities 
Earlier, we saw the 1990 Census data depicted in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. It is useful to 
see these data again to provide a baseline against which to measure the growth of 
minority populations. These tables indicate a growth in the black and Hispanic 
populations both in the nation and in Maryland by 2004. In 14 years, Maryland’s white 
population decreased from 71 percent to 66 percent, while blacks increased 3 percentage 
points and Hispanics grew nearly 2 percentage points. 
Table 5.3 
Total and Minority Populations Growth in U.S., 1990 to 2004 
US 1990 Percent of 
U.S. 1990 









Total pop  248,709,873 293,655,404 44,945,531 18.1 
White 199,827,064 80.3 220,535,208 75.1 20,708,144 10.4 
Black 29,930,524 12.0 36,119,615 12.3 6,189,091 20.7 
Hispanic 21,900,089 8.8 36,706,926 12.5 14,806,837 67.6 
Source: U.S. Census383, 384 
The tables also demonstrate that both the state’s total population (11.1 percent) 
and its white population (3.1 percent) grew during that 14-year period, but not at the rate 
of the rest of the nation. The total U.S. population increased in that time period 18.1 
percent, and the nation’s white population rose 10.4 percent. But the reverse trend occurs 
for racial and ethnic minorities. Maryland’s rates of increase among its black population 
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was 26.5 percent (compared with 20.7 percent nationally) and among its Hispanic 
population was 84.1 percent (compared with 67.6 percent nationally). 
Table 5.4 
Demographics in Baltimore, MD, 1990 and 2000 
BALTIMORE 1990 2000 Percent change 1990–2000 
White 289,041 210,842 -27.1 
Non-White 446,973 440,312 -1.5 
Total Pop 736,014 651,154 -11.5 
Percent in labor force 60.7 56.6 -6.8 
per capita income (2000$) $22,277 $24,789 11.3 
Source: U.S. Census385 and Maryland Department of Planning.386 
Figure 5.1 graphically depicts this growing racial diversity of Maryland. Figure 
5.2 indicates that black birth rates, while generally decreasing over the last decade, 
remain well above white birth rates. 
Figure 5.1. Distribution of the Population by Race, Maryland, 1940–2003. 
Source: Maryland Vital Statistics Annual Report (2003). Maryland Department of Health and Mental 
Hygiene, Vital Statistics Administration. 
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Figure 5.2. Birth Rates by Race, Maryland, 1994–2003. 
Source: Maryland Vital Statistics Annual Report (2003). Maryland DHMH, Vital Statistics Administration. 
Hispanics are also a fast-growing demographic both in Maryland and in the 
United States as a whole. Figure 5.3 illustrates that the birth rate for Hispanics is more 
than twice that of whites. As blacks and Hispanics continue to grow at a faster rate than 
whites, poorer access and quality of care for racial and ethnic minorities has the potential 
to grow from a serious public health issue to a public health crisis. 
Figure 5.3. Birth Rates by Race and Hispanic* Origin, Maryland, 2003. 
Source: Maryland Vital Statistics Annual Report (2003). Maryland DHMH, Vital Statistics Administration. 
* Persons of Hispanic origin may be of any race. 
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2. De Facto Changes Affecting Health Care for Immigrants 
a. Immigrants and Health Care: Uninsurance Rates 
An analysis by the state indicates that only half of Maryland’s Hispanic 
population has employment-based health insurance coverage, and 40 percent of 
Hispanics are uninsured. Interestingly, minorities in Maryland are less likely to have 
health insurance than are whites, regardless of income. Hispanics and blacks are 
disproportionately represented among the state’s uninsured population. 387 
b. Growth in Maryland’s Immigrant Communities 
Both in the United States and in Maryland, immigrants are one of the fastest 
growing population groups. The foreign-born population in the state grew 65.3 percent 
between 1990 and 2000 (nationally, the growth was 57.4 percent). In 2000, Maryland had 
the thirteenth largest foreign-born population in the U.S.388 (i.e., 9.8 percent of 
Maryland’s population were foreign-born, up from 6.6 percent in 1990).389 When 
measuring the percent of foreign born in the total population in 2000, Maryland ranked 
15 out of 51 (50 states plus the District of Columbia).390 According to the Maryland 
Office for New Americans (MONA), an average of 16,000 immigrants resettle in 
Maryland each year.391 Although their numbers sound small, during the 1990s, a full 76 
percent of the labor force growth in Maryland was attributable to new immigrants.392 
The Washington metropolitan area, including the Maryland suburbs, attracted 
575,000 immigrants between 1980 and 2000. By 2000, 832,000 immigrants comprised 
roughly 17 percent of the area’s population, making it the seventh-largest immigrant 
gateway in the nation. New immigrants make up about half of the overall population 
growth in the last decade, and approximately 47.5 percent of the area’s immigrant 
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population arrived in the 1990s. Indeed, the number of immigrants in the Greater 
Washington area quintupled between 1970 and 2000. In Langley Park, Maryland, 
immigrants represent nearly two-thirds of the total population.393 
As of the 2000 Census, most Maryland immigrants resided in the Washington, 
DC suburban counties: Montgomery County (46 percent) and Prince George’s County 
(24 percent). The next largest immigrant counties include Baltimore (nine percent), 
Baltimore City (six percent), Howard (five percent), and Anne Arundel (4 percent). All 
other counties combined account for six percent.394 
i. Legal Categories of Maryland’s Immigrants 
Most of Maryland’s foreign-born are naturalized citizens (44 percent) or Legal 
Permanent Residents (26 percent). (See Table 5.5.) However, undocumented immigrants 
are estimated to comprise approximately 20 percent of the state’s alien population.395 
Additionally, a small but growing demographic within the immigrant community 
in Maryland is the refugee population. “International developments… have dramatically 
affected the population of a relatively small state like Maryland,”396 reads a MONA 
report. Since 1975, 15 states (of which Maryland is one) resettled 70 percent of the total 
population of refugees in this country. In that time, Maryland became home to 29,494, or 
1.4 percent, of the U.S.’s refugee population.397 
Table 5.5 
Maryland Foreign Born in 2000 
Type of immigrant Number Percent 
Naturalized Citizens 233,000 44 
Legal Permanent Residents 140,000 26 
Undocumented Immigrants 108,000 20 
Temporary Legal Residents 29,000 5
Refugees 22,000 4
TOTAL 530,000 100 
Source: Immigration Studies Program, The Urban Institute, 2005, based in part on 2000 Census.398 
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ii. Immigrants Racial Characteristics 
Racially, immigrants are a diverse mix. As shown in Table 5.6, the majority of the 
foreign born in Maryland reported either white alone (33.5 percent) or Asian alone (30.1 
percent). 
Table 5.6 
Maryland and U.S. Foreign Born by Race 
Source: Migration Information Source399 
A diverse set of languages spoken in Maryland’s homes. As of the 2000 Census, 
of the 623,000 total non-English speakers, 37 percent speak Spanish, 32 percent speak 
other Indo-European tongues, and 22 percent speak languages native to Asia.400 
According to the 2000 Census, in the United States. as a whole, the majority of 
the foreign-born came from Latin America (51.7 percent), but roughly the same 
proportion of Maryland’s immigrants hail from Latin America (34.0 percent) as from 
Asia (35.0 percent). Europe accounts for 16.8 percent (down from 24.5 percent in 1990), 
while 12.1 percent of the state’s foreign-born population arrived from Africa (up from 7.6 
percent in 1990).401 
The evolving demographic picture in Maryland is clearly one of increasing 
diversity. If poor immigrant and racial and ethnic minority communities continue to grow 
Maryland foreign born, 2002 US foreign born, 2002 
Subject Total N Percent Subject Total N Percent 
MD Total foreign born 518,315 100.0 US Total foreign born 3.1 mil. 100.0 
White alone 173,717 33.5 White alone  43.0 
Black alone 99,868 19.3 Black alone 6.8 
AI/AN alone 1,457 0.3 AI/AN alone  0.4 
Asian alone 156,046 30.1 Asian alone 22.5 
NHOPI alone 483 0.1 NHOPI alone  0.2 
Some other race alone 57,674 11.1 
Some other race 
Alone 21.5 
Two or more races 29,070 5.6  Two or more races  5.5 
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at the same time such groups face greater barriers in accessing health care, an ever-
increasing number of state residents will be affected by changes in Maryland’s low-
income health care market. 
3. Problems with HealthChoice Implementation 
Establishing a massive and complicated new mandatory Medicaid managed care 
program obviously creates many changes in the low income health care market. Other 
unforeseen changes came about due to significant problems during the programs initial 
implementation. 
HealthChoice was to begin on January 1, 1997, but the state delayed 
implementation until June 2, 1997 because neither the state, the participating managed 
care organizations (MCOs), nor the beneficiaries were prepared. Despite concerns that 
key stakeholders remained unprepared in June, statewide implementation of 
HealthChoice nonetheless began at that time.402 
Initial implementation was chaotic for several reasons. First, many more than the 
anticipated number of people enrolled in the program’s first two months, which 
overwhelmed participating MCOs’ system. 403 When developing the HealthChoice 
program, the state originally anticipated transferring a total of 75 percent of the Medicaid 
population from PCCM to the enrollee’s choice of participating MCO.404 That goal 
increased steadily, and by the time the program was actually implemented in June 1997, 
the state directed almost 90 percent of all non-institutionalized and non-dually-eligible 
Medicaid recipients to enroll in one of eight MCOs.405 By March 1998, more than 
305,000, or the state’s original goal of three-quarters of Maryland’s Medicaid population, 
were enrolled in a HealthChoice MCO.406 
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Other problems abounded. Many enrollees did not receive the enrollment material 
due to missing address data. Directories of clinicians and affiliated health care delivery 
sites were incomplete and even erroneous. These factors caused high rates of auto-
assignments, making PCP assignments confusing for both patients and clinicians. An 
annual lock-in feature further complicated the situation.407 
C.  Time Line of National and Maryland-Specific LIHCM Changes 
 This time line is included here to clarify the de facto and de jure changes to the 
low income health care market that occurred before, during, and after the study period.  It 
includes activities that affected the nation, as well as those whose scope was limited to 
Maryland. 
Table 5.7 
Time Line of Selected Activities Affecting Low-Income Health Care Markets 
 
When What Happened Nationally What happened in Maryland 
July 30, 1965 
 
President Lyndon Johnson signs 
Medicaid and Medicare into law, 
stating that “…no longer will this 
Nation refuse the hand of justice to 
those who have given a lifetime of 
service and wisdom and labor to the 
progress of this progressive country…. 
[B]ecause of this document--and the 
long years of struggle which so many 
have put into creating it--in this town, 
and a thousand other towns like it, 
there are men and women in pain who 
will now find ease. There are those, 
alone in suffering who will now hear 
the sound of some approaching 
footsteps coming to help. There are 
those fearing the terrible darkness of 
despairing poverty--despite their long 
years of labor and expectation--who 
will now look up to see the light of 
hope and realization.”408 Medicaid is 
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authorized under Title XIX of the 
Social Security Act. 
 
1967 
The Early and Periodic Screening, 
Diagnostic, and Treatment (EPSDT) 
health services benefit is established 
for all Medicaid-enrolled children 




All states except Arizona began 
participating in the Medicaid program. 
(Arizona began participating in 1982.) 
Also, states are provided the 
opportunity to link Medicaid 
eligibility for elderly, blind and 
disabled residents to eligibility for the 





Federal Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare established the 
Health Care Financing Administration 
(HCFA) to administer the Medicaid 
and Medicare programs.410 
1981 
 
Reagan Administration proposal to 
convert Medicaid into a block grant 
fails. Meanwhile, the Omnibus 
Reconciliation Act of 1981 (OBRA 
81) cuts federal matching payments to 
states for FY 1982-1984 as part of 
required federal budget savings.411 
Additionally, Freedom of choice 
waivers (1915b) and home and 
community-based care waivers 
(1915c) are established; states 
are required to provide additional 
payments to hospitals treating a 
disproportionate share of low-income 
patients (DSH hospitals).412 
1982 
 
Arizona becomes last state to opt into 




The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 
requires that children born after 
9/30/1983 in AFDC-eligible families 
receive Medicaid coverage. Also 
mandates coverage for AFDC eligible 
first-time pregnant women and 
pregnant women in two-parent 
unemployed. 
 
The Consolidated Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1985 mandates 




Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1986 
(OBRA 86) requires states to cover 
treatment of emergency medical 
conditions for illegal immigrants 
otherwise eligible for Medicaid. 415 
1987 
 
Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1987 
(OBRA 87) allows states to cover 
pregnant women and children under 
age 1 in families with income up to 
185 percent of FPL.416 
1988 
 
The Medicare Catastrophic Coverage 
Act of 1988 (MCCA) requires states to 
phase in coverage for pregnant women 
and infants (up to age one) in families 
with income up to 100 percent of FPL. 
Special eligibility rules are established 
for institutionalized persons whose 
spouse remains in the community to 
prevent “spousal impoverishment;” 
Qualified Medicare Beneficiary group 
is established (QMBs).417 
The Federal Family Support Act of 
1988 required states to extend 12 
months transitional medical assistance 
(TMA) to families losing AFDC cash 





Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
of 1989 (OBRA 89) mandated 
coverage for pregnant women and 
children under age 6 in families with 
incomes at or below 133 percent of the 
FPL, whether or not they were 
receiving AFDC cash assistance. 
OBRA 89 also required states to cover 
services provided by federally-
qualified health centers (FQHCs). 419 
Total Health Care, a Maryland-based 
HMO, is formed by a union of several 
Baltimore FQHCs to provide primary 
care to Medicaid patients. Separately, 
these health centers have been 
providing care in the city’s poorest 
areas since the late 1960s.420 
1990 
 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
of 1990 (OBRA 90) mandated 
coverage of children ages 6 through 18 
in families with incomes at or below 
100 percent of FPL (whether or not 
they were receiving AFDC cash 
assistance) with coverage phased in 
one year at a time and completed by 
2002.421 Additionally, the Medicaid 
prescription drug rebate program 
began; it includes limitations on states’ 
use of formularies to restrict access to 




Congress passes the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA 
’93), permitting states to implement 
prior authorization for any prescription 
medication under federal standards.  
 
Also, HCFA begins approving Section 
1115 waivers to states, allowing them 
to implement statewide expansion 
demonstrations. States begin to 
conduct experimental, pilot, or 
demonstration projects. Most such 
efforts experiment with Medicaid 
managed care and expand coverage to 
previously uninsured populations. 
Oregon and Tennessee blaze the trail 
for mandatory managed care for most 
beneficiaries.422 
Winter 1993-
Spring 1994  
High Cost User Initiative (HCUI) is 
developed and approved by the 
General Assembly 
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Summer 1994  
 
HCUI submitted to HCFA for 
approval 
 
UMBC forms the Center for Health 
Program Development and 
Management (CHPDM) 
 
Fall 1994  
Parris Glendening (D) is elected 
governor 
 
Integrated Care Management System 
(ICMS) program development begins 
 
Winter 1994-
Spring 1995  
Decision to pursue a Section 1115 
waiver for a system-wide and 
statewide Medicaid managed care 
program (and suspension of work on 
the ICMS program) 
 
Introduction and passage of SB 694 
(Senator Hollinger’s bill) directing 
DHMH to develop a Section 1115 
waiver and present it in the 1996 
legislative session. 
 
Maryland welfare reform becomes 




The U.S. Congress passes as part of 
the budget process and President Bill 
Clinton vetoes legislation converting 
Medicaid to a block grant to states.423 
PrimeHealth Corporation, a minority-
owned HMO based in Lanham, is 
formed to sell to Medicaid patients 
mainly in Prince George’s County.424 
HMOs were sued in the state, as were 
state employees, for selling names of 
Medicaid beneficiaries to HMOs.425 
May 1995 
 
Congress called for $182 billion in 
Medicaid reductions over seven years 
(H Con Res 67).426 
Summer 1995-
Fall 1995  
UMBC oversees the public hearing 
process, involving a committee of 
100+ members and other community 
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forums, intended to identify and 
discuss key issues in the waiver design 
 
UMBC and DHMH develops 
recommendations for the Section 1115 
waiver 
 





House Republicans released details of 
their “Medi-Grant” proposal to end 
Medicaid’s entitlement status and 
provide block grants to states instead. 
(States would have to cover certain 
populations, but could decide how 
robust a benefits package to offer, and 
would also be freed from expensive 
federal mandates such as staffing and 
inspection requirements enacted in 
1987 to improve the quality of nursing 








President Clinton vetoed Medi-Grant 
bill.429 
Winter 1995-
Spring 1996  
DHMH submits the Medicaid reform 
proposal to the legislature. Legislative 
committee hearings in the House and 
Senate result in modifications to the 
proposal, which are negotiated through 
the joint committee process into SB 
750 
 
April 30, 1996  
 
SB 750, the Medicaid reform proposal, 
is signed by Governor Glendening into 
law 
 
May 3, 1996  
 




July 18, 1996 
 
Senate agreed to drop Medi-Grant” 
Medicaid reform provisions from 
welfare reform bill (S 1956); House 
effectively did same when it adopted 
the rule for floor consideration of the 





President Clinton signs the 1996 
Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(PRWORA) law. It repeals AFDC 
individual entitlement to cash 
assistance, replacing it with the 
Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (TANF) block grant to states. 
This ends the formal link between 
cash assistance welfare and Medicaid 
eligibility, and requires states to cover 
families meeting the AFDC eligibility 
standards on July 16, 1996. (Welfare 
enrollees began falling off rolls ahead 
of schedule, and there was a 
simultaneous drop in Medicaid 
enrollment, despite continued 
eligibility.) 
PRWORA also imposes a moratorium 
on non-emergency Medicaid and other 
social welfare benefits for legal 
immigrants who enter the U.S. on or 
after August 22, 1996, for five years. 
After that 5-year ban, coverage is 




HCFA approves Maryland’s Section 
1115 waiver, making it the 14th states 
to receive approval. Approved plan 
allows Maryland to enroll about 75 
percent of its 440,000 Medicaid 




Medicaid regulations are made public 
November 8, 1996 
November 21, 1996: Johns Hopkins 
HealthCare and the Maryland 
Community Health System form 




January 1997  
January 1 intended start date for 
HealthChoice delayed to give all 
parties additional time to develop 
infrastructure 
 
Late 1996 to 
1997 
HMOs begin to shy away from 
Medicaid contracts and instead pursue 
Medicare market, which offers higher 
reimbursements and less 
administrative costs. Nine HMOs in 
New York alone discontinued 
Medicaid contracts due to low 
reimbursement rates.433
In 1996, Mamsi attributed part of its 
$64 millions losses to its participation 
in Maryland’s Medicaid program and 
subsequently withdrew from that 
market.434 
Greenbelt-based NYLCare, one of 
Maryland’s largest HMOs, opts not to 
bid for Medicaid contract, and 
Rockville-based Mid Atlantic Medical 
Services pulls out of Medicaid market 




Green Spring Health Services and 
CMG Health begin a 3-year contract 
with the state to manage mental health 
benefits under Maryland’s Medicaid 
managed care program 
 




Enrollment period for the state’s 
330,000 Medicaid beneficiaries to sign 
up with an approved MCO 
 
July 1, 1997  
 
HealthChoice program is implemented 
in June with a six month enrollment 
phase-in (the first enrollees become 
effective on July 1) 
 
July 1997  
 
PrimeHealth Corp., a minority-owned 
HMO based in Lanham, is approved to 
sell care to Maryland HealthChoice 
program, thus becoming the 8th HMO 
approved as a HealthChoice 
provider.435 Later, scandal emerges 
that PrimeHealth was unqualified, but 
DHMH approved because of its ties to 






President Clinton signs the Federal 
Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA) 
into law. BBA established the State 
Children’s Health Insurance Program 
(SCHIP), and permits states to 
mandate that most Medicaid 
beneficiaries enroll in managed care 
plans without obtaining a federal 
waiver. Most states offer SCHIP 
coverage to kids in families whose 
incomes are at or below 200 
percent of the FPL (which is 
roughly $36,800 for a family of 4). 
 
However, because HealthChoice 
received federal approval before BBA 
passed, its mandated managed care 
components continue to operate under 
the waiver. 
October 1997  
 
National Committee for Quality 
Assurance (NCQA) released “report 
cards” for all licensed HMOs doing 





CHIP initiative is developed 
 
June 1, 1998  
 
Benova replaces Foundation Health as 
the HealthChoice enrollment broker 
 
July 1, 1998  
 
Medicaid expansion to kids under age 
19 in families up to 200 percent of the 
FPL becomes effective; expansion was 
funded via the State Children’s Health 




Governor Glendening is re-elected 
 
First plan announces its withdrawal 
from HealthChoice. 
 
October 1998  
 
Maryland Insurance Administration 
places PrimeHealth in receivership. 
 
January 1999  
 
The first cohort of persons receiving 
temporary cash assistance (TCA) 
reach the two-year time limit 
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February 1999  
 
Maryland Hospital and Health Care 
Institute study found overpayments to 
HMOs and underpayments to newer 
MCOs; HMO overpayments were 20-
32 percent and other MCOs had 




DHMH announced imposition of more 
than $640,000 in sanctions on five of 
the eight participating Medicaid 
MCOs, in response to an independent 
quality of care audit. The audit, 
conducted by the Delmarva 
Foundation, revealed unsatisfactory 
diabetes and prenatal care.436
1999 
 
The Federal Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations for FY 1999 
transferred the federal share of $240 
billion, 25-year master settlement 
between states and tobacco 
manufacturers to state governments. 
Much of these funds are used to cover 
health care programs for low-income 
populations. 
 
Amerigroup bought Prudential’s 
Medicaid business in Maryland437 
2000 
 
The Federal “Medicare, Medicaid, and 
SCHIP Benefits Improvement and 
Protection Act directs the Secretary of 
DHHS to issue regulations tightening 
upper payment limits (UPLs). This 
continues a trend of the federal 




Bush Administration announces the 
Section 1115 waiver initiative, Health 
Insurance Flexibility and 
Accountability (HIFA), which allows 
states to demonstrate comprehensive 
state approaches that will increase the 
number of individuals with health 
insurance coverage using current-level 
Medicaid and SCHIP resources. 439 
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May 1, 2001  
 
Amerigroup Maryland, Inc. received 
more than 17,000 Medicaid 
beneficiaries who lost coverage when 
PrimeHealth pulled out of the 
Medicaid market. Maryland Insurance 
Commissioner selected Amerigroup to 
take over PrimeHealth’s membership 




UnitedHealth Group purchased the 
managed Medicaid company 
AmeriChoice (360,000 members), 
increasing UnitedHealth’s MMC 




The Federal Jobs and Growth Tax 
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 
“raises all state Medicaid matching 
rates by 2.95 percentage points for the 
period of April 2003 through June 
2004 as temporary federal fiscal relief 
for states due to the downturn in the 
economy. Congress recognized that 
state revenue collection had declined 
just when Medicaid programs were 
facing increased enrollment by low-
income families.” 441 
2003 
 
The Federal Medicare Prescription 
Drug, Improvement, and 
Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) 
transfers Medicaid drug coverage for 
dual eligibles to Medicare, effective 




Congress passes a budget resolution 
calling for a $10 billion cut in the 
Medicaid program. 
 
Federal DHHS Secretary Michael 
Leavitt established advisory Medicaid 
Commission, which will submit a 
report on September 1, 2005 outlining 
recommendations for Medicaid to 
simultaneously achieve $10 billion in 
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savings over the next five years and 
begin “meaningful long-term 
enhancements” that can better serve 
beneficiaries. A second Commission 
report, due December 31, 2006, offers 
recommendations to help ensure the 
long-term sustainability of the 
Medicaid program.442 
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Part Three: Impact of Changes in Maryland’s Low-Income 
Health Care Market on Access to Care 
Chapter 7: Qualitative Analysis 
Part Two provided a history of Medicaid managed care in Maryland, giving the 
reader background on how the system worked prior to the study period. It also identified 
key changes to the low-income health care market that occurred during the mid-1990s. 
Part Three will offer an analysis of those changes and their impact on access to health 
care among poor Marylanders. The current chapter will examine the qualitative data. 
A. Impact of HealthChoice 
Medicaid managed care (MMC) offers many conceptual advantages over a 
Medicaid fee-for-service (FFS) reimbursement system. Under a MMC structure, for 
example, it becomes a corporate responsibility to ensure that beneficiaries have access to 
care, which arguably should enable enrollees to experience more continuous and regular 
care.443 The state also has a greater to play under MMC. Whereas it was merely the bill 
payer under the old system, MMC empowers the state to hold MCOs accountable for 
performance standards. Indeed, asserts one state official, beneficiaries “are getting a lot 
more preventive care than they did under the old [FFS] system.”444 Furthermore, in a 
capitated MMC structure, financing is equal for minorities and whites, so in theory, 
MMC should take cost out of the disparities equation.445 
Did these advantages improve access to care among low-income Marylanders, or 
did the reality of HealthChoice’s implementation prevent their actualization? This next 
section looks at unfortunate circumstances that may have undermined the aforementioned 
benefits. 
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1. Interviewee Observations about Access to Care 
According to one HealthChoice expert, researchers at the University of Maryland 
at Baltimore County (UMBC) found that, for children, access was improved and 
emergency department use was decreased under HealthChoice compared with the old 
FFS structure. Improvements, moreover, were consistent at every age below 18.446 
This is consistent with reports from one FQHC, which suggests that access for 
Medicaid enrollees was not significantly affected at its clinics: 
I don’t think they [MCOs] were able to apply their rules in what is a 
typical managed care mode of operation (which is to really control the 
network utilization and deny care when it’s out of network or that sort of 
thing) because there was such craziness in the marketplace and nobody 
really knew who belonged to whom. I don’t think a lot of rules applied. So 
I don’t think that access was denied, although it was probably a little more 
inconvenient. And probably a lot more expensive, but I’m not sure the 
population suffered for that. They went back utilizing in all their old 
ways…[Although] I am only looking at it from my vantage point [as an 
FQHC]. I can’t speak for the hospitals and other places where maybe 
there was some access denial, but I didn’t see it here and I didn’t hear it 
with any other FQHCs.”447 
However, another FQHC observed that HealthChoice significantly lowered access 
for the uninsured because the program’s rigidity eliminated its previous ability to 
negotiate services. 
When you’re a poverty program, you ought to be able to leverage your 
spending power and your relationships with venders…. I have no leverage 
whatsoever. If I send five paying patients to a specialist and I want to slip 
one non-paying patient, it does not work that way anymore. Can’t do it.448 
This FQHC official also believes that HealthChoice lowered the quality of care 
for all patients because, under the MMC model, a greater portion of the total funding to a 
health clinic must be spent on administrative overhead. 
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Because the MCOs call all the shots, you are really practicing medicine as 
the MCO dictates that you practice medicine…. Way too much money is 
being invested in the administrative infrastructure [under] Medicaid 
managed care. There is a whole lot more energy being put into the 
business aspects than into the clinical aspects, and I cannot help but 
believe that the patient is getting the short end, because the amount of 
money that used to be invested in the actual clinical care has got to 
decrease. If somebody takes a critical look at that, they’re going to see 
that the amount of money spent on clinical services had to go down. It just 
had to. And it’s going for all administrative things, and people are not 
getting any more care than they did before…. [Indeed,] I don’t see what 
contribution [HealthChoice] has made to low-income people. I think it’s 
taken money away from direct medical care. I think we could have spent 
the money more wisely on direct services.449 
A state government employee agrees, noting that fewer refugees receive care in 
HealthChoice than in the old FFS model.450 
a. Factors Negatively Influencing Access to Care at Initial Implementation of 
HealthChoice 
i. Implemented before Stakeholders were Ready 
A source from the Maryland DHMH pointed out that, at the time of 
HealthChoice’s implementation, not much was known yet about mandatory Medicaid 
managed care. There were no studies yet on how to best implement such programs, and 
as a result, Maryland found itself on the wrong side of a steep learning curve.451 Indeed, 
says one Medicaid managed care expert, the problems encountered in the program’s 
implementation stemmed from transitioning to HealthChoice, not from HealthChoice 
intrinsically.452 
All interviewees agreed that the initial start-up period was problematic. According 
to one interviewee affiliated with the state, the initial implementation process was “really 
painful.”453 A representative of a safety net institution contact echoed this sentiment, 
noting that the initial implementation was difficult for all stakeholders: 
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I think the first almost two years, maybe three years of the program were 
really tough on providers, tough on the MCOs, tough on the individuals 
covered, tough on people trying to get into the program. It was just 
immensely hard for the state to organize itself to deal with all the issues 
that they were dealing with. Now that whole period of time, I think a lot of 
providers suffered with not getting paid. MCOs probably suffered with 
getting bad lists of people that took them years and years to reconcile. The 
ombudsman and the hotline and all the other mechanisms were 
overwhelmed and they were not all that helpful to begin with. And patients 
were darned confused about what they were supposed to do and where 
they were supposed to go. The cost savings of the program, at least in 
those early years when it was in such disarray, were never realized.454 
Perhaps this was the fundamental issue that plagued the implementation process: 
unrealistic expectations and naivety. One example of unrealistic expectations, as noted in 
the previous chapter, was the program’s start date. HealthChoice was to begin on January 
1, 1997, but the state delayed implementation until June 2, 1997 because neither the state, 
the participating managed care organizations (MCOs), nor the beneficiaries were 
prepared. 
They [the DHMH] did make certain changes and in fact when it became 
very clear that they were not ready to go with the program on the original 
implementation schedule, they pushed back about six months to give 
themselves a little bit more time, particularly to gather the information 
they were going to gather, to put together credible books of provider 
networks that the MCOs were going to put on the table. The MCOs were 
also just trying to organize themselves.455 
Despite concerns that key stakeholders remained unprepared in June, and against 
the advice of many in the provider community who sought a staggered implementation 
based upon geographic regions of the state,456 statewide implementation of HealthChoice 
nonetheless began at that time.457 
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ii. Massive Early Enrollment Overwhelmed the System 
Although the state had planned to transfer Medicaid beneficiaries on a graduated 
schedule, many more than the anticipated number of people enrolled in the program’s 
first two months, and a full 75 percent of the Maryland Medicaid program was enrolled in 
HealthChoice within nine months,458 overwhelming participating MCOs.459 Why did 
beneficiaries enroll so quickly? Perhaps, asserts one expert in Maryland’s Medicaid 
managed care program, because clinicians encouraged their patients to enlist within their 
affiliated MCO.460 
The first 6 months was really painful. The pace at which people enrolled 
surprised people within the bureaucracy. I was there when it happened 
and I thought these were reasonable assumptions. Most people assumed 
that the population would respond slowly to the changeover, and that … 
the big bulk of people would be comfortable staying where they were and 
they would not make a change until they had to…And when you were 
expecting 30,000 people the first month and you got 90,000 it 
overwhelmed the system. 461 
iii. Errors in Provider Directories 
Inaccurate provider directories, which incorrectly identified which clinicians and 
institutions had contracts with each managed care company, confused those lucky enough 
to receive provider directories in the mail.462 An annual lock-in feature further 
complicated the situation.463 Says one safety net clinic: 
The MCOs who were supposedly turning in lists of their contracted 
providers, they either were not able to gather the information the way they 
should or the communication with the state was problematic. The books 
that the state was using to describe the networks and the offerings of the 
primary care providers that you could select to be your primary care 
provider were incomplete. And it was wrong in many cases. Not only 
incomplete, but actually incorrect.… For FQHCs in particular, this was a 
problem because most of our patients know us more by our site location 
than they do by our physicians… Our patients are not necessarily going to 
hunt through these books. Their reading skills are not all that strong... so 
by not having the provider name and the site name listed separately, our 
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patients could get easily confused… It took a year or a year-and-a-half for 
that to [be resolved]. 464 
iv. Inaccurate Beneficiary Address Information 
Access to care became a problem for the many enrollees for whom the state 
lacked address data and who subsequently did not receive enrollment material. This 
caused high rates of auto-assignments, making provider assignments confusing for 
patients and clinicians alike.465 
b. Ongoing Concerns About HealthChoice-Imposed Access Barriers 
i. New Bureaucratic Requirements Means Less Patient Care 
Before HealthChoice, reports an interviewee from a health care safety net delivery 
site, clinicians were able to spend more time providing care. 
There was no pre-authorization so nurses were actually doing nursing and 
there was no need to hire people to be referral coordinators and nurses 
managing utilization… there was a lot more freedom to provide care to 
your patients, and a lot fewer administrative requirements, a lot fewer 
administrative expenses associated with providing the care. At the point in 
time that the Medicaid program went to managed care, all of that stopped. 
A nurse who used to see an OB patient to get vital signs and do patient 
education is pulled from that to get on the telephone to justify what we 
want to do…. We don’t have the nurse teaching anymore. She’s in the 
office talking to people on the telephone.466 
ii. Lack of Information of Poverty Programs Across State Government 
In addition to the natural growing pains that were caused by the establishment of a 
more bureaucratic system, other concerns stem from insufficient knowledge of poverty 
programs both by the Maryland governmental agencies that administer programs for the 
poor and by the beneficiary population. In Maryland, the Department of Health and 
Mental Hygiene (DHMH) has primary oversight of the Medicaid program and the 
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Department of Human Resources (DHR) administers the various welfare programs, 
including Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, cash assistance, and food stamps. 
However, the DHR employs the case workers that make eligibility determinations for 
Medicaid.467 
You have a lot of situations where [a homeless patient] would go to DSS 
and say, ‘I need to get this prescription filled,’ or ‘I have a toothache.’ 
[The response is] ‘You have to apply for benefits… Sorry, Pal, I can’t help 
you.’ They don’t know the other agency’s resources and programs… Both 
agencies are charged, among other things, with serving poor people, but 
neither is really able to have [one voice].... The average client low-income 
person seeking help doesn’t know that they’re two different agencies. 
Doesn’t care that they’re two different agencies. They just want help now. 
You know, it’s a real problem.”468 
Another manifestation of this problem is the insufficient awareness by social 
workers who determine eligibility for HealthChoice of the eligibility rules for various 
groups, particularly refugees.469 
iii. Delays in Correspondence Between all Stakeholders May Impact Access 
Confusing and delayed applications are compounded by bureaucratic problems at 
the MCO level, such as delays in mailing enrollment documentation to newly-accepted 
HealthChoice members. One state government official notes that, by the time 
beneficiaries she works with receives the Medical Assistance card and documentation 
sent by the MCO informing them of their enrollment in the program, it is frequently time 
for re-eligibility determination.470 
Erroneous letters sent by MCOs informing members of PCP auto-assignments and 
changes to those auto-assignments is another problem that one former state government 
interviewee came across in his dealings with the MCOs.471 This interviewee also noted 
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inefficiencies that occurred within the Medicaid agency that affected and delayed 
correspondence between MCOs, beneficiaries, and state472 
Reimbursement delays, reports one FQHC, have been a major problem with the 
HealthChoice program. 
It took [one MCO] three months after nagging and cursing and going up 
to their offices and banging on their door [to receive reimbursements the 
MCO owed the FQHC]. When I submit my claim to them, they should pay 
me in 30 days. So they paid me in 90 days.473 
Compounding the problem are persistent problems with the both the state’s and 
many of the MCOs’ electronic claims software that, says one interviewee, results in 
significant payment delays.474 
We [FQHCs] have this market-based rate, and then if the MCO sends the 
claim to the state, the state will pay us the rest. If the MCO denies the 
claim, then we don’t get paid for it. If the MCO loses the claim, we don’t 
get paid for it. And so we have claims all the way back to 2003 that the 
MCO has not honored and one MCO in particular [name omitted] has 
claims that it has mismanaged and the reason they give is us because their 
information system has some problems. 475 
But another FQHC disagrees that this remains a major problem. 
We get our payments, we still have a few problems here and there but 
overall it’s working as it should…. Really after two or three years of 
pandemonium they got the thing working right.476 
iv. Eligibility Determination Problems 
The establishment of MMC did not alter one of the major characteristics of 
Medical Assistance: the fact that financial eligibility for Medicaid in Maryland is, in the 
words of one interviewee, “abominably low: 50 percent of the FPL. We’re basically 
talking about the homeless with minor children or the disabled homeless.”477 Indeed, 
according to the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, Maryland’s 
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Medicaid program only covered about half of the state’s residents with incomes under the 
poverty level in 1995, and eligibility levels for Maryland Medicaid remain below the 
national averages.478 
Although financial eligibility thresholds did not change, the frequency of 
eligibility determination did; and as documented in previous chapters, frequent 
redetermination of eligibility in many states has resulted in churning (i.e., on-again-off-
again enrollment that fluctuates with seasonal earning cycles). According to one anti-
poverty lobbyist479 and corroborated by a state employee,480 churning remains a problem 
for HealthChoice enrollees in Maryland. In some cases, access may have been hindered 
because of inaccurate eligibility determinations. One FQHC representative explains that 
the most vulnerable may be particularly at risk of losing Medicaid coverage. 
“One of the things that we note here is that it is particularly hard to get 
people who are dually or triply diagnosed for Medicaid. The [Medicaid 
State Review Team, which reviews eligibility for Medicaid] doesn’t do 
their job with these cases… If somebody has, let’s say, diabetes, high 
blood pressure, a substance abuse problem and some other problems, 
they’re particularly likely to turn such a person down.481 
Indeed, at the time of the interview, a lawsuit was pending against the State 
Review Team for inappropriately denying Medicaid eligibility.482 A University of 
Maryland researcher noted that, in fact, eligibility was narrowed for the disabled under 
HealthChoice as compared with its predecessor FFS Medicaid structure.483 Moreover, the 
state is working to eliminate Medicaid payments for non-emergent care provided in 
hospital emergency departments because of budget concerns,484 which may have the 
unintended consequence of lowering access to services for low-income populations. 
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c. State’s 2002 HealthChoice Evaluation’s Assessment of Program’s Impact 
on Access to Care 
Maryland’s Department of Health and Mental Hygiene conducted an evaluation in 
2002 of the program thus far, which generally showed improvement in use of services 
among children, who at that time represented 75 percent of the program’s population.485, 
486 The evaluation found that the number of services per person has decreased, but overall 
HealthChoice made “discernible,” albeit modest progress between 1997 and 2000 in 
improving access to care for MCO enrollees. It also noted that improvement in access 
was “not always uniform across population groups, regions of the state, or MCOs.” 487 
For example, children in foster care appeared to have fewer well-child visits in 
HealthChoice than they had in the 1997 baseline FFS period.488, 489 Additionally, 
although the report found that the proportion of children receiving dental care visits 
increased substantially under HealthChoice, access to dental services remained a serious 
concern.490 
d. Interviewee Observations about HealthChoice’s Impact on Access to 
Specialty Care 
Interviewees from multiple FQHCs agreed that specialty care has become a 
“serious problem under HealthChoice.”491 One former Maryland Medicaid official agreed 
that network adequacy was always of great concern in the mid-late 1990s. Indeed, one 
interviewee recalls a decision to drop a project to counter HealthChoice fraud because of 
agency fears that addressing the problem would result in providers getting dropped from 
MCOs and decreasing the already fragile network adequacy.492 
This affected not only the HealthChoice population, but also the uninsured. One 
FQHC reports that: 
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Those OBs who used to do surgery for my [FQHC’s] uninsured people 
[prior to HealthChoice] now will not. I used to have it in my contracts 
with them. If you see one of my uninsured people, and that person needs 
surgery, you will do it at no cost to me, but he made me take it out [of their 
new contracts]. He said, I can’t do that anymore. Increased expenses, a 
decrease in reimbursement. He’s just closing down his uncompensated 
care [practice].”493 
Another interviewee from a different FQHC also believes specialists dropped out 
of FQHC-owned MCOs because of poor reimbursement.494 This was the conclusion of a 
departmental study on provider profit margins, states a former Medicaid employee, 
adding that “the report found that HealthChoice providers were not covering basic costs. 
In fact, Medicaid providers could expect to lose money delivering care to the Medicaid 
population.”495 Indeed, agreed an official with one Medicaid MCO that exited the market, 
“If it costs you $10 and you only get $8, you cannot make it up, and the program is 
seriously underfunded.”496 This interviewee noted that, “The specialist pool has gotten 
smaller… what I find is absolutely missing is the mental health sector. Cannot find a 
psychiatrist, period …. We have also had a terrible time finding dental hygienists.”497 
A researcher with the state, however, disagrees. Specialty care may be hard to 
access in certain parts of the state, but he asserts that it is no worse now under 
HealthChoice than it was under Medicaid FFS.498 
e. Interviewee Observations about Impact of HealthChoice on Health Care 
Disparities 
Although one FQHC was outspoken about the persistence of disparities in access 
and quality of care for racial and ethnic minorities,499 two researchers who were 
interviewed separately cited different studies indicating that disparities have narrowed 
state-wide under HealthChoice. One noted the University of Maryland at Baltimore 
157 
County’s evaluation for the state Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, which 
“finds nearly no” persistent disparities.500 
Another interviewee’s own research evaluated measures of well-child access, 
adult preventive ambulatory care access (chosen because it captures some men within the 
disabled male population), and breast cancer screenings (which tends to have racial 
disparities in outcomes). His research found that, relative to FFS in the days prior to 
HealthChoice, disparities among adults were nearly eliminated under managed care and, 
in an unexpected finding, black and Hispanic children and adolescents surpassed white 
children in the use of preventive services. That said, he found that 
black and Hispanic children are more likely to live in an area with fewer practicing 
physicians, and he is planning additional research investigating his concern that the 
preventive services that they receive may be shorter in duration and possibly less 
beneficial.501 
B. Establishment of Medicaid MCO Market 
The quality of care in a Medicaid managed care program is determined in large 
part by the quality and quantity of the MCOs that participate. In turn, the quality of the 
MCOs is only as high as the quality and quantity of the clinicians with whom they 
contract. Historic Medicaid providers (i.e., individual physicians, FQHCs, Maryland 
Qualified Health Centers,502 rural health clinics, school-based health centers, local health 
departments, and family planning clinics), as well as the two university medical centers 
in Baltimore (Johns Hopkins and the University of Maryland at Baltimore) sought to 
continue having Medicaid beneficiaries comprise large portions of their patient pools. 
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Prior to HealthChoice, Johns Hopkins and the University of Maryland at 
Baltimore together accounted for nearly 33 percent of all Medicaid general hospital 
revenues.503 These historic providers, however, feared having to compete on even footing 
with the private clinicians that had more resources to attract new patients at their 
disposal.504 Indeed, black physicians reported challenges negotiating to join MCO 
networks, and FQHCs feared that the MCOs would oppose contracting with them.505 
1. New Provider-Formed MCOs 
The state, having every incentive to keep the provider pool as robust as possible, 
agreed to designate those with a history of caring for Medicaid enrollees as “historic 
providers” who, at minimum, would be assigned to one MCO. Under HealthChoice, 
providers are also permitted to create their own MCOs.506 On November 21, 1996, Johns 
Hopkins did just that: together with the Maryland Community Health System, it formed 
Priority Partners, a provider-based Medicaid-only MCO.507 Other Maryland FQHCs, 
working with Health Care for the Homeless, Blue Cross/Blue Shield, the University of 
Maryland, and Mercy Hospital formed Care Parnters, another provider-based MCO.508 
Two more MCOs were founded by FQHCs, and many were founded by hospitals.509 
A short time later, Green Spring Health Services and CMG Health began a three-
year contract with the state to manage mental health benefits under HealthChoice. In July 
1997, just as HealthChoice enrollment began, PrimeHealth Corp., a minority-owned 
MCO, was approved to sell care to Maryland HealthChoice enrollees.510 
2. MCO Concerns about Viability Under HealthChoice 
But some MCOs, however, grew concerned about their ability to stay afloat in the 
new managed care environment. Several companies chose not to compete for Medicaid 
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contracts while others hastily pulled out of the Medicaid market in Maryland and 
elsewhere. MAMSI, a national managed health care company, attributed part of its $64 
millions losses in 1996 to its participation in Maryland’s Medicaid program and 
subsequently withdrew from the market just before the state instituted HealthChoice.511, 
512 Care Partners, which had grown to be the second-largest Medicaid MCO in the state, 
folded.513 In 1996 and 1997, the NYLCare, one of the state’s largest MCOs, opted not to 
bid for a Medicaid contract for fear of unwieldy state regulations. Nine MCOs, in total, 
applied for Medicaid contracts with the state of Maryland and all nine received 
contracts.514 (For a comprehensive list, see Table 5.4.) 
Table 7.1 
The Nine MCOs Contracting with HealthChoice at the Program’s Inception 
1. Prudential Health Care Plan 
2. United Healthcare of the Mid-Atlantic, also known as Chesapeake Family 
First 
3. Freestate/Total Healthcare (the latter contracted with Freestate Blue Cross 
Blue Shield) 
4. Priority Partners 
5. Maryland Physicians Care 
6. Helix Family Choice 
7. New American 
8. Prime Health 
9. JAI Medical Systems 
Source: Gold et al.515 
3. Consolidations in the Market 
Over the course of several years, there were multiple changes to the MCO market. 
Said one University of Maryland health policy researcher, “We had a number of 
turnovers early on in the system and the most painful one was probably Free State 
because that was probably the largest number that had to be picked up and moved 
around.”516 
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In chronological order, New American Health was the first to pull out of the 
HealthChoice program, followed by Prudential (Maryland’s largest MCO), which sold its 
provider network to Amerigroup. At that point, all Prudential enrollees were given the 
option to go to any participating MCO. Total Health, a community health center-based 
plan, was bought out. Prime Health went out of business. Then came the largest blow in 
2001: BlueCross/Blue Shield’s “Free State” left Maryland.517 
One interviewee, a national observer of Medicaid managed care trends, talked 
about the proliferation and then the withdrawal of MCOs in the Medicaid market. 
You saw when the BBA was first enacted the elimination of the 75/25 rule. 
[The 75/25 Rule required that a minimum of 25 percent of an MCO 
membership must be comprised of private, non-Medicaid payers] And that 
is when you saw a lot of Medicaid only plans begin to sprout up…They 
were successful financially. And you started to see some of the larger 
firms and entities begin, you know, merging, acquiring some of these small 
plans… And it makes it tougher for the smaller plans, the individually 
owned plans … to compete with them, because they don’t have the 
economies of scale, you know, that the larger groups have.… You saw a 
number of the commercial plans pull out of Medicaid managed care.518 
The state was very eager to keep Free State in the market. In the words of one of 
the key players: 
For two years, Free State was considering pulling out. It was like, oh, 
they’re the statewide blah, blah, blah, and you know, the state bent over 
backwards to try to keep them to participate in the program. And then they 
left anyhow, and [laughing] oh, my goodness. It wasn’t so bad! … We 
should have just said, this is the rate, we think they’re fair rates and if you 
can’t make it go, you know, good luck to you. Go off and do whatever you 
want to do… The departure of any big plan is a big hassle because you’ve 
got to reassign all these people, and you’ve got to get everything squared 
away and I think that was painful, but by the same token, probably one of 
the things that if people in Maryland had it to do over again, they would 
not have worked so hard to keep Free State in.519 
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4. What Caused the Departures? 
Why did so many MCOs leave the program? Stakeholders have different 
opinions, but several common themes emerge. A Health Choice program evaluator 
believes that the departures were part of the “Medicaid managed care shake-out” that 
occurred across the country in the wake of the BBA.520 
One FQHC-owned MCO believed the problem had to do with insufficient 
reimbursement. “MCOs pulled out of the market because it cost them $10 to provide the 
care and we only got $8 for it, and they just can’t make it up. You’re going to continue to 
run deficits.”521 A reimbursement rate study completed by the state corroborated the 
MCO complaints that the current rates were not covering cost of providing care.522 
Providers complained about the HealthChoice reimbursement policy, which 
called upon FQHCs to submit claims to the MCOs, which pays a “‘market fee’ that does 
not even cover the cost of sterilizing the room. Then the state pays us the remainder. So 
you have got to chase down a claim twice.” In the first year of the HealthChoice program, 
the market rate was just over $15 per visit. It was not until January 2005 that the state 
reorganized its reimbursement structure such that the MCO pays the FQHC the entire rate 
at one time.523 
Indeed, FQHC-owned MCOs had the double burden of implementation problems 
affecting providers and implementation problems affecting MCOs. An interviewee from 
one such organization explained that when FQHCs lost their cost-based reimbursement in 
Maryland after the BBA’s implementation in 1998, it was “a huge hit” to the safety 
net.524 Indeed, it was several years before Maryland decided to reinstate the funds with 
state dollars.525 
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An observer of national Medicaid MCO trends thought that over-regulation 
played a significant role in the market shake out. 
Maryland …has a reputation for not being the friendliest state to 
insurance entities. And that carries over to the MCOs that are in the 
Medicaid business as well. So, I would imagine that that probably adds to 
the overall business decline that the plans are under.526 
In one example of what MCOs deemed over-regulation, prior to HealthChoice, no 
more than 33 percent of an FQHC’s total budget could be spent on administration. That 
ratio did not change under HealthChoice. “Our cap of 33 percent stayed the same, in spite 
of the fact that they forced us to increase our administrative burden. So they don’t allow 
us to be efficient, but then they complain about our costs.”527 
A then-analyst with the Maryland Medicaid agency agreed that MCOs left both 
because of frustrations about new regulatory requirements and their inability to make a 
profit.528 A HealthChoice official acknowledged that it probably had to do with the state 
placing a lot of new administrative burdens on MCOs to provide data on health care 
quality, which was much more than the requirements had been required of them under 
FFS. This official also attributed the market changes to concerns from the MCOs over 
turnover within their provider networks.529 
Providers were promised less money in exchange for no claims form or 
other paperwork, but then the MCOs reneged, and actually wanted more 
data and more paperwork. MCOs denied a lot of claims to providers who 
did not provide this data. As a result, physician groups that had formed to 
compete for Medicaid contracts with MCOs disbanded. 530 
A University of Maryland researcher concluded that, whatever the issues were 
that caused such instability in the program’s first few years, the market has stabilized. 
The departure of plans is a problem, which is why I would argue [the low-
income health care market is at a good point] right now. You’ve got seven 
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players in the market… no one having more than a quarter of the market 
share…. They’ve been relatively stable, they’re able to make a margin 
every year….531 
C. Impact of Welfare Reform on Maryland 
1. Declining Welfare Enrollment 
The number of families that received Maryland’s Temporary Cash Assistance 
(TCA) fell sharply (65 percent) between January 1995 and July 1999, decreasing the 
caseload to its smallest level since 1969.532 Medicaid enrollment by those who had been 
eligible for AFDC over that same period fell by approximately 23,000.533 
2. Declining Medicaid Enrollment 
In 2001, researchers at the University of Maryland found that Medicaid rolls 
declined “at a surprisingly high rate in given years, particularly given the recent federal 
and state efforts to expand medical coverage.” Potential causes include declining welfare 
caseloads, an improving economy, and changes to the state’s welfare policies including 
diversion programs and the divorce between cash and medical assistance. 
Data from Maryland’s Department of Human Resources (DHR) indicate that 50 
percent of former welfare beneficiaries have Medical Assistance coverage within the first 
three months after exiting welfare,534 leaving researchers wondering what happened to 
the other 50 percent. For purposes of tracking employment or health records, the other 
half of former Maryland welfare recipients have “disappeared.”535 Of those for whom the 
state has data, only half of workers (i.e., 25 percent of all welfare “leavers”) are earning 
more than $800 per month.536 Indeed, fewer than 40 percent of leavers work 
continuously, and among those who do, median earnings were roughly $2,000 per 
quarter, suggesting that most families who exit welfare continue to earn incomes well 
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below the FPL.537 Concludes one researcher: “there is information from some states that 
former welfare recipients are being cut off from Medicaid despite their continuing 
eligibility.”538 
One FQHC reports that its patient base tripled from 1995 to 2005, but its 
Medicaid patient base is lower than its 1995 levels. 
[Why?] Because of welfare reform… [a lot of people have begun 
working]. Now that’s a good thing, but the bad part is the health 
insurance part. You have high deductibles and your medicine costs a lot of 
money. What we see is that somebody does not want to come back in 
because there’s a copay associated with every visit…. If you have no 
insurance, [out-of-pocket costs] may be less because you’re on a sliding 
fee scale…. So yeah, they do have jobs, but do they have access?539 
D. Impact of Implementation of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 
on Maryland 
1. Computer Problems 
The simultaneous HealthChoice and welfare reform implementation caused 
problems. For example, information technology staff in DHMH (the agency responsible 
for Medicaid enrollment) and DHS (the agency responsible for welfare enrollment) had 
not yet resolved electronic data transfer concerns by June 1997, and as a result, 
individuals who were entitled to and were receiving Medicaid erroneously were expelled 
from the program when they lost welfare benefits. Likewise, according to staff at the 
DHMH, some Marylanders remained on the Medicaid rolls much longer than they should 
have because of similar administrative errors subsequent to and resulting from the 
Medicaid/welfare delinking.540 
According to one DHS staff member, technological limitations prevented the 
TANF eligibility screen to be sent to Medicaid eligibility computers. 
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Once [the eligibility worker] gets [a refugee] eligible and she finds that 
with TANF families, there is some kind of a disconnect with the computer 
system that keeps them from automatically taking information from the 
TANF screen and sending it over to the Medical Assistance Screen. She 
checks a few days later and no, it didn’t go over, so she has to hand-fill 
out papers and fax them over to someone, who then has to hand-ender it in 
all over again. If the worker is not diligent, that family will simply not get 
Medical Assistance... And the worker thinks they did their job, and they 
originally did – they put their information in there, but it didn’t convert 
over to the Medicaid screen.541 
Staff with one FQHC agreed that eligible enrollees were being cut off 
inappropriately, particularly in the early years of HealthChoice. One such episode had to 
do with the loss of Social Security eligibility. 
We had people being cut off of SSI and being evicted and becoming 
homeless. [At the same time,] we had people mistakenly having their 
Medicaid cut off, which wasn’t supposed to happen. It was just supposed 
to be their [SSI] benefits. The clients were supposed to be given 
notification that they had three months to provide documentation for what 
their other impairments were, to try and make sure they weren’t cut off 
when they had many other problems as well. It didn’t go well, and many, 
many thousands of people lost their benefits and could not get them 
returned. 542 
Some believed that the problems with initial implementation were eliminated as the 
program matured, but others maintain that new and more fundamental issues emerged 
and plague the program even today. 
2. The Medicaid Population Became Younger 
As noted in previous chapters, the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 established the 
State Children’s Health Insurance Program (or SCHIP). Maryland implemented SCHIP 
by expanding the Medicaid program to include SCHIP eligibles, which changed the 
demographics of the Medicaid population, in the words of one interviewee, “from a 
program for women and children to a program for children and children.”543 Indeed, the 
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state’s 2002 self-evaluation of the HealthChoice program noted that the percentage of 
Maryland children enrolled in Medicaid statewide grew from 12.7 percent in 1990 to 22.2 
percent in 2000. Growth was particularly sharp among children on the Eastern Shore, 
where the percentage of children served by Medicaid grew from 12.4 percent in 1990 to 
28.7 percent in 2000.544 For a breakdown of Medicaid enrollment by group, see Table 7.2 
and Figures 7.1 and 7.2. 
Table 7.2 
Percent of growth of eligible children in Maryland Medicaid from 1999 to 2003. 
Year No. of Kids All Enrollees Percent of kids vs. all 
1999 306,891 628,458 49 
2003 418,297 825,492 51 
Growth 111,406 197,034 Percent growth attributable to children: 57 
Source: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. 545, 546 
However, one University of Maryland interviewee notes that the establishment of 
Maryland’s SCHIP program has not significantly improved child health outcomes 
because the sickest and/or poorest children were already receiving Medicaid-funded care 
via Supplemental Security Income (SSI), a federally-funded welfare program. MCHIP is 
a popular program, however, for two reasons. First, it covers a sympathetic group: 
children living in families of the working poor. Secondly, the program is inexpensive 
because the covered population is generally healthier than the very poor and because 
unlike Medicaid, which offers the state a 50 percent federal match, MCHIP fetches a 65 
percent federal matching rate.547 
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Figure 7.1. FY 1999 Medicaid Enrollees in Maryland. 
Source: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.548 













Figure 7.2. FY 2003 Medicaid Enrollees in Maryland. 
Source: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.549 
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3. Loss of Medicare Pilot Funding for Baltimore Medical Systems 
As noted above, Baltimore Medical Systems (BMS), the state’s largest FQHC, 
grew out of a Medicare demonstration project that began in the late 1970s, and a 
substantial amount of its patient base has always been the elderly. Through 1998, 
Medicare volume accounted for roughly $25 million of BMS’s revenue, but this changed 
with the implementation of the BBA. 
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services interpreted the language of the 
BBA in a way that fundamentally changed the demonstration project. What had been an 
open-enrollment, cost-based reimbursement program with no patient cost participation 
and no managed care became a closed-enrollment managed care program with significant 
cost sharing. As a result, BMS’s poor elderly patients were suddenly required to 
participate in the cost of the care that for twenty years they received without having to 
pay. 
This drove many Medicare patients out of the system, leaving BMS with excess 
geriatric capacity and, with closed enrollment, no way to rebuild it. BMS provided only 
$14 million in Medicare services in 1999, a loss of $11 million from the previous year. 
The main cause of lost revenues was from Medicare, but “the fact that occurred 
simultaneously [with the cut in cost-based reimbursement and the establishment of 
HealthChoice] was very problematic.”550 Between 1999 and 2000, BMS lost an 
additional $4 million, closed two of its sites, and nearly went out of business. It took the 
FQHC until 2004 to fully recover.551 
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E. Impact of Changes on the Most Vulnerable: Maryland’s 
Homeless and Immigrant Populations 
1. Homeless 
According to the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, MCOs 
that participate with HealthChoice must meet specific standards set forth in the 
regulations552 for treating seven special needs populations. These include 1) children with 
special health care needs; 2) individuals with a physical disability; 3) individuals with a 
developmental disability; 4) pregnant and postpartum women; 5) individuals who are 
homeless; 6) individuals with HIV/AIDS; and 7) individuals with a need for substance 
abuse treatment. It further states that participating MCOs “must attempt to identify 
homeless individuals and link them to the appropriate service provider.”553 However, 
according to one interviewee with extensive experience in working with the homeless 
population, there are problems in the system: 
HealthChoice is really designed for somebody who has a phone, a home, 
and the capacity to keep appointments… The [HealthChoice] program has 
been very difficult for the homeless populations. Homelessness both 
causes health problems and health problems can cause homelessness. 
When people need care, they seldom have the resources to take public 
transportation or get a ride to their primary provider. That has a big 
impact. When it was fee-for-service, they could get care wherever they 
were. The way it is now, there’s frequently people that can’t get care and 
don’t know how to resolve it.554 
The homeless have unique problems with a Medicaid managed care delivery 
system. First, they do not have a mailing address, and therefore cannot receive the 
HealthChoice enrollment package or Medical Assistance membership card. They 
frequently need more involved social services than traditional primary care providers 
offer, including psychiatric services and assistance in scheduling visits with specialists. 
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Homeless individuals can neither make nor receive phone calls to coordinate 
appointments. If they are auto-assigned to doctors that are not conveniently located near 
public transportation, they cannot access their primary care providers. Transportation is 
frequently a barrier, even to those whose doctors are in the urban center, because they do 
not have the ability to pay for bus fare or cab rides.555 This may have significant 
implications for their access to services. 
We do see HealthChoice as having created its own access to care 
problems, above and beyond the problems that homelessness creates. For 
example, the average provider needs appointments. For the average 
person experiencing homelessness, you need walk-in hours.556 
It also has administrative implications for safety net providers, who have trouble 
under the HealthChoice reimbursement structure. Even if a patient sees multiple 
providers offering completely separate health care services during a single encounter at 
the clinic, the provider can only bill for one appointment. 
For example, if someone’s a walk-in for addiction, and they’re down there 
with the addiction counselor and they [exhibit psychiatric care needs], our 
addiction counselor says, you know, I think you need to see a mental 
health provider. They have the capacity to go upstairs and say [to a 
mental health provider], ‘hey, I got one you really ought to see.’ To do 
that is hard. That’s one thing that’s hard to do from a system standpoint. 
And it’s hard to build in the capacity to do that… you just bill for one 
visit… the client may have seen three different teams here, but on paper it 
goes down as one visit.557 
2. Immigrants 
Evolving demographics within Maryland have played an important role in the 
state’s low-income health care market. An interviewee and immigration researcher 
explains that there has been a significant growth in the immigrant population in 
Maryland, particularly in Montgomery and Prince Georges Counties.558 This has put a 
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strain on hospital emergency departments (EDs or ERs), which is frequently the default 
site of care for the uninsured. 
One official with the Maryland Office for New Americans also reports that many 
uninsured immigrants seek care from the ER, but there are efforts to bring care to this 
population in more cost effective ways. 
The Health Alliance of Howard County, for example, is a free clinic 
established by some local docs and the Howard County General Hospital 
to address the ER overcrowding issue. The docs volunteer services, and 
the hospital waives fees. In this way, it serves both the community and the 
hospital because it provides less expensive care than they were covering 
in the ER.559 
A University of Maryland researcher comments that, via the ER, the state 
provides immigrants with “inefficient health care,” which he characterizes as “a real 
problem.”560 One Health Care for the Homeless staff member agrees about the magnitude 
of the problem, and is working to expand access in other ways. 
We’ve seen a lot more [homeless] people that are immigrants in the past 
couple of years than we had previously…. Our [new] clinic is going to be 
for day laborers, which addresses both the documented and 
undocumented. They work all day, but in all likelihood have no health 
insurance, and probably are more likely to go to an ER for a problem 
because it is open weekends and evenings and we’re not. So we’re trying 
to expand to be able to serve that …both working people who are 
homeless and people who are either migrant or undocumented. There are 
a lot of those… It’s a growing demographic and it’s a growing unserved 
and underserved demographic.561 
Many immigrants, both insured and uninsured, seek care in FQHCs. An FQHC 
CEO concurs that there have been more immigrants in his clinics, noting that there are 
many more refugees and fewer adults since the pre-Balanced Budget Act (BBA) period. 
He adds that, since Medicaid and the BBA-created Children’s Health Insurance Program 
(which provides reimbursement for care to low-income children through Medicaid) came 
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into existence, Medicaid accounts for twice as much of his FQHC’s revenue stream. “The 
Medicaid program is covering more kids, immigrants, and refugees that weren’t here 
[pre-HealthChoice] in ’97.”562 
A HealthChoice administrator agrees. There is a costly and “hugely increasing 
alien population” in Maryland.563 For example, HealthChoice funds a multi-language 
injury and complaint information hotline, which offers beneficiaries free and 
linguistically appropriate advice.564 Montgomery County, in particular, has printed much 
of its Medicaid materials in multiple languages.565 These efforts are in response to 
“language access laws,”566 which are expensive to maintain. Maryland also provides non-
emergency care for certain undocumented aliens (see Table 7.3) and has an unusual state-
funded hospital uncompensated care structure, which asserts one state official, makes it 
an attractive home to undocumented pregnant women; that funding is in jeopardy, 
however, because of massive budget cuts to the program.567 
Table 7.3 
Post-PRWORA Services Available to Certain Legal Immigrants 
Legal Immigrants in Maryland Before 
8/22/1996 
Legal Immigrants in Maryland ON/After 
8/22/1996 
Family eligible for TCA Family eligible for TCA 
Family Eligible for Medical Assistance Children/pregnant women eligible for 
Medical Assistance (state-funded)568 
Children eligible for Food Stamps Children eligible for Food Stamps. 
Source: Welfare Advocates 569 
Eligibility workers had difficulty differentiating refugees (whose federal share of 
Medicaid funding comes in part from the U.S. Office of Refugee Resettlement) from 
immigrants (whose federal share of Medicaid funding comes exclusively from the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services). 
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We discovered that eligibility workers were extremely confused about who 
qualifies for Medical Assistance, TANF, etc., because they saw so few 
refugees and they fit them in their head under the immigrant category, and 
said, ‘you have to wait five years or you’re not eligible at all.’ Under 
refugee medical assistance, they’re eligible only for 8 months.... It seemed 
to me, pre-HealthChoice, that it rarely happened that a person would get 
their Medical Assistance cared with more than a few weeks left on it. 570 
Another concern is that the package of information that HealthChoice sends out 
both to refugees571 and to the general beneficiary population572 is complicated and 
unclear. 
[Refugees enrolled in HealthChoice] will receive a packet of information 
that is extremely confusing. Some do nothing about it, and if they don’t do 
anything of course they are assigned a provider, who may be on the other 
side of town and who they might not be able to get to because they don’t 
drive or they don’t know the bus system. 573 
a. Post-PRWORA Pregnant Women and Children Medicaid Provision 
In the eight years since the BBA was enacted, Medicaid funding for Maryland’s 
immigrants has remained a political hot potato. In 2004, Maryland’s DHMH Secretary 
estimated that Medicaid is funding as much as $12 million worth of health care services 
to aliens who came to the area seeking health care. According to the Baltimore Sun, 
Maryland spent $34 million for health care services to non-U.S. residents in 2003.574 The 
DHMH responded by issuing a policy alert informing clinicians that emergency care they 
provide to Maryland “visitors” will not be eligible for Medicaid reimbursement. The 
Secretary further suggested that the state develop a system to verify the visa status of 
Medicaid applicants. Such a national requirement actually came to pass when Congress 
enacted language in the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 mandating proof of citizenship 
upon submitting a Medicaid application. 
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By 2005, there was a contentious debate over whether the Maryland governor 
would cut a $7 million program for pregnant women and children classified as permanent 
legal residents for less than five years. Legislative analysts anticipate that the full cut 
would affect 4,000 people statewide. In response, the General Assembly set aside $1.5 
million to continue prenatal coverage for uninsured pregnant immigrant women, but the 
governor was undecided if he would spend the funds for this purpose.575, 576 Although 
prenatal care would no longer be covered by Medicaid, the program would continue to 
cover labor and delivery charges.577 This may cause parents to sacrifice routine checkups 
and wait until health conditions deteriorate enough to qualify for emergency care in 
hospital emergency rooms, suggested the health officer for Montgomery County’s 
Department of Health and Human Services, adding that “we are effectively removing 
preventive care for them and that’s only going to end up costing the county more.”578 
The governor chose to maintain prenatal care coverage for all pregnant women 
enrolled in Medicaid as of July 1, 2005 (for which the administration allocated $3 
million), but would not extend the coverage to any new enrollees,579 thus bringing 
Maryland in line with Medicaid policies that are in place in most other states.580 On July 
1, 2005, funding was removed from the Maryland budget for State-only Medical 
Assistance coverage for certain aliens, namely children or pregnant women who qualify 
technically and financial for Medical Assistance or the Maryland Children’s Health 
Program except that they are qualified aliens subject to the five-year ban who have not 
lived in the U.S. for that amount of time.581 
However, in response to a state Court of Appeals ruling in October 2006, 
Maryland reinstated the $7 million program, upholding a Montgomery County Circuit 
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Court’s injunction that blocked the cuts. In the lawsuit, filed by the Maryland Legal Aid 
Bureau, families of 13 immigrant children claimed discrimination against non-U.S. 
citizens over the removal of a Medicaid provision that provided benefits for 4,000 legal 
permanent residents. The Governor also reinstated enrollment for pregnant women.582 
b. Immigrants Remain Largely Uninsured 
The impact of PRWORA’s anti-immigrant flavor and resentment of immigrants 
grew stronger in the aftermath of the tumultuous 1990s. Immigrant advocates are 
concerned that aliens have been and continue to avoid seeking health care services for 
fear of public charge labels, demands to pay back monetary worth of the services 
received, or of possible citizenship or deportation-related ramifications for themselves or 
family members. Data from Maryland’s DHMH indicate that, regardless of family 
income, Maryland’s non-citizens are significantly less likely than Maryland’s citizens to 
have health insurance. In fact, although non-citizens comprise only 9 percent of the 
state’s non-elderly population, it comprises nearly one-third of Maryland’s uninsured 
population.583 Post welfare reform, Maryland’s mixed status families still frequently do 
not get themselves or their children enrolled in Medicaid, despite eligibility.584 Indeed, 
says a University of Maryland researcher, the safety net for immigrants are often public 
hospitals and ERs only. The state is providing immigrant care, but it is doing so 
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Chapter 8: Quantitative Analysis 
This chapter looks first at the growth of uninsured in the nation and in Maryland. 
It then considers the prevalence of racial and ethnic disparities in Maryland generally, 
and finally examines the HCUP data and regression analyses looking at appendicitis care 
for patients in Maryland hospitals. 
A. Population of Uninsured Grows 
The significance of the growth in the uninsured population is perhaps obvious, but 
critical enough to state explicitly. Uninsured individuals face substantial access barriers 
to and have lower utilization of health care services.586,587, 588, 589 Because this study 
examines the impact of changes in the low-income health care market, which affects both 
the Medicaid and the uninsured populations, it is important to note population trends of 
both groups. 
From 1987 through 2006, the uninsurance rates in Maryland and in the nation 
resemble a rollercoaster. The late 1990s and early 2000s saw declines in uninsured 
populations across the country, as illustrated in Figure 8.1. That trend, however, reversed 
itself by 2001, when the rates and the numbers of the uninsured population rose. 
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Figure 8.1. U.S. Number Uninsured and Uninsured Rate: 1987 to 2005.590, 591 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 1988 to 2006 Annual Social and Economic 
Supplements.592 
The trends in Maryland closely mirror those of the United States. The percentage 
of uninsured Marylanders grew steadily from 1987 (10.9 percent of the state population) 
to 1995 (17.2 percent). Maryland’s uninsured population rate dropped dramatically to its 
lowest point in nearly a decade (12.8 percent) in 1996, but as illustrated in Table 8.1, by 
1998, it was at an all-time high at 18.9 percent.593 By 2000, the percent of uninsured 
Marylanders followed the national trend and fell substantially—to 11.8 percent.594 That 
trend was to reverse quickly, however. From 2001 to 2006, the percentage of 
Marylanders without health insurance increased 44 percent, and the associated medical 
bill exceeds $2.4 billion annually.595 
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Table 8.1 
Uninsured Rates in the United States and Maryland 
Year National Uninsured (%) Maryland Uninsured (%) 
2005 15.9 N/A 
2004 15.7 16.1* 
2003 15.6 16.1* 
2002 15.2 15.0 
2001 14.6 13.8 
2000 14.0 11.8 
1999 15.5 12.5 
1998 16.3 18.9 
1997 16.1 14.9 
Source: U.S. Census596, National Center for Health Statistics597, 598 
*Number reflects 2003–2004 average as reported by the Kaiser Family Foundation.599 
1. Immigrant Uninsurance Rates 
The national picture for immigrants’ access to insurance is even more concerning. 
In 2005, the uninsured rate was 13.4 percent for the U.S. native population, 17.9 percent 
for naturalized citizens, 33.6 percent for the foreign-born population, and 43.6 percent for 
noncitizens. Indeed, in 1995, the proportion of the foreign-born population lacking health 
insurance coverage was about two and a half times that of the native population.600 
2. Medicaid Enrollment 
As more poor children in Maryland were being enrolled in Medicaid as a result of 
the Children’s Health Insurance Program, which began in 1998, the percentage of 
uninsured state residents fell. To wit, the number of Maryland’s Medicaid recipients 
increased from 339,000 in 1996—just before the federal Balanced Budget Act of 1997 
passed—to 665,000 in 2000, and the percent of Maryland’s Medicaid beneficiaries in 
managed care grew dramatically from 1996 (64 percent) to 2000 (81 percent). The 
number of Maryland Medicaid recipients per 100 persons below the federal poverty level 
grew from 74 in 1989–90 to 170 in 1999–2000.601 
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B. Racial and Ethnic Health Care Disparities in Maryland 
Racial and ethnic populations have been growing much faster than the white 
population. As noted in Table 5.2, while the total population increased 11 percent from 
1990 to 2004, the growth rate was three percent for whites, 27 percent for blacks, and 84 
percent for Hispanics.602, 603 Consider this growth within the national context of growing 
uninsurance rates, by race, as described in Table 8.2. As the uninsured population 
continues to grow, and to do so disproportionately among Hispanics, greater numbers of 
racial and ethnic minorities are at risk to lack access to health care. 
Table 8.2 
Uninsured (“Not Covered at Any Time”) in the United States by Race, 2003–2005 (in 
thousands) 
Racial Group 2003 2004 2005 Percent Change (2003-2005) 
White, non-Hispanic 21,582 21,983 22,144 2.6 
Black 7,080 7,186 7,228 2.1 
Hispanic (any race) 13,237 13,678 14,122 6.7 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Bureau of the Census, 2003,604 2004,605 and 2005606 
Consider next the pervasive problem of disparities in health care delivery. Health 
care disparities exist in Maryland, as in the rest of the country. As quantified in the 
illustrations below, when compared to whites, blacks are less likely to receive prenatal 
care, are more likely to have low birth weight babies, greater percentages of low birth 
weight babies, higher infant mortality rates, higher death rates from various diseases, and 
shorter life expectancies. This was true before, during, and after the study period. Indeed, 
black Marylanders were three-to-four times as likely as their white counterparts to 
experience delays in receipt of, or simply to do without, prenatal care in each year 
between 1994 and 2003. 
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1. Prenatal Care 
Access to prenatal care for American women as a whole improved steadily from 
1994 to 2003. In Maryland, however, this trend was reversed in 1998, and that began a 
period of decreasing access among Marylanders that remained through 2003. Despite 
historically enjoying more frequent prenatal care access than their national counterparts, 
Maryland women experienced either late or no prenatal care at the same rate as U.S. 
women in 2002, and actually had poorer access by 2003 (see Figure 8.2). 
Figure 8.2. Percentage of Women Receiving Late or No Prenatal Care, Maryland & the 
United States, 1994–2003.* 
Source: Maryland Vital Statistics Annual Report (2003). Maryland DHMH, Vital Statistics Administration. 
* Maryland figures exclude women for whom timing of prenatal care was unknown. Late care refers to 
prenatal care which begins during the third trimester of pregnancy. The percentage of women receiving late 
or no prenatal care in Maryland has been increasing in recent years, in part as a result of more complete 
reporting of this variable on the birth certificate. 
**2003 U.S. data preliminary. 
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Figure 8.3. Percentage of Births to Women with Late or No Prenatal Care by Race, 
Maryland,* 1994–2003. 
Source: Maryland Vital Statistics Annual Report (2003). Maryland DHMH, Vital Statistics Administration. 
* Maryland figures exclude women for whom timing of prenatal care was unknown. Late care refers to 
prenatal care which begins during the third trimester of pregnancy. The percentage of women receiving late 
or no prenatal care in Maryland has been increasing in recent years, in part as a result of more complete 
reporting of this variable on the birth certificate. 
Figure 8.4. Percentage of Births to Women Receiving Late or No Prenatal Care by Race 
& Hispanic Origin***, Maryland, 2003.* 
Source: Maryland Vital Statistics Annual Report (2003). Maryland DHMH, Vital Statistics Administration. 
* Maryland figures exclude women for whom timing of prenatal care was unknown. Late care refers to 
prenatal care which begins during the third trimester of pregnancy. The percentage of women receiving late 
or no prenatal care in Maryland has been increasing in recent years, in part as a result of more complete 
reporting of this variable on the birth certificate. 
***Persons of Hispanic origin may be any race. 
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Figure 8.3 demonstrates that prenatal care access was not distributed evenly 
across all races during the period from 1994 to 2003. In the last year of that window, 
blacks (6.7 percent) and Hispanics (6.4 percent) continued to be more likely than whites 
(2.2 percent) to suffer from delayed or no prenatal care (see Figure 8.4). 
2. Infant Mortality 
Figure 8.5. Infant Mortality by Race, Maryland, 1994–2003. 
Source: Maryland Vital Statistics Annual Report (2003). Maryland DHMH, Vital Statistics Administration. 
Figure 8.5 shows that whites experienced little variation in infant death rates from 
1994 to 2003; the ten-year white mortality rate among peaked in 1994 and 1995 
(6.0/1,000 births), recorded its lowest rate of the decade in 2000 (4.7/1,000), and rose 
again in 2001 (5.5/1,000). Infant mortality rates among blacks were more volatile during 
this time period, decreasing in 1996 (14.5/1,000), rising and peaking in 1997 
(16.1/1,000), decreasing again from 1998 (15.4/1,000) through 2000 (13.0/1,000), 
increasing in 2001 (13.6/1,000), falling in 2002 (12.7/1,000), and finally gaining its 
greatest one-year increase in 2003 (14.7/1,000). 
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Infant death rates in Maryland exceed the national average in each year between 
1994 and 2002. While the national rate fell slightly each year (until a slight increase from 
6.8/1,000 in 2001 to 7.0/1,000 in 2002), the Maryland rate rose and fell three times—
most sharply in 2000, when it dropped to its lowest level of the decade (7.4/1,000). Both 
the national and statewide peak was in 1994, at 8.0/1,000 and 8.8/1,000, respectively (see 
Figure 8.6). 
Figure 8.6. Infant Mortality, Maryland and United States, 1994–2003. 
Source: Maryland Vital Statistics Annual Report (2003). Maryland DHMH, Vital Statistics Administration. 
* 2003 U.S. data not available. 
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Figure 8.7. Infant Mortality by Race and Hispanic Origin* Maryland, 2003. 
Source: Maryland Vital Statistics Annual Report (2003). Maryland DHMH, Vital Statistics Administration. 
* Persons of Hispanic Origin may be of any race. 
As Figure 8.7 demonstrates, the black infant mortality rate in 2003 (14.7/1,000) 
was nearly three times that of whites (5.4/1,000), and more than twice the rate for 
Hispanics (6.1/1,000). It is interesting to note that, while a similar percentage of blacks 
(6.7 percent) and Hispanics (6.4 percent) receive late or no prenatal care, black infants 
are so much more likely than Hispanic infants to suffer from LBW (13.1 percent versus 
7.0 percent) or infant mortality (14.7/1,000 versus 6.0/1,000). 
Adult minorities do not fare much better than their younger counterparts. 
Although average life expectancy among Marylanders in 2003 was 77.0 years, it varies 
significantly by gender and race. Specifically, life expectancy was more than seven years 
lower for black males (68.7) than white males (76.0) and nearly five years lower for 
black females (76.0) than white females (80.9).607 The figures below indicate that blacks 
have been consistently dying at faster rates from heart disease, cerebrovascular disease, 
respiratory diseases, diabetes, and HIV/AIDS than are whites. 
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4. Heart Disease Deaths 
Figure 8.8. Age-Adjusted Death Rate* for Diseases of the Heart by Race, Maryland, 
1994–2003. 
Source: Maryland Vital Statistics Annual Report (2003). Maryland DHMH, Vital Statistics Administration. 
*Death rates are age adjusted to the 2000 projected U.S. population. 
As indicated in Figure 8.8, the age-adjusted death rate for heart disease in 
Maryland during 1994–2003 was consistently higher for blacks than whites. In 1994, the 
death rate for heart disease was at its ten-year height for whites (at 278.1/10,000), and fell 
steadily until landing at its lowest point (223.9/10,000) in 2003. The rate for blacks 
followed a similar pattern from 1994 to 1996 and 1998 to 2002, but peaked in 1997 
(324.6/10,000); it ebbed in 2002 (285.1/10,000) and rose slightly in 2003 (286.3/10,000). 
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Figure 8.9 Age-Adjusted Death Rate* for Diseases of the Heart, Maryland and the 
United States, 1994–2003. 
Source: Maryland Vital Statistics Annual Report (2003). Maryland DHMH, Vital Statistics Administration. 
*Death rates are age adjusted to the 2000 projected U.S. population. 
** 2003 U.S. data not available. 
Figure 8.9 demonstrates that the death rate for heart disease fell nearly every year 
in Maryland, as it did in the United States, but the decline was faster on the national level. 
In 2000, Maryland’s rate (260.1/100,000 population) exceeded that of the United States 
(257.6/100,000) for the first time during this period. 
As indicated in Figure 8.10, males are have a higher death rate for heart disease 
than do females, and rates for blacks again outpace those for whites. Specifically, black 
men (355.1/100,000) suffer a higher death rate for heart disease than white men 
(272.8/100,000), and black women (238.5/100,000) suffer a higher rate than white 
women (180.5/100,000). 
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Figure 8.10. Age-Adjusted Death Rate* for Diseases of the Heart by Race and Sex, 
Maryland, 2003. 
Source: Maryland Vital Statistics Annual Report (2003). Maryland DHMH, Vital Statistics Administration. 
*Death rates are age adjusted to the 2000 projected U.S. population. 
5. Cerebrovascular Disease Deaths 
As with heart disease, the death rate from cerebrovascular diseases is higher for 
blacks for each of the ten years examined. Figure 8.11 shows that the rate declined slowly 
for whites for most of this period, remaining relatively stable from its height in 1995 
(63.0/100,000) until it began to fall off more sharply in 2000 (at 59.2/100,000) and finally 
reached its low point in 2003 (49.9/100,000). During this window, the black death rate 
was highest in 1994 (84.2/100,000), declined steadily through 1998 (74.2/100,000), rose 
again in 1999 (78.7/100,000) again decreased until coming to its lowest point in 2002 
(64.0/100,000), and finally turned upward again in 2003 (67.0/100,000). 
Both the Maryland and the U.S. data in Figure 8.12 indicate sharp decreases from 
the nearly identical 1994 cerebrovascular disease death rates of 66.1/100,000 and 
67.1/100,000, respectively. In 2002, the rates in Maryland and the United States again 
were nearly identical: 56.5/100,000 and 56.3/100,000. The decline was steadier for the 
United States, while Maryland experienced a lull between 1997 (63.1/100,000) and 2000 
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(63.0/100,000). By 2001, the Maryland rate again began to fall again and reached its low 
point in 2003 (53.3/100,000). Gender breakdowns in 2003 indicate no significant 
difference between the sexes (see Figure 8.13). 
Figure 8.11. Age-Adjusted Death Rate* for Cerebrovascular Diseases by Race, 
Maryland, 1994–2003. 
Source: Maryland Vital Statistics Annual Report (2003). Maryland DHMH, Vital Statistics Administration. 
*Death rates are age adjusted to the 2000 projected U.S. population. 
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Figure 8.12. Age-Adjusted Death Rate* for Cerebrovascular Diseases, Maryland and the 
United States, 1994–2003. 
Source: Maryland Vital Statistics Annual Report (2003). Maryland DHMH, Vital Statistics Administration. 
*Death rates are age adjusted to the 2000 projected U.S. population. 
** 2003 U.S. data not available. 
Figure 8.13. Age-Adjusted Death Rate* for Cerebrovascular Disease by Race and Sex, 
Maryland, 2003. 
Source: Maryland Vital Statistics Annual Report (2003). Maryland DHMH, Vital Statistics Administration. 
*Death rates are age adjusted to the 2000 projected U.S. population. 
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6. Chronic Lower Respiratory Disease Deaths 
Figure 8.14. Age-Adjusted Death Rate* for Chronic Lower Respiratory Diseases by 
Race, Maryland, 1994–2003. 
Source: Maryland Vital Statistics Annual Report (2003). Maryland DHMH, Vital Statistics Administration. 
*Death rates are age adjusted to the 2000 projected U.S. population. 
Chronic Lower Respiratory Disease (CLRD) is one of only three examples of data 
included in the Maryland Vital Statistics Annual Report for which the death rate for 
whites exceeds that for blacks. (The other two conditions, not included in this analysis, 
are Alzheimer’s Disease and suicide.) As indicated in Figure 8.14, 1995 is the year of the 
greatest gap between CLRD death rates for blacks (25.4/100,000) and whites 
(42.1/100,000), and the time when the black rate is at its lowest point of the ten-year 
window (and the white rate is at its second-lowest point). 
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Figure 8.15. Age-Adjusted Death Rate* for Chronic Lower Respiratory Diseases, 
Maryland and the United States, 1994–2003. 
Source: Maryland Vital Statistics Annual Report (2003). Maryland DHMH, Vital Statistics Administration. 
*Death rates are age adjusted to the 2000 projected U.S. population. 
** 2003 U.S. data not available. 
Figure 8.16. Age-Adjusted Death Rate* for Chronic Lower Respiratory Diseases by Race 
and Sex, Maryland, 2003. 
Source: Maryland Vital Statistics Annual Report (2003). Maryland DHMH, Vital Statistics Administration. 
*Death rates are age adjusted to the 2000 projected U.S. population. 
While 1994 saw similar CLRD death rates in Maryland (41.4/100,000) and the 
United States (42.6/100,000), their trends did not mirror each other again until they both 
rose in 1999 and then both slowly declined. Maryland’s rates remained below those for 
each of the nine years for which data was available (see Figure 8.15). Figure 8.16 
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demonstrates differentiation by race and gender in 2003, such that white males 
experienced the highest CLRD death rate (45.6/100,000), followed by white females 
(40.8/100,000), black males (32.2/100,000), and black females (22.0/100,000). 
7. Influenza and Pneumonia Deaths 
Figure 8.17. Age-Adjusted Death Rate* from Influenza and Pneumonia by Race, 
Maryland, 1994–2003. 
Source: Maryland Vital Statistics Annual Report (2003). Maryland DHMH, Vital Statistics Administration. 
*Death rates are age adjusted to the 2000 projected U.S. population. 
Influenza and pneumonia are diseases for which there are vaccinations. Deaths 
from these illnesses, therefore, are often used as a proxy for poor access to primary care 
clinicians, who are able to provide patients with such immunizations. The data in Figure 
8.17 indicate that the death rate for blacks was at its lowest point at the start of this ten-
year window, in 1994 (21.5/100,000), and peaked just two years later in 1996 (at 
29.7/100,000). It declined in 1997 (25.2/100,000), rose in 1998 (28.2/100,000), fell again 
in 1999 (24.5/100,000), increased again in 2000 (25.4/100,000), once again declined in 
2001 (24.9), and then began climbing again in 2002 (25.0/100,000) and 2003 
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(25.3/100,000). The trend of influenza and pneumonia death rates for whites was 
smoother, increasing slowly from 1994 (20.3/100,000) until it peaked in 1999 (at 
25.5/100,000), began its descent in 2000 (23.5/100,000), fell to its low point in 2001 
(19.1/100,000), and again began rising again in 2002 (22.6/100,000) and 2003 
(22.7/100,000). Interestingly, as the white rate peaked in 1999 (at 25.5/100,000), the 
black death rate for influenza and pneumonia dipped below it (to 24.5/100,000), 
apparently reversing the racial disparity for a 12-month period. 
Over this ten-year period, Maryland’s influenza and pneumonia death rate varied 
greatly, at times both dropping below and exceeding the national average (see Figure 
8.18). The state death rate grew from 1994 (20.8/100,000) through 1996 (24.0/100,000), 
fell slightly in 1997 (23.5/100,000), peaked in 1998 (25.8/100,000), fell to its low point in 
2001 (20.2/100,000), and began growing again in 2002 and 2003. Nationally, the death 
rate grew more slowly, but also peaked in 1998 (24.2/100,000). 
Figure 8.18. Age-Adjusted Death Rate* from Influenza and Pneumonia, Maryland and 
the United States, 1994–2003. 
Source: Maryland Vital Statistics Annual Report (2003). Maryland DHMH, Vital Statistics Administration. 
*Death rates are age adjusted to the 2000 projected U.S. population. 
** 2003 U.S. data not available. 
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Figure 8.19. Age-Adjusted Death Rate* from Influenza and Pneumonia by Race and Sex, 
Maryland, 2003. 
Source: Maryland Vital Statistics Annual Report (2003). Maryland DHMH, Vital Statistics Administration. 
Maryland data from 2003, depicted in Figure 8.19, indicates virtually no 
difference between black and white women (18.8/100,000 and 19.0/100,000, 
respectively), but the male death rates vary more meaningfully by race; the influenza and 
pneumonia death rate for black men (35.6/100,000) exceeds that for white men 
(29.3/100,000). 
8. Diabetes Deaths 
Although the diabetes death rate for blacks is much greater than for whites 
throughout this period, Figure 8.20 indicates that the black rate steadily declined after 
1999 (when it was 58.1/100,000). The high point for the diabetes death rate among blacks 
during this ten-year window occurred in 1995 (59.1/100,000), and its lowest point was in 
2003 (49.9/100,000). Similarly, although there is some fluctuation over the decade, the 
white diabetes death rate peaked in 1994 (26.3/100,000) and its low point, like that of the 
black rate, was in 2003 (22.7/100,000). 
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Figure 8.20. Age-Adjusted Death Rate* for Diabetes by Race, Maryland, 1994–2003. 
Source: Maryland Vital Statistics Annual Report (2003). Maryland DHMH, Vital Statistics Administration. 
*Death rates are age adjusted to the 2000 projected U.S. population. 
Figure 8.21. Age-Adjusted Death Rate* for Diabetes, Maryland and the United States, 
1994–2003. 
Source: Maryland Vital Statistics Annual Report (2003). Maryland DHMH, Vital Statistics Administration. 
*Death rates are age adjusted to the 2000 projected U.S. population. 
Figure 8.21 demonstrates that, while the U.S. rate climbed steadily from its lowest 
reading of the period in 1994 (22.9/100,000) to its height in 2002 (25.4/100,000), 
Maryland experienced the opposite trend; the state began in 1994 at its second-highest 
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level (31.2/100,000) and ended the decade in 2003 (27.7) at its lowest rate. Despite 
falling as the national rate rose, Maryland’s diabetes death rate remained higher than the 
national rate for all nine years for which national data is available. 
Race and gender differentials are evident in Figure 8.22, which depicts 
Maryland’s diabetes death rates in 2003 by race and sex. Women experience lower death 
rates from diabetes than men, although the gender gap is smaller among blacks and 
whites. Black men have the highest diabetes death rate (54.2/100,000), followed by black 
women (46.8/100,000), white men (28.0/100,000), and white women (18.6/100,000). 
Figure 8.22. Age-Adjusted Death Rate* for Diabetes by Race and Sex, Maryland, 2003. 
Source: Maryland Vital Statistics Annual Report (2003). Maryland DHMH, Vital Statistics Administration. 
*Death rates are age adjusted to the 2000 projected U.S. population. 
9. HIV Deaths 
As illustrated in Figure 8.23, for both whites and blacks, the end of the ten-year 
period indicate far lower HIV death rates than in the earlier years. 1995 was the high 
point for both whites (8.6/100,000) and blacks (73.7/100,000), as well as for the 
substantial racial gap between the two. Racial disparities in the HIV death rate persist 
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during the entire decade, and for both whites and blacks, the rates creep up slightly 
toward the end of the window. Perhaps most profound in this data is the near-elimination 
of HIV deaths among whites, contrasted with the stubborn persistence of high rates of 
HIV deaths among Maryland’s black population. 
Figure 8.23. Age-Adjusted Death Rate* for Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), 
Maryland, 1994–2003. 
Source: Maryland Vital Statistics Annual Report (2003). Maryland DHMH, Vital Statistics Administration. 
*Death rates are age adjusted to the 2000 projected U.S. population. 
Both the United States and the state of Maryland experience the same pattern: 
very high death rates in 1994 and 1995, then dramatic decreases by 1997 and 1998 (see 
Figure 8.24). Maryland’s HIV death rate began to rise slightly from 1999 (10.7/100,000) 
through 2003 (11.1/100,000), while the U.S. rate continued to drop. 
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Figure 8.24. Age-Adjusted Death Rate* for HIV, Maryland and the U.S., 1994–2003. 
Source: Maryland Vital Statistics Annual Report (2003). Maryland DHMH, Vital Statistics Administration. 
*Death rates are age adjusted to the 2000 projected U.S. population. 
Figure 8.25. Age-Adjusted Death Rate* for HIV by Race and Sex, Maryland, 2003. 
Source: Maryland Vital Statistics Annual Report (2003). Maryland DHMH, Vital Statistics Administration. 
*Death rates are age adjusted to the 2000 projected U.S. population. 
Data from Maryland in 2003 (see Figure 8.24) indicate that white women have the lowest 
rate (1.4/100,000), followed by white men (3.7/100,000), which is then juxtaposed to the 
significantly higher death rates among black women (18.4/100,000) and black men 
(53.4/100,000). 
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C. Quantitative HCUP Data Analysis:  Perforated Appendicitis 
The Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) offers a useful source of 
comprehensive Maryland data before and after the critical policy changes explored in this 
study. HCUP’s State Inpatient Database (SID) provides patient-level demographic, 
diagnosis, and billing information that lends itself well to this study.   
1. Avoidable Hospitalizations and Prevention Quality Indicators (PQIs) 
“Ambulatory-care-sensitive conditions” can be thought of as “conditions for 
which good outpatient care can potentially prevent the need for hospitalization or for 
which early intervention can prevent complications or more severe disease.”608 To help 
track inpatient care provided for such conditions, investigators at Stanford University and 
the University of California developed a 16 “prevention quality indicators” (PQIs), a set 
of measures that are used with inpatient discharge data to identify the level of health care 
quality for ambulatory-care-sensitive conditions. PQI software, distributed by the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services’ Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality, can be applied to hospital inpatient administrative data (e.g., billing data 
available through the HCUP SID).609 
While PQIs rely upon hospital inpatient data, they provide insight into the health 
care delivery system outside of the hospital setting. Indeed, these measures “provide a 
window into the community—to identify unmet community heath care needs, to monitor 
how well complications from a number of common conditions are being avoided in the 
outpatient setting, and to compare performance of local health care systems across 
communities.”610 
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2. Perforated Appendicitis 
One such ambulatory-care-sensitive condition is perforated appendicitis.  As 
explained in detail in Chapter 1, patients suffering with appendicitis who lack access to 
surgical evaluation can experience delays in obtaining necessary care, which can result in 
appendiceal perforation, a life-threatening condition.611 
Appendicitis that progresses to appendiceal perforation is an ideal measure to explore 
for several reasons.  First, virtually every case of appendicitis will rupture if left 
untreated, making those who fail to receive treatment in a timely fashion readily 
apparent.  Secondly, there is no evidence that appendicitis strikes certain races or 
ethnicities more frequently.  Therefore, assuming that this condition affects racial and 
ethnic groups equally, increased appendiceal perforation among a particular racial or 
ethnic population would indicate insufficient access to appendicitis care.  It is also an 
informative measure because appendicitis is most frequently recognized by abdominal 
pain that grows increasingly more severe as time passes, and virtually all successfully-
treated cases involve hospital visits and surgery.  If we hypothesize that those with less 
ability to pay delay coming to the hospital in the hope that the pain will dissipate on its 
own, we should see increased likelihood of appendiceal perforation among low-income 
and uninsured populations.  
Perhaps the most compelling reason to consider appendicitis is that HCUP uniquely 
captures delays in access to care along a gradation by using two measures:  prevalence of 
appendiceal perforation and length of hospital stay for appendicitis.  If we think of 
perforation as a stage of appendiceal inflammation, we can measure the condition as a 
continuous rather than a binary variable.  This allows us to identify appendicitis patients 
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at advanced stages of inflammation whose appendices do not rupture (i.e., patients with 
near-perforation), as measured by length of stay for appendicitis treatment.  This is 
explained in greater detail, below. 
a.  Appendiceal Perforation Prevalence and Length of Hospital Stay 
This analysis examines two outcomes to measure disparities in appendiceal 
perforation by race and ethnicity.  The first is prevalence of appendiceal perforation 
among appendicitis hospitalizations in 1996 and 2003, which indicates the degree to 
which racial and ethnic disparities existed in this condition before and after the study 
period.  A second outcome is the length of stay appendicitis patients experience in the 
hospital, which is meant to capture the severity of the appendicitis (i.e., how close it is to 
rupture), variation in the degree of complications that patients may have encountered, as 
well as the patient’s overall health upon entering the hospital. 
Indeed, the measures of appendiceal perforation and length of stay due to appendicitis 
represent different levels of severity of the same problem:  delayed presentation.  As an 
appendicitis patient delays seeking care, the lining of the abdomen becomes increasingly 
inflamed and tender, and the infected appendix progresses closer to rupture.  If the delay 
is long enough, the appendix will ultimately rupture, but poor outcomes from appendicitis 
occur along a continuum.  If the delay is substantial and the appendix is extremely 
inflamed, the surgery is more complicated, requiring additional care to ensure that the 
appendix does not rupture during the appendectomy.  The level of disease and infection 
can increase with delay, resulting in longer hospital stays.612 
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 b. Differences-in-Differences 
To determine if variations in the outcome measures in Maryland were truly 
attributable to state-specific circumstances, data from another state with similar 
demographics and a similar Medicaid structure was selected and analyzed.  If the same 
results occurred there, the findings may be generalizable to other states.  If the results are 
different, perhaps there is something unique about Maryland that is worthy of attention.  
By comparing the two states, we can identify disparate trends that would require 
additional study before concluding that the policy changes described herein were a 
primary driver in observed outcomes.  This “differences-in-differences” analysis is 
conducted by comparing Maryland to New Jersey for both 1996 and 2003. 
3. Descriptive statistics 
The combined New Jersey and Maryland database for both years indicate that a 
total of 18,120 individuals were hospitalized with appendicitis. Although more people 
had appendicitis in both states in 2003 than in 1996, the likelihood of appendiceal 
perforation decreased in both states during the interim seven years.  (See Table 8.3.)  
Length of stay data is described as frequency of multi-day hospital stays for appendicitis 
in Tables 8.4 and 8.5, below. 
In Maryland in 1996, most patients stayed 2 days (25 percent) or five or more 
days (30 percent). By 2003, the percentage of one-day stays in Maryland hospitals 
increased from 19 percent to 37 percent, and the number of 5 or more days decreased 
from 30 percent to 18 percent. New Jersey experienced similar trends. One-day hospital 
stays in the Garden State rose from 11 percent in 1996 to 26 percent in 2003, while 
hospital stays of 5 or more days decreased from 32 percent in 1996 to 22 percent in 2003. 
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Table 8.3 
Number and Percent of Patients with Perforated Appendices (With Mortality Data) 








Maryland  1996 2,462 1,548 914 37 13 .5 
Maryland  2003 3,705 2,451 1,254 34 16 .4 
New Jersey  1996 4,615 3,051 1,564 34 34 .7 
New Jersey  2003 7,338 5,242 2,096 29 35 .5 
Total 18,120 12,292 5,828 32 98 .5 
Source:  Author’s tabulations from HCUP SID data. 
Table 8.4 
Number of Days in Hospital (Zero Through Two) 










Percent  2 
day stay 
Maryland  1996 2,462 39 0.02 477 0.19 617 0.25 
Maryland  2003 3,705 128 0.03 1,364 0.37 843 0.23 
New Jersey  1996 4,615 6 0 511 0.11 1,069 0.23 
New Jersey  2003 7,338 31 0 1,919 0.26 2,001 0.27 
TOTAL 18,120 204 0.01 4,271 0.24 4,530 0.25 
Source:  Author’s tabulations from HCUP SID data. 
Table 8.5 
Number of Days in Hospital (Three Through Five or More) 
Year  Total 3 days Percent  3 
day stay 





Percent  5+ 
day stay 
Maryland  1996 2,462 351 0.14 240 0.10 738 0.30 
Maryland  2003 3,705 438 0.12 261 0.07 671 0.18 
New Jersey  1996 4,615 884 0.19 572 0.12 1,573 0.32 
New Jersey  2003 7,338 1,128 0.15 653 0.09 1,606 0.22 
TOTAL 18,120 2,801 0.16 1,726 0.1 4,588 0.25 
Source:  Author’s tabulations from HCUP SID data. 
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From this preliminary analysis, it appears that the rate of appendiceal perforation 
has decreased slightly in recent years in both Maryland and New Jersey.  Furthermore, 
there appears to be some decrease in the length of hospital stays for appendicitis patients. 
4. Insurance Coverage and Appendiceal Perforation 
An important consideration in explaining the degree of illness with which the 
patient presents at the hospital is the relationship between insurance coverage and 
appendiceal perforation.  To ascertain this, chi square tests were performed to identify 
whether the type of insurance is related to appendiceal perforation. If insurance type does 
not matter, the incidence of patients with appendicitis that result in ruptures should be 
evenly distributed across the three insurance status categories: private, Medicaid, and 
uninsured. 
Table 8.6 
Cross Tabulations of Insurance Type and Appendiceal Perforation, Maryland 















Patients with Rupture 37.12 62.88





Patients with Rupture 33.85 66.15
Source:  Author’s tabulations from HCUP SID data. 
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Table 8.6 indicates that, in 1996, 42.6 percent of Maryland Medicaid-enrolled 
appendicitis patients experienced appendiceal perforation, compared with 37.4 percent of 
Maryland’s privately-covered appendicitis patients. In New Jersey (see Table 8.7), 35.3 
percent of patients with private insurance ruptured appendices while 29.8 percent of those 
on Medicaid experienced appendiceal perforation.  By 2003, every insurance category 
experienced lower perforation rates, including the uninsured.  Interestingly, for both years 
in both New Jersey, and Maryland, private insurance was most highly-correlated with 
appendiceal perforation.  The chi-square test indicates that insurance status and the 
incidence of perforated appendicitis are statistically independent of each other in 
Maryland.  No relationship exists between insurance status and likelihood of perforation 
in either year. 
Table 8.7 
Cross Tabulations of Insurance Type and Appendiceal Perforation, New Jersey 
State and 
Year 













Total % Patients 
with Rupture 
33.89 66.11




Total % Patients 
with Rupture 
28.56 71.44
Source:  Author’s tabulations from HCUP SID data. 
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In New Jersey, the story is slightly different.  As indicated in Table 8.7, there 
appears to be a relationship between insurance type and likelihood of perforated 
appendicitis in 1996 and 2003, with those who have private insurance the most likely to 
have experienced a perforated appendix, though rates are lower in 2003 than in 1996. 
Possible reasons for this could include improved access under managed care in 
both the Medicaid and private markets, greater awareness of the dangers posed by 
appendicitis symptoms, or perhaps shorter delays from the point of entry in the hospital 
to the appendectomy. 
The next two tables offer data on racial distributions of perforated appendices in 
1996 and 2003 in both Maryland and New Jersey.  Data in the first, Table 8.8, indicates 
that 37 percent of Maryland’s appendicitis patients in 1996 experienced appendiceal 
perforation.  Moreover, while the results are not statistically significant, racial and ethnic 
differences exist.  Maryland’s Black and Hispanic appendicitis patients in 1996 were 
more likely than white patients to experience rupture, while Asian patients were nine 
percentage points less likely than white patients to suffer appendiceal perforation.   By 
2003, Maryland’s Asian appendicitis patients were only about two percentage points less 
likely than white patients to experience rupture, but we see an interesting reversal with 
other groups:  appendicitis patients who are blacks and Hispanics are now less likely than 
white patients to suffer a rupture. 
New Jersey’s black appendicitis patients, as described in Table 8.9, were more 
likely than whites in 1996 to experience perforation, but like their Maryland counterparts, 
were less likely to do so in 2003.  Meanwhile, patients who are Asian, Hispanic, or of 
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other races were significantly less likely than whites to have a perforated appendix in 
both years.   
Table 8.8 
Cross Tabulations of Race and Ethnicity and Appendiceal Perforation in Maryland. 
State and 
Year 





Racial or Ethnic 
Disparity, vs. White 
P
Value 
MD 1996 0.286 
White 36.32 0.00 
Black 40.39 4.07 
Asian 27.27 -9.05 
Hispanic 40.96 4.64 





MD 2003 0.093 
White 35.10 0.00 
Black 32.64 -2.46 
Asian 33.33 -1.77 
Hispanic 28.72 -6.38 





Source:  Author’s tabulations from HCUP SID data. 
Unlike the Maryland cohort, the 2003 New Jersey data indicate that ruptures 
deceased during the seven-year interim for each racial and ethnic group. Moreover, 
Hispanics in New Jersey fared much better than their Maryland counterparts in both 1996 
(when this group experienced a 27 percent perforation rate) and in 2003 (when the rate 
fell to 23 percent).  Statistical power is greater in New Jersey, where we can reject the 
null hypothesis and conclude that race and ethnicity is correlated with appendiceal 
rupture for both 1996 and 2003.  This indicates that there are likely different issues at 
play in the two states, particularly among the Hispanic populations. 
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Table 8.9 
Cross Tabulations of Race and Ethnicity and Appendiceal Perforation in New Jersey. 
State and 
Year 





Racial or Ethnic 
Disparity, vs. White 
P
Value 
NJ 1996 0.001 
White 35.46 0.00 
Black 35.62 0.16 
Asian 26.55 -8.91 
Hispanic 27.23 -8.23 
Other Races 30.03 -5.43 
Total % Patients 
with Rupture 33.89 -1.57 
NJ 2003 0.00 
White 30.92 0.00 
Black 28.78 -2.14 
Asian 23.26 -7.66 
Hispanic 22.59 -8.33 
Other Races 25.32 -5.60 
Total % Patients 
with Rupture 28.56 -2.36 
Source:  Author’s tabulations from HCUP SID data. 
5. Multivariate Analyses 
a. Perforated Appendicitis as Dependent Variable 
Race and ethnicity, however, is only one factor among many that predict 
appendiceal perforation. For this reason, several multivariate probit regression analyses 
were conducted using race and ethnicity, as well as gender, age, and insurance status 
variables. Ultimately, this analysis explores the link between insurance coverage and 
appendiceal perforation in a multivariate model.  The most comprehensive regression 
results are shown in Table 8.10, below.  It asks the question:  controlling for other factors, 
to what degree does race, ethnicity, or insurance status affect likelihood for appendicitis 
to worsen into appendiceal perforation? 
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i. Maryland 1996 
The results reported in table 8.10 indicate that in 1996 and holding age, gender, 
race, and ethnicity constant, Maryland Medicaid patients with appendicitis were 11 
percentage points more likely than privately insured patients to experience a ruptured 
appendix (p<.05). Moreover, older patients are more likely than their younger 
counterparts to experience perforation.  Specifically, compared to those aged 18 to 29, 
those aged 30 to 44 (by 13 percentage points, p<.01), and those 45 to 59 (by 30 
percentage points, p<.01), and those aged 60 or older (by 46 percentage points, p<.01)
are all more likely to have an appendiceal perforation. 
Three other interesting findings that fall shy of statistical significance: blacks (by 
6 percentage points) and Hispanics (by 10 percentage points) are more likely than whites, 
and men were more likely than women (by 5 percentage points) to experience 
appendiceal perforation once insurance type, gender, and age are controlled. 
While the coefficients for “other race” are not statistically significant, and the 
coefficient for “black” is only statistically significant in 1996, it is important to note that 
patients of these racial groups are more likely than white patients to have a ruptured 
appendix once other factors are controlled. Similarly, Asians are less likely than whites 
and the uninsured are more likely than the privately insured to experience appendiceal 
perforation, but again, these results fall short of statistical significance. 
ii. Maryland 2003 
By 2003, the picture was very different. In a multivariate model controlling for 
race, ethnicity, gender, age, and insurance type, gender and age are the only statistically 
significant factors that can predict rupture. Men continued to be more likely than women 
(6 percentage points) to experience appendiceal perforation, and this finding is 
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statistically significant (p<.01). Similarly, older patients are statistically more likely 
(p<.01) than those aged 18 to 29 to experience perforation.   
Table 8.10 
Regressions Using Perforated Appendicitis as Dependent Variable, by Year and State 
MD 1996 MD 2003 NJ 1996 NJ 2003 
Black 0.064 -0.009 0.029 -0.009 
(2.37)* -0.42 -1.12 -0.42 
Hispanic 0.097 -0.017 -0.022 -0.042 
-1.68 -0.55 -0.87 (2.67)** 
Asian -0.082 -0.003 -0.058 -0.058 
-1.06 -0.07 -1.6 -1.72 
Other Race 0.018 -0.045 -0.019 -0.028 
-0.26 -1.02 -0.68 -1.56 
Female -0.052 -0.059 -0.06 -0.038 
(2.55)* (3.69)** (4.15)** (3.53)** 
Age 30–44 0.125 0.106 0.121 0.045 
(5.03)** (5.01)** (6.53)** (3.16)** 
Age 45–59 0.303 0.274 0.304 0.211 
(9.96)** (11.74)** (13.60)** (13.15)** 
Age 60 or + 0.46 0.39 0.452 0.379 
(13.46)** (13.50)** (18.41)** (19.01)** 
Medicaid 0.112 0.029 -0.005 0.01 
(2.79)** -0.95 -0.12 -0.28 
Uninsured 0.023 0.067 0.02 0.041 
-0.73 (2.67)** -0.99 (2.64)** 
Observations 2462 3705 4615 7338 
Source:  Author’s tabulations from HCUP SID data. 
Z statistics in parentheses.  All standard errors have been corrected for heteroscedasticity. 
* significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent. 
 
A new story emerges for different insurance categories:  the Medicaid effect 
evens out, and the uninsured become 7 percentage points more likely than the privately 
insured to experience appendiceal perforation (p<.01). Medicaid is associated with a 
slight increased risk of perforation (3 percentage points), but the finding is no longer 
statistically significant. Also noteworthy, although not statistically significant, is that all 
examined racial and ethnic minorities are less likely than whites to experience ruptures. 
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iii. New Jersey 1996 
The same multivariate analysis indicates that in New Jersey in 1996, gender and 
age are the only statistically significant factors predicting appendicitis perforation. As in 
Maryland, and holding race, ethnicity, gender, and insurance status constant, men are 
more likely (by 6 percentage points) than women to do so, as are older populations.  
Racial and ethnic factors are not statistically significant, and tell a somewhat 
different story from Maryland. All minority racial and ethnic group appendicitis patients 
fare better than white patients.  To wit, compared with whites, blacks are 2 percentage 
points more likely, while Hispanics (by 2 percentage points), Asians (by 6 percentage 
points), and others (by 2 percentage points) are less likely to experience appendiceal 
perforation.  Also of note: Medicaid patients are one percentage point more likely and the 
uninsured are two percentage points less likely to suffer from a rupture, though this 
difference is not statistically significant. 
iv. New Jersey 2003 
Seven years later, the story changed slightly. Holding race, ethnicity, gender, and 
insurance status constant, men continue to be more likely than women (by 4 percentage 
points), and that those aged 45–59 and 60 and above are more likely than 18–29 year olds 
(here, by 21 percentage points and 38 percentage points, respectively) to have a 
perforated appendix.  Also statistically significant is that Hispanics are 4 percentage 
points less likely than whites (p<.01), 30–44 year olds are less likely than 18–29 year 
olds (p<.002), and the uninsured are 4 percentage points more likely than the privately 
insured to experience appendiceal perforation. 
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v.  Discussion of Race and Ethnic Differences in Appendiceal Perforation Rates 
When holding gender, age, and insurance status constant, the racial and ethnic 
disparities for appendiceal perforation have virtually disappeared in both Maryland and 
New Jersey.  Before the changes in Maryland’s low-income health care market (LIHCM) 
that occurred in the mid-1990s, Maryland black appendicitis patients were 4.07 
percentage points more likely to suffer appendiceal perforation.  By 2003, this group was 
actually 2.46 percentage points less likely to experience appendiceal perforation.  The 
same trend is observed for Hispanics, who in 1996 were 4.64 percentage points more 
likely than whites to have appendiceal perforation, but in 2003 were 6.38 percentage 
points less likely to do so—an improvement of 11.02 percentage points.  These trends are 
repeated in the New Jersey data, where the data achieve statistical significance. 
If managed care actually improves access to care, the reversal of racial and ethnic 
disparities in appendiceal perforation rates may be explained by the fact that racial 
minorities are disproportionately in health systems that operate under a managed care 
structure (either via Medicaid or the private sector). 
vi. Appendiceal Perforation by Insurance Type, Controlling for Race, Ethnicity, 
Gender, and Age  
The multivariate regression analysis provides a more robust picture than the Chi 
Square analysis on the importance of insurance status as a predictor of appendiceal 
perforation.  In Maryland, perforation in Medicaid appendicitis patients was more likely 
than their privately insured counterparts for both 1996 and 2003, but the degree of the 
difference decreased by 2003.  This suggests that managed care could be providing better 
access to Medicaid patients than the former fee-for-service Medicaid model.  These 
results are very different in New Jersey, where patients covered by Medicaid were less 
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likely in 1996 and more likely in 2003 to experience perforation compared to those with 
private insurance.  Perhaps New Jersey’s Medicaid managed care program is not 
performing as well as HealthChoice. 
The story is similar in both states for uninsured appendicitis patients:  holding 
race, gender, and age constant, the uninsured are more likely than the privately insured to 
experience appendiceal perforation in both Maryland and New Jersey in both years.  
Moreover, the likelihood of appendiceal perforation among the uninsured increases in 
2003 for both states, and the difference is statistically significant at the .01 level.  This 
supports the author’s hypothesis that those less able to pay probably delay coming to the 
hospital.  It also corroborates the qualitative findings that, as the reimbursement 
mechanisms for Medicaid became more rigid and, in Maryland, improved the outcomes 
for Medicaid patients, uninsured patients fared worse.   
 
Uninsured Populations:  Racial and Ethnic Disparities? 
Examining at the uninsured population in isolation of the other insurance types 
suggests that race and ethnicity are not a major determinant.  In Maryland in 1996, 
controlling for race, gender, and age, uninsured black appendicitis patients are 3 
percentage points more likely and uninsured Hispanic appendicitis patients are 14 
percentage points more likely to experience perforation than their white counterparts.  
(These differences do not reach statistical significance.)  However, by 2003, Maryland’s 
uninsured black and uninsured Hispanic appendicitis patients are actually less likely than 
their white counterparts to experience perforation.  (Again, the differences are not 
statistically significant.) 
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In New Jersey, uninsured black appendicitis patients are less likely than their 
white counterparts to suffer appendiceal perforation in both 1996 and 2003.  New 
Jersey’s Hispanic appendicitis patients are only slightly more likely (i.e., by .02 
percentage points) than whites to experience perforation in 1996, and as in Maryland, 
actually become less likely than white appendicitis patients to suffer perforation in 2003. 
The sample sizes are very small, (see Table 8.11), but even when combining 
Maryland and New Jersey for each of the years, the trend remains the same:  blacks and 
Hispanics are more likely in 1996 and less likely in 2003 to experience appendiceal 
perforation.  This indicates that insurance status, rather than race, is the core indicator of 
access to care. 
 
Table 8.11 
Sample Sizes for Uninsured with Perforated Appendicitis, by Black and Hispanic 
State Year Black Hispanic 
Maryland 1996 27 17 
Maryland 2003 39 28 
New Jersey 1996 23 53 
New Jersey 2003 30 131 
Source:  Author’s tabulations from HCUP SID data. 
 
b. Multivariate Results for Length of Stay 
Perhaps a more revealing picture is evident when examining another dependent 
variable: length of stay in the hospital for appendicitis.  This analysis asks the question:  
to what degree does race, gender, age, or insurance status affect the length of stay for 
appendicitis patients?  For the purposes of this analysis, we ignore the incidence of 
perforation and consider solely length of hospitalization. 
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Table 8.12 
Length of Stay as Dependent Variable 
MD 1996 MD 2003 NJ 1996 NJ 2003 
Black 0.576 0.649 0.465 0.44 
(7.51)** (9.95)** (6.71)** (6.19)** 
Hispanic 0.058 0.01 0.194 0.2 
-0.35 -0.1 (2.94)** (4.24)** 
Asian -0.291 -0.018 -0.047 -0.052 
-1.3 -0.12 -0.47 -0.51 
Other Race -0.053 -0.241 0.062 0.193 
-0.29 (2.06)* -0.77 (3.53)** 
Female -0.03 -0.032 -0.108 -0.002 
-0.51 -0.68 (2.75)** -0.06 
Age 30–44 0.513 0.35 0.402 0.249 
(7.36)** (6.20)** (8.21)** (6.32)** 
Age 45–59 1.222 0.811 1.068 0.826 
(14.18)** (12.22)** (18.42)** (17.72)** 
Age 60 or + 2.03 1.749 1.69 1.64 
(23.92)** (20.36)** (29.55)** (29.34)** 
Medicaid 0.467 0.305 0.422 0.223 
(4.37)** (3.43)** (3.93)** (2.18)* 
Uninsured 0.082 0.122 0.155 0.067 
-0.92 -1.63 (2.87)** -1.46 
Constant 2.221 1.703 2.719 2.126 
(35.90)** (33.39)** (62.16)** (58.38)** 
Observations 2,462 3,075 4,516 7,338 
R-squared 0.19 0.14 0.16 0.13 
Source:  Author’s tabulations from HCUP SID data. 
T statistics in parentheses.  All standard errors have been corrected for heteroscedasticity.  
* significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent. 
 
i. Maryland 1996 
Holding race, gender, age, and insurance status constant, black appendicitis 
patients in Maryland are hospitalized .576 days longer than their white counterparts in 
1996 (P<.01).  Medicaid patients, too, were hospitalized for .47 days more than privately 
insured patients (P<.01).  As we saw with the perforated appendix analysis, older patients 
also fare worse on this measure than younger ones.  Specifically, those aged 30-44 (by .5 
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days), those aged 45-59 (by 1.2 days) those 60 or older (by 2.0 days) have longer lengths 
of stay than those 18-29. 
ii. Maryland 2003 
Seven years later, the length of stay for black appendicitis patients increased to 
.649 days longer than their white counterparts. Hispanics, too, have longer hospital stays 
than their white counterparts, although the difference is not statistically significant. 
Patients who are Asian or of other races have shorter lengths of stay than whites, and 
women have shorter hospitalizations than men, but the differences are not statistically 
significant. 
iii. New Jersey 1996 
Black and Hispanic appendicitis patients were hospitalized for .47 and .19 days, 
respectively, longer than white patients.  As expected, older populations also have longer 
lengths of stay than the younger populations:  those aged 30-44 (by .4 days), those aged 
45-59 (by 1.1 days), and those aged 60 or older (by 1.7 days) are hospitalized longer than 
those aged 18-29.  Insurance status also matters:  Medicaid patients and the uninsured 
have longer lengths of stay (by .42 days and .16 days, respectively) than their privately-
insured counterparts.  Finally, the data also indicate that women have shorter lengths of 
stay than men—by .11 days.  All of these findings are statistically significant. 
iv. New Jersey 2003 
 Despite the passage of seven years, the 2003 data looks relatively similar to the 
1996 for many of the groups.  Patients who are black, Hispanic, and of other races have 
greater lengths of stay than white patients (by .44, .20, and .2 days, respectively).  
Similarly, 30-44 year olds, 45-59 year olds, and those 60 and over have greater lengths of 
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stay than those 18-29 years old (by .25, .83, and 1.64 days, respectively).  Those covered 
by Medicaid still have longer lengths of stay than those who are privately insured (by .22 
days), but that does represent a decrease from the lengths of stay in 1996.  All of these 
results are statistically significant.   
In short, across both states and over time, Medicaid patients uniformly have 
statistically significantly longer lengths of stay than privately insured patients. Uninsured 
patients follow the same trend, but the differences are not always statistically significant. 
v. Discussion of Race and Ethnic Differences in Length of Hospital Stay  
 The regression analysis of lengths of stay indicates that race is correlated with 
longer periods of hospitalization.  In Maryland, black appendicitis patients’ 
hospitalizations are longer than the white appendicitis patients’ stays in 1996, and despite 
the trends observed above that find fewer blacks experiencing ruptures, the lengths of 
stay for blacks increased in 2003.  In New Jersey in both years, blacks experienced longer 
hospitalizations than whites, although the disparity fell slightly from a length of stay of 
.465 days’ longer in 1996 to .440 days’ longer in 2003. 
 Hispanics, also, have longer hospitalizations than whites, though the disparity 
shrinks over time in Maryland, where the findings fall short of statistical significance.  
The Hispanic length of stay grows slightly in New Jersey, however, and is statistically 
significant ant the .01 level.  Asians have lower lengths of stay across both states and 
years, although the disparity does not reach statistical significance.  The “other race” 
category in Maryland indicates shorter lengths of stay while in New Jersey, this group 
has longer lengths of stay.  This may be due to state differences in the composition of this 
category. 
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vi. Length of Stay for Appendicitis Patients by Insurance Type, Controlling for 
Race, Ethnicity, Gender, and Age  
 
Again, Medicaid patients in Maryland have different experiences from those in 
New Jersey.  In Maryland, Medicaid-covered appendicitis patients had longer lengths of 
stay than those with private insurance in both 1996 and 2003, but the disparity decreased.  
This again implies that managed care is improving care for Medicaid populations.  In 
New Jersey, however, Medicaid-covered appendicitis patients had shorter lengths of stay 
than their privately insured counterparts in 1996, but longer lengths of stay than privately 
insured appendicitis patients in 2003.  New Jersey’s Medicaid patients seem to be doing 
worse under Medicaid managed care than the old Medicaid fee-for-service structure in 
that state. 
Uninsured appendicitis patients, once again, share the same experience in both 
states:  their lengths of stay were longer than the privately insured in both 1996 and 2003, 
and again, the disparity between them and the privately insured grew larger during the 
seven year period. 
vii. Low-Income Black Appendicitis Patients, Controlling for Insurance Type, 
Race, Ethnicity, Gender, and Age  
In both Maryland and New Jersey, black appendicitis patients were more likely than 
white appendicitis patients in 1996 to experience perforation.  By 2003, however, black 
patients were less likely to suffer appendiceal perforation.  This result may suggest that 
blacks were concentrated in the Medicaid and privately-insured populations and had 
increasing access to care.   
The length of stay variable provides additional information.  In Maryland, the 
length of stay for black appendicitis patients was longer than that of their white 
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counterparts in both 1996 and 2003.  The racial disparity grew larger during those seven 
years, and these findings are statistically significant in both years.  Also statistically 
significant in both years is the length of stay data for black appendicitis patients in New 
Jersey.  As in Maryland, New Jersey’s black appendicitis patients had longer 
hospitalizations than their white counterparts in both years, although the disparity 
decreased minutely during the seven year interim.  
viii.  Low-Income Hispanic Appendicitis Patients, Controlling for Insurance 
Type, Race, Ethnicity, Gender, and Age  
 
Maryland’s Hispanic appendicitis patients were more likely than white 
appendicitis patients to suffer perforation in 1996, as the author hypothesized.  However, 
Hispanic appendicitis patients were less likely than white patients experience perforation 
by 2003.  In New Jersey, Hispanic appendicitis patients were less likely than their white 
counterparts to experience appendiceal perforation in either year.  This suggests that 
Hispanic appendicitis patients had better access to care in Maryland after the policy 
changes of the mid-1990s.  Perhaps Hispanics were more likely to be either privately 
insured or covered by Medicaid than uninsured. 
Again, the length of stay variable provides a fuller picture.  Hispanic appendicitis 
patients in both Maryland and New Jersey had longer lengths of stay than their white 
peers in both years.  In Maryland, the disparity was decreasing, while in New Jersey, the 
disparity was on the rise. 
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6. Discussion  
a. Racial and Ethnic Disparities 
As noted in Chapter 1, appendicitis is an inflammation of the appendix. While 
most patients recover without difficulty if they receive care in a timely manner, delays in 
treatment can result in a perforated appendix, which may lead life threatening 
infections.613 The main symptom of appendicitis is abdominal pain, which usually grows 
more severe over the course of six to twelve hours and eventually becomes 
excruciating.614  
To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first study examining insurance 
status and race on appendiceal perforation and length of stay in the adult population.  
Several researchers have found that appendiceal perforation is more prevalent among 
racial and ethnic minority children.615, 616, 617 Researchers also found that children 
covered by Medicaid and uninsured children had higher rates of juvenile appendiceal 
perforation than privately insured appendicitis patients.618, 619, 620, 621 One study found 
that appendiceal perforation was more prevalent among Medicaid-covered and uninsured 
adults than privately insured adults.622 
In this dissertation, the first part of Chapter 8 found that there is a growing 
uninsured population in the U.S. and Maryland, and that one vulnerable population, 
immigrants, are overrepresented among the uninsured.  Chapter 8 also identified data on 
a wide range of health conditions for which racial and ethnic disparities existed both in 
Maryland and in the nation.    
Finally, the first regression analyses found that there were racial and ethnic 
disparities in both the likelihood that appendicitis patients would develop appendiceal 
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perforation in both years and both states.  It shows that, holding age, gender, and 
insurance status constant, the largest racial and ethnic minorities fared worse than whites 
in 1996, but actually fared better than whites in 2003.  If we ended the analysis here, we 
would conclude that events of the interim seven years helped eliminate a) the racial and 
ethnic access to care gap that left minorities faring worse than whites, and b) the 
Medicaid handicap, bringing access to care relatively equally to those with private, 
public, or no health insurance.   
By measuring lengths of stay, we learn that Medicaid appendicitis patients in both 
states have longer hospitalizations than privately insured patients, independent of whether 
the appendix is perforated.  That difference remains statistically significant across both 
states and both years.  Moreover, black appendicitis patients also experience greater 
lengths of stay across both states and both years.  Whereas New Jersey’s rate of 
perforation among Hispanics is lower than that of whites, Hispanics have longer lengths 
of stay in both 1996 and 2003, and the rate is virtually identical, despite the passage of 
time. 
What do greater lengths of stay indicate?  Perhaps Hispanic and black patients 
present with appendicitis that is closer to rupture than white patients.  Maybe Hispanic, 
black, and Medicaid patients are in worse health and need to be hospitalized for longer to 
stabilize comorbidities.  Or it might imply higher complication rates among these latter 
groups.  
b. Insurance Disparities 
Arguably the most compelling information gleaned from this data analysis, 
however, is that the uninsured are more likely than the privately insured to suffer 
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appendiceal perforation.  The uninsured experience appendiceal perforation grows worse 
in both Maryland (by 4.4 percentage points) and in New Jersey (by 3.9 percentage points) 
during the 7 year period studied, as indicated in Table 8.10.  Maryland’s length of stay 
data over this 7 year period correspondingly became longer (from .082 days to .122 days) 
for the uninsured, and the fact that the length of stay does not keep pace with the 
increasing number of uninsured appendiceal perforation patients in New Jersey raises 
serious concerns about the pressure hospitals are feeling to release uninsured patients 
sooner than may be clinically appropriate. 
7. Limitations 
a. Differences-in-Differences Proxies 
The data used in this analysis has several limitations. First, and as discussed in the 
Methods chapter, there is no comparable national data for a true differences-in-
differences approach. Data from another Northeastern state, New Jersey, was used in 
place of national data. The quantitative findings compare Maryland with New Jersey for 
both 1996 and 2003. This poses several issues. First, the New Jersey Medicaid managed 
care (MMC) program began in 1995, so the 1996 Medicaid data consists largely of MMC 
rather than Medicaid fee-for-service enrollees. The MMC program in Maryland, 
however, did not commence until July 1997. Therefore, the Medicaid 1996 data for 
Maryland included in this analysis completely consists of pre-HealthChoice Medicaid 
enrollees. 
Secondly, although similarly demographically diverse, New Jersey is a wealthier 
state. Compared with Maryland, the data indicate that a greater percentage of the New 
Jersey population in both 1996 and 2003 sought inpatient care at the hospital. The 
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reasons for this are unclear, though perhaps more of the New Jersey hospitalizations are 
for elective surgery. 
While not a perfect differences-in-differences methodology, assessing trends in a 
similar state allows for identification of disparate trends that would require additional 
study.  It provides a frame of reference to compare the Maryland findings against, but 
analysis on the full number of states for whom there is HCUP SID data would be more 
powerful. 
b. Sample Sizes 
Although sample sizes were significant enough to make determinations about 
blacks and whites in both states and about Hispanics in New Jersey, a third limitation in 
this study is the small number of Hispanics in Maryland who suffered from appendicitis 
in 1996 (i.e., 49).  Furthermore, sample sizes were too small to consider Asians.  Much 
consideration was given to the choice of prevention quality indicators used in this study. 
Given that appendicitis is characterized by a pain of ever-increasing severity coupled 
with the fact that every case of appendicitis can lead to a rupture if not diagnosed and 
extracted within a short amount of time, it is a useful way to evaluate how likely it is that 
people across racial and ethnic lines will access care. Yet appendicitis strikes a relatively 
small portion of the population. Small sample sizes also prevent analysis of potential 
racial or ethnic disparities within appendicitis mortality rates. 
c. Insufficient Data on Clinical Confounders 
 HCUP data uses administrative hospital billing data, which does not include 
clinical confounders, such as whether the patient is a smoker.  This is an important 
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limitation because, using this example, smoking impedes healing and might actually 
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Chapter 9: Discussion 
 
This dissertation sought to answer the question:  Did changes that occurred in the mid-
1990s to Maryland’s low-income health care market (LIHCM) affect access to health 
care differently for different racial and ethnic groups?  Let us consider the evidence. 
As noted in Chapter 1, this phrasing contains two important implications: 
A. Changes occurred in the market, and  
B. Those changes affected access to care. 
 
Both of these issues are addressed throughout Parts One, Two, and Three of this 
study.  Part One, “Federal legislation affecting access to care for vulnerable populations,” 
identified in detail the changes posed by federal legislation enacted in the mid-1990s, 
particularly the Personal Responsibility and Workforce Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
of 1996 (PRWORA, or “welfare reform”), and the Balanced Budget Act of 1997.  It also 
discussed several congressional measures from that time period that limited or eliminated 
health benefits for poor immigrants.  In addition, Part One outlined the impact of each of 
these federal measures on access to care for the poor nationally. 
 Part Two, “Maryland’s low-income health care market,” considered how these 
and other policy changes affected access to health care services for poor Marylanders.  It 
opened with a history of the Maryland LIHCM, and provided a list of “de jure” and “de 
facto” changes that occurred during the mid-to-late 1990s.  Part Two concludes with a 
comprehensive time line of the national and Maryland-specific LIHCM changes. 
 Finally, Part Three, “Impact of changes to Maryland’s low-income health care 
market on access to care,” consists of qualitative and quantitative analyses of the research 
question.  The qualitative section includes a content analysis of transcripts from 
236 
interviews conducted with 14 stakeholders in Maryland’s LIHCM.  Themes that emerged 
from the interviews included concerns about access barriers posed both by 
HealthChoice’s initial implementation and its current manifestation, stories about how 
some safety net clinics are no longer able to negotiate free care for uninsured patients, 
and poor communication between governmental agencies.  This latter point became 
particularly problematic after PRWORA eliminated the automatic enrollment into 
Medicaid for welfare beneficiaries, when social workers in one agency determined 
eligibility for participation in programs run by the other agency.   
Interviewees discussed their observations about the relatively steady access for 
Medicaid patients throughout this period, but noted that the eligible Medicaid population 
became younger after the Children’s Health Insurance Program was implemented in 
1997.  Errors in interpretation of the welfare reform efforts caused some adults who were 
still eligible for Medicaid to be dropped from the rolls.  Moreover, those adults who 
remained in Medicaid were costlier and less healthy than the Medicaid case mix in the 
program at the start of HealthChoice, causing distortions in fiscal projections of the cost 
of care.  Interviewees also discussed the increase in uninsured adults and described at 
length the holes in the safety net through which two populations in particular fell through:  
immigrants and the homeless. 
It was critical to do a qualitative analysis to answer this question because many 
immigrants and homeless are not included in quantitative data sources.  However, using 
the Hospital Cost Utilization Project (HCUP) data, quantitative analyses bring out the 
same concerns about the uninsured, a category that captures most of the immigrant and 
homeless populations.  In both 1996 and 2003, uninsured appendicitis patients in both 
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Maryland and New Jersey were more likely than privately insured appendicitis patients to 
experience perforation, and the disparity increased during the seven year interim.   
Similarly, lengths of stay were longer for uninsured appendicitis patients than for 
privately insured appendicitis patients in both 1996 and 2003, and again, the disparity 
grew larger during that time.   
This supports the author’s hypothesis that those less able to pay probably delay 
coming to the hospital.  It also corroborates the qualitative findings that, as the 
reimbursement mechanisms for Medicaid in Maryland became more rigid, the outcomes 
for uninsured patients grew worse.   
Conclusion 
Did changes that occurred in the mid-1990s in Maryland’s LIHCM affect access 
to care differently for different racial and ethnic groups?  Evaluation of the qualitative 
and the quantitative data suggests that the policy changes referenced above affected 
different demographic groups differently.  The qualitative data indicate that the 
uninsured, immigrants, and the homeless, fared worse than they had prior to these policy 
changes.   Couple this with the quantitative data, which indicate that Maryland’s 
uninsured are disproportionately black (26 percent of the uninsured were black in 1996; 
25 percent in 2003) and Hispanic (13 percent of the uninsured were Hispanic in 1996; 19 
percent in 2003). 
Moreover, the quantitative multivariate regression analyses, particularly the 
length of stay analyses, illustrate how black and Hispanic appendicitis patients had 
different and in nearly all cases worse access to care than their white counterparts.  It can 
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therefore be concluded that changes in Maryland’s LIHCM affected access to care 
differently for members of different racial and ethnic groups. 
That said, the main finding of this research is a disparity based not upon race or 
ethnicity, but on insurance status.  The qualitative and quantitative data consistently 
indicate that the uninsured fare worse than the privately insured.  Initiatives that became 
law during the Contract with America era had a predictable if unintended consequence:  
the uninsured are less likely to access health care services, which is resulting in greater 
severity of disease at presentation.  As the number of uninsured Marylanders (and 
Americans) continues to rise, in part because of the impact of PRWORA, the BBA, and 
the proliferation of Medicaid managed care, as documented in this study, poor access for 
the uninsured will become an increasingly urgent public policy problem. 
Future Research 
Given the expense of the data sets, the author selected two states and two years 
only:  Maryland and New Jersey, 1996 and 2003.  Future research could collect data from 
all 33 states that have information available and conduct a more thorough differences-in-
differences analysis.  Additionally, obtaining data from additional years would permit 
time series analyses, which could help pinpoint more exactly when in this seven-year 
time period the perforation rates and lengths of stay changed.  This would help to 
correlate which policy changes were responsible for each variation. 
 This quantitative analysis focused upon appendiceal perforation as the proxy for 
access to care.  Other Prevention Quality Indicators (i.e., measuring avoidable 
hospitalizations or hospitalizations for ambulatory-care-sensitive conditions) that are 
available to use with the HCUP data set include complications from diabetes, lower 
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extremity amputations among patients with diabetes, angina without procedure, adult 
asthma, and more.  Although it may be challenging to find adequate denominator data to 
conduct some of these analyses, future research looking into these factors would be a 
welcome addition to the literature. 
Furthermore, collection of quantitative data identifying immigrants would be 
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